Russia Future Watch – IV. Growing Rifts Between Moscow and Dagestan
By:
Growing Rifts Between Moscow and Dagestan by Umar Hitinav and Zarema Gasanova is the fourth article in a series of analyses as part of “Promethean Liberation: Russia’s Emerging National and Regional Movements,” a project from Jamestown Senior Fellow Janusz Bugajski.
Umar Hitinav is an activist advocating for Dagestan’s independence, and Zarema Gasanova is an independent Dagestani activist.
Executive Summary:
- Protests against Russia’s war against Ukraine have been larger in Dagestan than in any other entity in the Russian Federation. Conscription of young men to fight in Ukraine is perceived as a threat to national identity.
- Colonization of Dagestan by the Russian empire continued under the Soviets and the Russian Federation, and resentment of Moscow’s denial of any level of sovereignty for Dagestan is growing.
- Resistance to the Kremlin occupation of Dagestan started after the collapse of the Soviet Union, presenting a multi-layered phenomenon with both national liberation elements and religious roots in Islam.
Russia’s war against Ukraine has intensified the already existing dynamics of asymmetric relations between Moscow and Dagestan, revealing deep contradictions between the imperial vertical of power and the ethnic, cultural, and religious identity of the region. Against the backdrop of the ongoing “partial mobilization” that began in September 2022, Dagestan has experienced one of the largest waves of protest compared to other regions of the Russian Federation. Residents, mostly women, have taken to the streets of the capital, Makhachkala, and other cities and towns, chanting “No to war!” and blocking roads, despite harsh detentions and forceful pressure from police forces.[1] This reaction demonstrates both distrust in Moscow and a deep sense of threat to national identity, when young men, native speakers of the local languages and keepers of traditions, find themselves drawn into a conflict far from their land and against their interests.
Ethnic and Religious Composition of Dagestan
Dagestan is home to more than 30 indigenous ethnic groups, including the Avars, Dargins, Lezgins, Laks, Kumyks, and many others, who belong to the Nakh-Dagestani language family, one of the oldest in the Caucasus. The indigenous peoples of Dagestan meet the criteria outlined in the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP, 2007), including the rights to self-identification and self-determination. [2]
The religious composition of Dagestan is predominantly Islamic. The majority of the population professes Sunnism of the Shafi’i madhhab (school of Islamic jurisprudence), and a smaller part belongs to the Hanafi madhhab. In the south of the republic, a small Shiite community of Azerbaijanis resides. Christianity is represented mainly by Russians and Armenians, and the historic communities of Mountain Jews have almost disappeared today. Thus, the region’s religious structure is almost entirely Muslim, which significantly influences its cultural and social development.
In the post-Soviet period, various branches of Salafi Islam (a fundamentalist branch of Sunni Islam) have become widespread in Dagestan, which has significantly changed the religious landscape of the region, becoming a factor of tension between traditional religious institutions and new forms of Islamic identity. Traditional Dagestani Islam is represented by Sufi tariqahs (brotherhoods), which over the past century and a half have transformed into spiritual and religious structures controlled by the Russian state that have little to do with Islam in either ideological content or religious practice. At the same time, the Russian administration is actively promoting the Iranian Shiite concept, especially in the south of the republic, which seems contradictory, since otherwise state policy consistently suppresses any manifestations of religious alternatives.
The unity of Dagestani society has historically been based on a shared religious affiliation and a common experience of resistance to external domination, which has ensured political cohesion despite significant linguistic and ethnic diversity. The Kremlin’s interference in religious and ethnic issues, however, has weakened this natural mechanism of unity. It has transformed Sufi tariqas into controlled structures, placed religious life under strict control, and used ethnic diversity as an instrument of division and rivalry. Despite this, Dagestan remains a region where many peoples are united in a common political community while maintaining their own distinct identities, which form the foundation for a stable political nation.
