Russia and Belarus Decrease Parameters of Zapad-2025 Joint Military Exercise

Executive Summary:

• Belarusian officials insist that the joint strategic exercise Zapad-2025 of the Regional Troops Grouping (RTG) of Belarus and Russia poses no threat to neighboring states, has limited parameters, and is purely defensive in nature.
• The Belarusian authorities present the scaling back of strategic maneuvers—from what was initially planned as the largest exercise in the history of RTG—to a minimum troop participation level as a de-escalatory step and a demonstration of commitment to arms control obligations and confidence-building measures.
• In practice, Russia has simply been unable to generate the necessary troop grouping for a new large-scale offensive against Ukraine from Belarusian territory this time.
• This current shift in Russia’s war priorities (seizing Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts in full and creating a buffer zone in Sumy, Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk, and Chernihiv), however, does not signify an abandonment of plans to prepare for a new large-scale offensive from Belarusian territory in the future.

On September 12–16, a joint strategic exercise (JSE) Zapad-2025 will be taking place on the territory of Belarus and Russia. Chief of the General Staff of the Belarusian Armed Forces, Major General Paval Muraveika, stressed that Belarus has been and remains committed to transparency in exercises held on its territory. According to him, Belarusian President Alyaksandr Lukashenka decided to move the drills away from the western and southern borders of the country to reduce tensions, demonstrate openness and tolerance, and avoid accusations of provocation. The exercises are now planned to be conducted at training ranges deep inside the country or in its eastern part. (Telegram/modmilby, August 31). State Secretary of the Belarusian Security Council Alyaksandr Valfovich contrasted the defensive Russian–Belarusian drills with offensive maneuvers conducted on the territory of neighboring North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) states. He added that, to ease tensions, all training areas were moved further inland, although initially almost all ranges in the Brest and Grodno regions had been earmarked for use (Belta.by, August 27).

Initially, Zapad-2025 was planned to be the largest exercise in the history of the Regional Troops Grouping (RTG) (see EDM, November 18, 2024). The exercise was originally supposed to exceed the parameters of the snap readiness check of the RTG’s Response Forces during Allied Resolve-2022 (Soyuznaya Reshimost-2022; Союзная решимость-2022), which evolved into Russia’s invasion of Ukraine from Belarusian territory on February 24, 2022 (see EDM, January 26, February 9, 16, 2022).

Following the first visit of Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov to Minsk to discuss the scope of the exercises in October 2024, Valery Ravenka, head of the Department for International Military Cooperation and Assistant Minister of Defense for International Military Cooperation, stated that the exercise would involve over 13,000 troops (Belta.by, October 23, 2024). This size triggers obligations under the 2011 Vienna Document to invite international observers, including from Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) member states (OSCE, November 30, 2011). He warned, however, that Belarus would not invite those countries that had previously failed to host Belarusian observers at their own drills, naming Poland, Latvia, and Estonia (Belta.by, February 20). Minsk and Moscow later discussed which states should be invited to observe Zapad-2025 during the sixty-third meeting of the Joint Consultative Group on Arms Control of the two defense ministries (Telegram/modmilby, March 18).

After Belousov’s second visit to Minsk, Belarus announced a joint decision with Moscow to reduce the scope of Zapad-2025 and move it inland (Telegram/modmilby, May 16). Khrenin linked this to Belarus’s fulfillment of arms control commitments and regional confidence-building measures (Interfax, May 28). Lukashenka later explained that the decision to reduce troop numbers and relocate the drills was taken to ease regional tensions (Belta.by, July 1). The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs had previously issued a similar statement (Interfax, June 4). Belarus, however, still planned to allow international monitoring of Zapad-2025, despite troop numbers being cut below the Vienna Document notification threshold. Officials announced they would inform all states about the drills and invite observers. At the same time, Minsk accused NATO states, especially Poland, of refusing to clarify their exercise parameters, rejecting dialogue, and ignoring invitations—thus avoiding genuine verification of Belarusian and Russian compliance (Belta.by, May 28). Poland and other NATO members’ refusals were likely linked to Minsk’s reciprocal conditions.

Belarusian Deputy Foreign Minister Igar Secreta stated in June that Minsk was open to inspections under the Vienna Document and viewed inviting observers to Zapad-2025 as contingent on reciprocity—namely, NATO states inviting Belarusian observers to their drills. He accused Western states of imposing “unprecedented unilateral coercive measures in the political and economic spheres,” forcing Belarus to adopt countermeasures to strengthen its security “in strict accordance with international law.” These include suspension of the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, deployment of Russian tactical nuclear weapons and hypersonic systems in Belarus, and expanded military cooperation with Russia, including joint drills such as Zapad-2025 (see EDM, April 11, May 9, 2024, April 17; Belarusian Foreign Ministry, June 26). Additionally, Belarus had previously declared readiness for mutual inspections with Poland up to 80 kilometers (approximately 50 miles) deep into the border area, precisely where Poland is forming three new divisions (Telegram/modmilby, February 20). Poland rejected this offer due to unfriendly and hybrid actions of the Belarusian special services, as intelligence data gathered by Belarusian inspectors would have been transferred to Moscow (Reform.news, August 18).

Minsk announced a revised concept, reducing the number of Zapad-2025 participants by almost half (TASS, May 28). The exercise is supervised by the General Staff of the Belarusian Armed Forces and will officially focus on the employment of troop groupings in the interests of ensuring the military security of the Union State. The stated overall goal included testing the capabilities of Belarus and Russia to ensure Union State security and readiness to repel possible aggression. Training objectives include repelling enemy air strikes; conducting defensive battle, defeating enemy forces that penetrated defenses, and restoring territorial integrity; providing air support for troops; and countering illegal armed formations and enemy sabotage-reconnaissance groups (Belta.by, August 12).

