Roman Starovoit’s Death Signals Waning Strength of Putin Regime

Executive Summary:

• Former Russian Transport Minister Roman Starovoit was found dead on July 7, reportedly due to suicide, just hours after Russian President Vladimir Putin fired him from the position.
• The active replacement of Russian elites has been a regular occurrence in Russia since the beginning of its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, and some suspect Starovoit’s death to be the result of intra-elite conflict.
• Starovoit’s death may be a symbol of a strengthening of the repressive character of the regime in an attempt to offset its growing instability as Putin’s power vertical weakens in the face of the continuing war.

Former Russian Minister of Transportation Roman Starovoit died on July 7. The cause of death was reported as suicide, and many political analysts view his death as a warning to remaining officials. Observers note that conflict among the Russian elite is often too serious to be resolved without publicity. In the battles between the various Kremlin power centers, Russian security forces are playing an increasingly significant role, although they are not unified and often act on behalf of different elite groups (MOST.media, July 9).

Most experts agree that the ongoing corruption investigation over the construction of defensive structures in the Kursk oblast was the reason for Starovoit’s death, be it suicide or murder. The investigation was looking into potential bribery and embezzlement amid the construction of fortifications in the oblast. Starovoit served as the governor of Kursk oblast from October 2018 to May 2024. Soon after his departure, part of the oblast was seized by Ukrainian forces in August 2024, despite Kursk receiving more than 19 billion rubles (about $242 million) from the federal budget for defensive purposes between 2022 and 2023 (see EDM, August 14, 2024; ВВС Russian Service, July 7).

The investigation began in May 2024, immediately following Starovoit’s transfer to the Ministry of Transportation. It did not gain momentum until the fall of 2024. In the spring of this year, operatives detained Aleskey Smirnov, a member of Roman Starovoit’s team, who had served as chairman of the Kursk oblast government during Starovoit’s governorship. Following Starovoit’s resignation, Smirnov headed the oblast for six months (Kommersant, April 16). Information is circulating in Russian media that Smirnov was prepared to testify against Starovoit, who had allegedly organized the embezzlement (Kommersant, July 7).

Starovoit’s body was found in his personal car on July 7 with a single gunshot wound, several hours after his resignation was announced. Pro-Kremlin political analyst Sergey Markov believes that Starovoit was most likely killed by persons involved in his corruption schemes to prevent him from providing compromising material (MK.ru, July 8). Considering that Starovoit has been described as a protégé of Arkadiy and Boris Rotenberg, oligarchs close to Russian President Vladimir Putin, Markov’s suggestion, therefore, seems rather dubious (Meduza, July 8). Russian oppositionist Mikhail Khodorkovsky, however, suggests that Starovoit’s death was a suicide committed out of fear of a long prison sentence (YouTube/@bild_ru, July 8).

There is no clear answer to who was putting pressure on the former minister. Journalist Tatyana Felgenhauer says that officials like Starovoit are often punished due to Putin’s personal dissatisfaction (Deutsche Welle Russian Service, July 8). Khodorkovsky suggests that the Russian special services are not acting in a coordinated manner, and that similar incidents are evidence that the regime’s power structure is becoming increasingly difficult to control while internal conflicts between different groups intensify (YouTube/@bild_ru, July 8).

Russia’s war against Ukraine has led to changes within the Russian elite. This has been evident in the redistribution of property. Last year, Deputy Minister of Finance Aleksey Moiseyev stated that the seizure of property will occur if the current owner “cannot effectively manage the property” or “directs funds earned in Russia to support the Armed Forces of Ukraine” (Kommersant, October 18, 2024). The Russian government rarely takes direct ownership of the seized property. Instead, it is often transferred to more loyal businessmen who demonstrate support for the war (Тelegram/russicaRU, October 22, 2024). Enterprises are seized not only from “disloyal” Russian businessmen, but also from those who have foreign citizenship or a foreign residence permit (Interfax.ru, April 12, 2023). Independent experts refer to this process as the “nationalization of the elite” (Re-Russia.net, March 20).

Changes within the elite are also ongoing in the political sphere. In the fourth year of full-scale war, Russian officials have seemingly begun to implement Putin’s promise to make war veterans the new Russian elite (Argumenty i fakty, February 29, 2024; see EDM, March 13, 2024). Independent journalists report that for the first time, leaders of veterans’ organizations are playing a central role in regional elections (see EDM, April 28). There are few real veterans among them, however, and trusted security officials control the organizations themselves. Candidates most often come from the “Association of Veterans of the Special Military Operation,” which is defined by the Kremlin as the main veteran organization of the country. Only three of the eight leaders of the association, however, have directly participated in the war, while real control is exercised by members of the Federal Security Service (FSB) and the elite special forces “BARS-Kaskad” (Verstka.media, May 13).

In early March, several deputies were quoted as saying that the authorities planned to elect around a hundred veterans of the war against Ukraine to the new State Duma in 2026 (The Insider, March 6). This can be best understood as an attempt to strengthen the already powerful siloviki (силовики) faction, as the FSB and Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces (GRU) manage the Association of Veterans.

Such a sharp shift in the elites toward the military-security power block will inevitably lead to an increase in intra-elite conflicts that involve the security services. The response to these conflicts will almost certainly be increased repression from above as the only way to maintain the weakening regime’s power vertical. Only a few days after Starovoit’s death, however, Kremlin loyalists in the media calculated that over the last four years, 27 top managers of Gazprom, Lukoil, Russian Railways, and other corporations have died. Some allegedly committed suicide, some fell out of windows, and some were diagnosed as having heart attacks (Lenta.ru, July 4). It is not known whether these deaths are the result of Putin’s personal anger or the machinations of competitors, but one thing is clear: working for the Putin regime is becoming increasingly dangerous.