History of Dagestan
Situated in the eastern North Caucasus, Dagestan occupies a strategic position at the crossroads of Europe and Asia, which has determined its role as a juncture of trade routes and cultural influences for centuries. Dagestan is an example of a region where the centuries-old history of ethnic groups and cultures forms a unique blend in the Caucasus. The most ancient monuments evidence this. The city of Derbent, with a history spanning over 5,000 years, is recognized as one of the world’s oldest continuously inhabited cities and represents a striking example of sustainable urban development throughout its ancient history. [3]
Early monuments of Islamic architecture include the mosque in Kala-Koreysh, built in the seventh century; the Juma Mosque of Derbent, one of the oldest mosques in the world, built in early eighth century and included in the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) World Heritage List; mausoleum complexes such as Yukhari-Gumbet, and fortress ensembles of mountain settlements, including the village of Kubachi, known since the six century. Despite the dominance of Islam, Dagestan is also home to Christian monuments. The most famous is the Datun Temple, built by Georgian missionaries in the 10th–11th centuries in the Shamil District. They demonstrate the antiquity and originality of Dagestan’s heritage, which has evolved over thousands of years as a synthesis of local innovations and external cultural influences.
For thousands of years, the territory of Dagestan has been an arena for interaction and conflict between various states and empires. Still, three periods of annexation can be considered the most critical historical stages in understanding Dagestan: the Caucasian War launched by the Russian Empire against various peoples of the North Caucasus who resisted subjugation in the 19th century; the occupation by the Bolsheviks at the beginning of the 20th century; and the transfer “by inheritance” to the Russian Federation after the collapse of the Soviet Union.
Tsarist Annexation
Russian historiography justifies the “annexation” of the Caucasus, and particularly Dagestan, by referring to the Treaty of Gulistan, signed on October 12, 1813, between the Russian Empire and Persia. This treaty concluded the Russo-Persian War of 1804–1813 and awarded Russia several Caucasian territories that had previously been under the direct control of the Persian state.[4] The lands of Dagestan, however, should not have been the subject of the agreement, since a significant part of them were independent societies that had never recognized the supremacy of the Persian Shah and therefore were not subject to legal cession. Nevertheless, this treaty is often presented in Russian historiography as the legal basis for the “voluntary annexation” of Dagestan by the Russian Empire, embellished by a narrative about the “historical desire” of the mountainous peoples for an alliance with the empire. This interpretation is ideological in nature, as it overlooks both the actual terms of the treaty, which were conditioned by Russian military pressure on Persia, and the subsequent resistance of the Dagestani population. The prolonged armed struggle in Dagestan and the Caucasus in the following decades showed that the subordination of the region was the result of colonial conquest, not the voluntary choice of its peoples.
The Russian Empire’s invasion of Dagestan began in the 18th century, during the Persian campaign of Peter I (1722–1723), when troops occupied the Caspian lowland and foothill territories inhabited by the Kumyks, using them as a springboard to gain a foothold in the Caucasus. With the outbreak of the Caucasian War (1817), the expansion became systemic, leading to the unification of Dagestani communities into the Imamate, which existed from 1829 to 1859. For nearly three decades, the Imamate provided organized resistance to Russian troops and became the primary obstacle to the region’s final occupation. During the leadership of Shamil, Chechnya became part of the Imamate, and later, allied relations were established with some Circassian communities. Despite the prolonged resistance and consolidation of local forces, the region was occupied and integrated into the Russian Empire.
Soviet Annexation
After the Bolshevik takeover in 1917, the peoples of the North Caucasus began a struggle for independence against both the Tsarist “White” army and the Bolsheviks’ Red Army, as both were perceived as occupiers. The first step was the creation of the Mountain Republic, proclaimed on May 1, 1917, at a Congress of the North Caucasian peoples. At the same congress, Nazhmudin Gotsinsky, one of the key leaders of the national movement, was elected mufti of the North Caucasus and Dagestan.