The first stage focuses on staff planning and command and control during the repulsion of aggression against the Union State. The second stage addresses the liberation of occupied territories and the stabilization of the situation. The main training activities will take place in the central Belarusian ranges near Barysau. Leading up to the exercise, two battalions of the Belarusian 120th Mechanized Brigade were dispatched to Russia to participate in practical events (Reform.news, August 13).

Officially, similar defensive goals and limited parameters were declared ahead of Zapad-2021 and Soyuznaya Reshimost-2022, which played an important role in the strategic disinformation campaign aimed at concealing preparations for Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine (see EDM, September 9, 16, 2021; Belarusian Defense Ministry, September 9, 2021; Vayar.mil.by, January 27, 2022). In a confidential report by Khrenin to Lukashenka, however, it was elaborated that the exercise would include planning for the employment of nuclear weapons and the Oreshnik missile system, and the use of newly constructed fortified areas on the Vaukavysk (Polish) and Smargon (Lithuanian) borders, despite the previous de-escalation steps moving main activities inland to Barysau ranges (Belta.by, August 13).  This involves a command-staff exercise of the Nuclear Planning Group/Joint Command of the RTG on deployment of tactical nuclear weapons, and planning nuclear strikes on military structures against a set of known or reconnaissance-identified targets to support both offensive and defensive operations. Minsk and Moscow had previously held similar staff-level drills last year, wargaming a nuclear attack on Ukraine and Eastern Europe without practical actions, as was the case during the subsequent joint non-strategic nuclear exercises in May–August 2024 (see EDM, April 30, May 24, June 17, August 15, 2024). The use of the Oreshnik missile system in combination with Russian tactical nuclear weapons is also a clear sign of the offensive nature of such an exercise scenario (see EDM, March 13)

On August 6, just two military echelons arrived from Russia. As part of the first echelon, three passenger cars with personnel, six covered cars with equipment and ammunition, and 35 platform cars with military equipment of units of the 4th Guards Tank Division (military unit No 19612) and the 2nd Guards Motorized Rifle Division (military unit No 23626) of the Moscow Military District arrived at the Barysau station. As part of the second echelon, two passenger cars with personnel, three covered cars with equipment and ammunition, at least 32 platform cars with military equipment of the 71st Guards Motorized Rifle Division (former 200th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade) of the Leningrad Military District of the Russian Federation, arrived at the Losvida station (Belzhd.info, August 11). At the same time, the unit of the 71st Guards Motorized Rifle Division took part in the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) exercises in Belarus between September 1 and 6. On September 5, another Russian railroad military echelon arrived in Belarus, consisting of only seven wagons. Presumably, the echelon delivered a unit of the 144th Guards Motorized Rifle Division of the Moscow Military District (Belzhd.info, September 9). Also, two Russian Su-30 and six Su-34 fighter jets arrived in Belarus to participate in the exercise at the Lida airfield. Five more Russian helicopters were stationed at the Machulishchy airfield (Reform.news, September 12).

So far, Russian participation in Belarus numbers about 350–500 servicemen and 100 pieces of equipment, including tanks, armored vehicles, SPGs, MLRS, essentially two to three company tactical groups. In parallel, CSTO Collective Forces exercises Interaction-2025, Search-2025, and Echelon-2025 took place from September 1 to 6, involving 2,000 troops and 450 pieces of equipment from Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Tajikistan (Odkb-csto.org, September 6).

At this stage, Zapad-2025 poses no threat of full-scale invasion or combined-arms offensive. There is neither sufficient time nor the necessary forces deployed. Lithuanian military intelligence estimates 8,000 troops—with 2,000 Russian servicemen—will take part in Belarus, while total participation across both countries will reach about 30,000 troops—three to five times fewer than originally planned for Belarusian territory alone (Obozrevatel.com, February 14, Delfi.lt, August 29).

The downsizing appears to be linked to Russia’s intensified offensive campaign in Ukraine’s Donetsk oblast and efforts to create a buffer security zone along the borders with Ukraine in the Kharkiv, Sumy, Chernihiv, and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts, rather than goodwill and de-escalation efforts by Minsk and Moscow (Interfax, May 22; RBC, June 9). This does not mean Russia has abandoned plans for a renewed offensive from Belarus,  repeatedly warned of by Ukrainian leadership over the summer (RBC-Ukraine, June 2). Russian President Vladimir Putin extended the current Russian Defense Plan (2021–2025) until 2027 (President of Russia, May 15). This cornerstone strategic document underpinned Russia’s preparation for war with Ukraine and possibly a future conflict on NATO’s eastern flank. Its extension implies that Russia may repeat the 2021–2023 military planning cycle between 2025 and 2027, potentially preparing a new offensive from Belarusian territory under the guise of future joint exercises or rapid readiness checks of the RTG. Any excess of real exercise parameters over declared ones—or an approach to the scale of 2021–2022 drills—would indicate preparations by Russia and Belarus for escalatory steps, either during or after the exercises.

Key Parameters of Belarusian–Russian Joint Strategic Exercises, 2021–2025 [1]

Note:

[1] Table sourcing: Zapad-2021 railway logistics (Belzhd.info, July 25); Soyuznaya Reshimost-2022 railway logistics (Belzhd.info, August 22, 2024). Other parameters and data were determined in accordance with the military standards of the Russian and Belarusian Armed Forces and aligned with the provisions of the 2011 Vienna Document (OSCE, November 30, 2011), as reflected in official statements of Belarusian Ministry of Defense about the exercises parameters (Belarusian Defense Ministry, August 5, September 9, 2021; Vayar.mil.by, January 18, January 27, 2022).