Straits Forum Puts Fujian at Center of Cross-Strait Integration Campaign

Executive Summary:

• Beijing is operationalizing its cross-Strait unification strategy through bureaucratic embedding and military-civil fusion, with Fujian Province as the central staging ground.
• The 17th Straits Forum in June served as a propaganda instrument to showcase apparent Taiwanese grassroots support, while parallel PLA developments contradict Beijing’s peace narrative.
• The absence of official engagement by Taipei and low support for unification in Taiwan highlight the enduring disconnect between Beijing’s unification goals and Taiwan’s political and societal realities.

Two meetings took place in Fujian Province across May and June that indicate the growing importance of its role in cross-Strait relations and shed light on the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) current views of Taiwan’s security. Despite a high-profile appearance by a former president of Taiwan, a lack of engagement with Taiwan’s incumbent administration affirmed that unification remains a unilateral policy position. Developments in the region by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), meanwhile, belie Beijing’s peaceful overtures.

Dual Sessions Push Integration Message

On May 8, the Central Taiwan Work Office and Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) convened a high-level inter-ministerial meeting in Fuzhou along with the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) and Fujian’s provincial government (Fujian Government, May 9). The meeting, which 48 other central and provincial departments also attended, was held to evaluate the implementation of Beijing’s 2023 directive on constructing a “Cross-Strait Integrated Development Demonstration Zone” (两岸融合发展示范区). It also underscored the Party-state’s resolve to embed integration into the bureaucratic apparatus of governance, while simultaneously preparing for a military operation (Xinhua, May 8). The directive, which was jointly issued by the CCP Central Committee and the State Council, included incentives to attract “Taiwan compatriots” (台湾同胞) to relocate to Fujian Province. These incentives spanned residence registration, housing, education and school registration, legal services, employment, and civic engagement (Xinhua, September 12, 2023).

In his remarks at the meeting, Taiwan Affairs Office Director Song Tao (宋涛) invoked CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping’s “important instructions” (重要指示) on integration and reunification. These framed the initiative as a step toward peaceful unification and a model for deepening cross-Strait integration (为全面深化两岸融合发展做好示范), as well as a means of laying the groundwork for the ultimate reunification of the motherland (为推进祖国统一大业积累条件) (People’s Daily, May 9).

The following month, the 17th Straits Forum (第十七届海峡论坛), an annual dialogue with representatives from the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Taiwan, took place in Xiamen. Former Taiwan president Ma Ying-jeou’s (馬英九) attendance was the most notable feature of the event, which also focused on deepening integration across the spectrum, from economic to cultural ties (Fujian Daily, June 14; CCTV, June 25). Over 7,000 Taiwanese participants from various industries attended the forum—the most since 2019, which saw a peak of 10,000 Taiwanese attend (TAO, June 26, 2019). PRC state media framed it as “a carnival for communication” (交流的盛会) and “a forum of common folks” (百姓的论坛), while also asserting that independence forces are “doomed to fail” (注定失败) (TAO, June 11; Xinhua, June 17).

Wang Huning (王沪宁), a politburo standing committee member and chair of the National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), addressed the convention (CPPCC, June 23). He said that “no force can block the historical momentum toward national unification” (谁也不能阻挡祖国统一的历史大势) and called on both sides to “forge a strong sense of community for the Chinese nation” (铸牢中华民族共同体意识). Invoking patriotic memory and shared heritage, Wang referenced the 80th anniversaries of both the end of World War II and Taiwan’s “liberation” (光复) from Japanese occupation, positioning unification as a necessary condition for national rejuvenation and security. Wang also focused on Taiwanese youth, of whom over 300 were in attendance. He called on them to strengthen the pride and resolve that comes from “being Chinese” (做中国人) and to “write a new glorious [chapter]” (续写 … 新辉煌) of China’s national history (Xinhua, June 15).

Table 1: Critical Participants in the 17th Straits Forum

(Source: Sohu, June 15; Meihua Media, June 15)

The forum signaled two key messages. First, that the PRC possesses both capacity and confidence in leveraging Taiwanese political actors and segments of public opinion to steer cross-Strait relations in its favor; and second, that Taiwan’s public—and its youth in particular—welcome integration and unification. In this sense, Ma’s comments, as well as those from “grassroots” (基层) participants, helped to reinforce the CCP narrative of unification as an “inevitable historical trend,” and not simply something the CCP unilaterally advocates.