In the second half of 1917, under the leadership of Gotsinsky and Uzun-Khadzhi, the North Caucasian Imamate (Emirate) was founded as a successor to the 19th-century Imamate. For this reason, Gotsinsky went down in history as the fifth Imam of Dagestan. In May 1920, the Bolsheviks consolidated their position in Dagestan, capitalizing on the weakening of the “White” Army and mountain armed formations. In September 1920, the Dagestan Autonomous Region was proclaimed part of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR). Gotsinsky immediately began an armed campaign, and by October 1920, the Imamate forces controlled the mountainous regions, including the Avar, Andinsky, and Gunib districts, laying siege to the fortresses of Gunib and Khunzakh, the main strongholds of Soviet power.
The death of Uzun-Khadzhi on March 30, 1920, had a significant effect on the future of the North Caucasus Emirate. In May 1921, Russia suppressed the resistance. Gotsinsky fled to Chechnya. In 1925, Gotsinsky was captured and shot in Rostov-on-Don by the Soviet secret police. Thus, the establishment of Soviet power in Dagestan marked the second occupation of the region, bringing to an end the attempt to restore an independent state entity.
Annexation by the Russian Federation
In December 1991, the Russian Federation became the legal successor of the Soviet Union, within the borders of the RSFSR. In accordance with the principle of legal and administrative succession, all autonomous republics, regions, and districts that were part of the RSFSR automatically became subjects of the Russian Federation. The Dagestan Autonomous Socialist Soviet Republic (ASSR) became the Republic of Dagestan without the direct expression of the will of the population. On September 17, 1991, the Supreme Council of Dagestan adopted the Declaration of State Sovereignty, which recognized the republic as a subject of the Russian Federation with the right to its own Constitution, legislation, citizenship, and resource management. The document did not provide for secession from the Russian Federation but reflected the republic’s desire to expand its powers within the framework of the federal structure. In 1994, the newly adopted Constitution of the Republic of Dagestan affirmed its status within the Russian Federation.
The origins of this status go back to 1920–1921, when granting the region the status of an autonomous republic within the RSFSR created an artificial “nexus”—an institution of fictitious political legitimacy not based on a treaty or plebiscite that excluded the right to secession, unlike the union republics. Thus, the status of autonomy from the very beginning was an instrument of control, characteristic of colonial practices, rather than an expansion of the population’s rights. The inclusion of Dagestan in the RSFSR as an autonomous republic was not due to objective historical or demographic prerequisites. It was dictated by the Soviet state’s strategy for imposing centralized management of multinational areas and consolidating key regions within the largest union republic, the Russian SFSR. Regarding Dagestan, as well as the entire North Caucasus, this allowed Moscow to consolidate the status of an autonomous republic, deprived even of the formal right to secede from the Soviet Union.
The commitment to Islamic identity expressed in Dagestan’s political projects in the 19th and early 20th centuries was a key factor in increasing the chances for international recognition. The declared focus on Sharia as the basis of the legal and state system, as well as the use of religious legitimation of power, distinguished Dagestan from other national entities that emerged from the Soviet Union. Western powers and international institutions were cautious, however, in recognizing political entities whose foundations were built on theocratic principles. Thus, the Islamic foundation of Dagestani state projects, although strengthening internal legitimacy and cohesion, simultaneously limited their external prospects.
Colonial Policy of the Russian Federation
Russia has successfully imposed its version of historical events related to the occupation of the Caucasus in academic studies, creating obstacles to achieving historical justice.[5] The Constitution of the Russian Federation does not provide for the right of republics to secede. Instead, it stipulates the inviolability of the Russian Federation’s territory. In the decision of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation No. 10-P on the constitutionality of certain provisions of the Constitution of the Republic of Altai of June 7, 2000, it is directly explained that all subjects of the Russian Federation are integral parts of the state and do not have the right to unilateral secession.[6]
This decision became a key act, legally enshrining the republics’ sovereignty and independent management of resources. The court indicated that the sole bearer of sovereignty is the Russian Federation as a whole, and the republics are deprived of the opportunity to interpret their status as sovereign states, despite their constitutions or the Constitution of the Russian Federation referring to them as “states.” Furthermore, the court stipulated that any provisions of the regional constitutions could not contradict the Constitution of the Russian Federation. The priority of federal legislation is established as a fundamental principle. In practical terms, this means that the Caucasian republics do not have the right to determine their political course independently, and their legislative bodies are limited by the framework set by the federal center.
Special attention was paid to the issue of property and natural resources. The Constitutional Court recorded that the subjects have no sovereign rights to their natural resources. Access to them is regulated within the framework of “joint jurisdiction,” which means complete control by Moscow. Federal laws determine the rules of disposal, while regional acts are subordinate and cannot contradict them. The subordinate status of the republics within the Russian Federation is institutionalized, which legally deprives them of referring to sovereignty and renders all natural resources confined to the federal level. Thus, any aspiration of Dagestani society for independence would be considered illegal from the point of view of Russian law.
Officially, Dagestan has attributes of autonomy—it has its own constitution, authorities, and official languages. This autonomy is largely simulative, however, as it is proclaimed only within the framework of the Russian Federation, without the right to contradict federal legislation. All key decisions—such as budget allocation, natural resources, and administrative-territorial changes—are made either directly by Moscow or require its approval. For example, in 2010, the issue of transferring part of the Dagestani lands to neighboring Azerbaijan was decided by Moscow without any local referendum or consent by Dagestani society when the agreement on the delimitation of the state border was signed.[7] The agreement transferred to Azerbaijan two Dagestani villages, Khrakh-Uba and Uryan-Uba, along with their adjacent pastures and a portion of the water resources of the Samur River. This precedent clearly demonstrates that the autonomy of the subject is limited and cannot exceed the interests of the federal state.
As part of the federal reform, a decision was made in 2021 to prohibit the use of the title “president” for the heads of the constituent entities of the Russian Federation.[8] In July 2011, the People’s Assembly of Dagestan unanimously supported the corresponding amendments to the republican constitution, renaming the highest executive position from “president” to “head of the Republic of Dagestan.” In 2021, the People’s Assembly of the Republic of Dagestan adopted key changes to its constitution. This move was presented as “bringing it into line with the Constitution of the Russian Federation” and had far-reaching consequences for reducing the scope of the republic’s sovereignty, especially in matters of territorial borders. A significant change was the exclusion of the provision obligating the head of the republic to ensure its territorial integrity. Matters related to territorial integrity are now interpreted exclusively within the competence of the federal center. The head of Dagestan, Sergei Melikov, stated that the provision of the republic’s constitution obliging the head of the republic to preserve its territorial integrity contradicts the Constitution of Russia, creating a “collision,” since the matter of the territorial integrity of Russia, including the territories of its subjects, is attributed to the jurisdiction of the Russian Federation.[9]
Additionally, direct elections of the head of the republic and governors of municipalities were abolished, limiting public political participation and increasing the republic’s dependence on Moscow. Thus, instead of developing self-government institutions, the republic was integrated into a Moscow-centric model of governance, an outright colonial policy, where the key role is played by the federal center, despite nominal coordination with Makhachkala.
Dagestan’s economic dependence on Moscow is a key instrument of federal control. The republic’s budget is dependent on grants and subsidies, and it is the Kremlin that determines which areas are financed. This deprives the republic of the opportunity to develop its industry, agriculture, and infrastructure independently. The Kremlin deliberately ignores Dagestan’s real potential. Moscow does not strive to develop industries in Dagestan that are capable of establishing and securing economic self-sufficiency. Economic dependence not only limits the republic’s development but also deepens its political subordination, preserving a system in which Dagestan remains dependent and deprived of space for autonomous decisions.