Parallel Military Preparations Deter Take-up in Taiwan

The absence of government representatives from Taiwan at either forum indicates that Beijing’s persistent assertions that there is “one family on either side of the Strait” (兩岸一家人) are largely intended to shore up domestic support (China Brief, August 18, 2023). An independent Taiwanese identity hinders any significant embrace of the “one family” concept (as of this year, 63 percent of those surveyed by Taiwan’s National Chengchi University identify as solely Taiwanese), and the pro-unification population in Taiwan remains a minority. “Unification as soon as possible” has remained the least favored course of action in Taiwan for the past 31 years (NCCU, June 2025).

The Mainland Affairs Council of Taiwan (大陸委員會, MAC), a committee under the Executive Yuan, criticized Ma Ying-Jeou’s mainland visit in a now-deleted post on its website. It called the visit an “attempt to deny the sovereign status of our nation” (企圖抹煞我國家主權地位). In a separate post that remains online, however, the MAC described the forum as a “CCP united front platform” (中共對台統戰平台) and expressed “deep regret” (深感遺憾) at Ma’s “cooperation with the CCP’s political manipulation” (配合中共政治操作) (MAC, June 11).

Rejection of Beijing’s proposals for unification from both Taiwan’s government and public opinion thus reflects an impasse, though Beijing remains undeterred and is committed to unification “by any means necessary” (一切必要措施). This includes the use of force (Xinhua, October 25, 2022, March 10). Fujian’s centrality here is best exemplified by the unveiling in 2022 of the PRC’s third aircraft carrier, which was likely named to signal the province’s role in a potential military contingency over Taiwan (Fujian Bureau of Veterans Affairs, June 20, 2022). [1] The carrier has been undergoing sea trials ever since and may be commissioned soon (Xinhua, May 26; The War Zone, August 1). It is also apparent in the extent of the PLA’s presence in Fujian.

Fujian Province is also home to several other important military installations. These include at least seven known air bases. From the most recently established, the Shuimen Air Base (水门空军基地), the PLA Air Force’s fifth-generation J-20 (歼二零) fighters can reach Taipei in approximately five minutes and fifty-one seconds (Author calculations, July 2025). [2] Fuzhou, meanwhile, has hosted the headquarters of the Eastern Theater Command’s ground forces since 2016; and Xiamen, the closest city to Taiwan, hosts the PLA Navy’s East Sea Fleet and potentially a submarine force unit (Department of Defense, December 18, 2024; China Daily, February 2, 2016; Author research, July 2025). Meanwhile, the provincial government’s recent announcement of “Measures for Guaranteeing Militia Rights and Interests” is another reminder of ongoing efforts to professionalize the province’s maritime and land-based militia forces, and to align its civilian governance with military mobilization objectives (China Brief, March 15).

Conclusion

The ministerial meeting in Fuzhou and the 17th Straits Forum in Xiamen signaled that Beijing is embedding its Taiwan policy into provincial governance and military-civil fusion machinery. As Fujian becomes both a testbed and launchpad for future action, any alignment or divergence between rhetoric supporting integration and hardening actions in the military domain could proffer clues about Beijing’s timetable for unification.

Notes

[1] Other theories claim that PLA carriers are named after famous battles. The Fujian carrier, according to this view, may be named after the 1884 Battle of Fuzhou (馬江海戰) that triggered the Sino-French War. CCTV noted in its coverage of the carrier’s unveiling that it was launched on the 17th of the month, which is the same day that the Treaty of Shimonoseki was signed in 1894. This treaty forced the Qing to cede Taiwan to Meiji Japan (CCTV, June 17, 2022).

[2] Author’s calculation is based on the J-20’s top speed of Mach 2 (approximately 2,648 km/h or 1,430 knots), and the measured distance between Shuimen Airbase (26.941389°N, 120.07694°E) and Taipei City (25.0330°N, 121.5654°E), which is approximately 258 km or 139.3 nautical miles. At this velocity, the estimated flight time is approximately 5 minutes and 51 seconds under ideal conditions. Distance was calculated using Geographic Calculator, applying WGS 84 (EPSG:4326) geodetic data (Blue Marble Geographics, July 2025). The methodology aligns with spatial analysis standards recommended by the Center for Geographic Analysis at Harvard University (Harvard University, accessed July 2025).