The colonial nature of the Russian presence is also evident in current cultural and educational policies. Russification, carried out during the imperial and Soviet periods, continues in an updated form. In 2018, Moscow significantly limited the study of native languages in the republics. In particular, Federal Law No. 317-FZ amended the legislation on education, stipulating that teaching native languages in the Russian Federation is conducted only upon request by the students and their parents.[10] In effect, the law made the teaching of mother tongues optional. Since Russian remains the only state language of the Russian Federation, the new regulations have forced Dagestani languages to be taught outside the school curriculum or reduced to a minimum. Thus, there is a continuation of assimilation. Instead of an open ban, as in the 19th century, a legal mechanism of “at will” was introduced. Under overwhelming Russian language dominance, however, this has led to a decline in the use of native languages.
Along with linguistic assimilation, Moscow actively restricts the teaching of Dagestani history and culture in educational institutions. In textbooks and official statements, the region is presented as a passive participant in events, deprived of its own will, which allegedly always aspired to be part of a “great Russia.” This allows Moscow to create and consolidate in the minds of the population a narrative of Dagestan’s political and cultural dependence, thereby suppressing aspirations for self-determination and independence. State propaganda plays a central role in shaping this imposed image. Ideas are constantly broadcast that without Russia, Dagestan is not only incapable of existing as an independent entity, but also incapable of reaching the level of self-sufficiency that it has within the Kremlin’s jurisdiction. Propaganda narratives create a sense of dependence on Moscow among the population, while idealizing Russian power as a guarantor of stability and prosperity. Similarly, religious identity and autonomy are restricted. Despite the existence of an official Muslim Spiritual Administration (Muftiate), real religious life in the region is strictly controlled by secular authorities.[11]
Narratives Justifying Repression
Russia’s repressive policy in Dagestan is an institutionalized model of governance aimed at maintaining federal control. The main instrument of suppression of political, social, and cultural independence is the security apparatus, which operates through detentions, extrajudicial prosecutions, and fabricated criminal cases. Under the guise of “anti-terrorist” operations, violence is committed against the civilian population, creating an atmosphere of fear, where any criticism is considered a threat. This policy creates an environment of impunity among security forces, which leads to widespread human rights violations.
One of Moscow’s primary tools for controlling Dagestan is the prosecution of opponents through fabricated criminal cases. Activists, human rights defenders, journalists, religious and public figures, as well as ordinary citizens who raise questions about the fairness and legality of political, economic, administrative, legal, and other measures in the republic, often become victims of arbitrary prosecution by the authorities and law enforcement agencies.[12] [13] [14] [15] [16] These accusations often lack a legal basis and are used as a means to discredit dissenters. Trials are conducted in violation of legal procedures, and sentences are handed down based on fabricated evidence or testimony obtained under duress.
In the religious sphere, the key role is played by the state-controlled Muftiate of Dagestan, which broadcasts an ideology agreed upon with Moscow. Traditional forms of self-expression and alternative interpretations of faith are being squeezed out through it. Attempts to revive local identity or appeal to pre-colonial knowledge systems are seen as a threat to the regime. Independent mosques are also being closed. Imams, activists, and religious figures who disagree with the position of the official clergy are subjected to pressure and criminal prosecution under the pretext of combating extremism. Freedom of religion is limited to a framework convenient for secular authorities, which demonstrates the federal center’s desire to maintain control over the religious sphere in Dagestan.
The police and the Federal Security Service (FSB) systematically conduct raids on mosques, private schools and kindergartens, as well as public catering establishments and public places, to exert pressure in the area of religious issues.[17] [18] The security forces monitor and survey people suspected of sympathizing with alleged Wahhabism for the purpose of controlling their activities. The practice is called “profuchet” or counting Wahhabis. “Wahhabism” is one of the branches of Islam, which in Russia and other countries is associated with Islamic radicalism and extremism, and is a term used for labeling extremism and radicalism.[19] Any manifestation of dissent or discontent can be prosecuted by the authorities, particularly in cases involving human rights or the quality of state services. It is especially pronounced in the religious sphere. Prosecution on charges of extremism and terrorism is a common and routine practice in Dagestan. Threats and torture are used as the main tools to obtain confessions in fabricated criminal cases related to charges of terrorism and extremism. In many cases, defendants admit guilt under duress and torture by the security forces, which casts doubt on both the veracity of the confessions and the legitimacy of the cases themselves.[20]
In addition to torture, the practice of extrajudicial killings of persons designated as “alleged participants in illegal armed groups” or “alleged terrorists” is widely used.[21] [22] [23] Such cases are rarely subject to investigations, as was the case with the young shepherds, the Gasanguseinov brothers.[24] There are also other known cases, the details of which can be found in both regional media and reports from international organizations.[25] Some of the many episodes are described in the report “Repressions in Dagestan,” with references to sources. The media and official rhetoric systematically present the region as “dangerous” and “unstable,” and its inhabitants as prone to terrorism. This narrative justifies harsh measures, reinforces stigmatization, and serves as a basis for further restrictions on rights and freedoms. As a result, violence and fear become the primary methods of governance.
Resistance in Dagestan: Context and Contemporary
Resistance to the Kremlin occupation of Dagestan began to emerge immediately after the collapse of the Soviet Union and was a complex phenomenon with both national liberation and religious roots. What the Russian authorities and media often called “separatism,” “bandit groups,” and “terrorist cells” was, in essence, an armed underground movement committed to the idea of de-occupying Dagestan. At one point, this resistance had the support of a significant portion of the local population, especially in remote, mountainous areas. The active phase of this movement, however, was suppressed by 2013–2014, during Russia’s preparations for the Winter Olympics in Sochi and on the eve of the annexation of Crimea.
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, ideas to unite the peoples of the region led to the creation of the Confederation of Mountain Peoples of the Caucasus (CMPC), and later the Confederation of Peoples of the Caucasus. It was one of the first attempts to transform disparate national groups into a single political force. Dagestan’s participation was complex. Unlike Chechnya, where the movement was more united, there was no single representation in Dagestan. The confederation comprised delegates from individual national movements seeking greater autonomy for their peoples. Some Dagestani figures held high positions in the leadership of CMPC, highlighting the region’s importance in the Caucasian resistance. Thus, Nadirshah Khachilayev maintained close ties with the organization. The participation of Dagestani representatives in the CMPC can be seen as part of a broader movement for autonomy or de-occupation. The confederation became an important but short-lived stage of resistance, preceding more local and radical forms of struggle. The first war in Chechnya weakened the organization’s influence, however, and it soon ceased to function.
In the context of the resistance, the 1999 events in the Kadar area marked an attempt to territorialize this movement.[26] Residents of the mountain villages of Karamakhi and Chabanmakhi attempted to create a de facto independent enclave, refusing to obey Russian legislation. It is essential to note that the conflict in the Kadar zone was primarily ideological in nature. The suppression of the enclave in 1999 was a turning point. It showed that the federal center would decisively resist any attempts to separate or create autonomous religious territories. This episode led to the restructuring of the resistance, which moved away from a political and territorial nature to become a guerrilla movement.
In addition to ideologically motivated and territorially isolated forms of resistance, a hybrid direction of struggle emerged in Dagestan, associated with influential individual figures who combined official political activity with pressure through armed formations. Brothers Nadirshah and Magomed Khachilayev are a striking example of this approach. Their activities combined participation in official politics (Nadirshakh was a member of the Russian Duma) while working with the leadership of armed formations operating within local communities. Ideologically, they relied on Dagestani nationalism and pan-Islamism, viewing Moscow’s policies as a threat to the republics’ interests.
In May 1998, armed supporters of Lak community leaders Nadirshakh and Magomed Khachilayev stormed and briefly seized the State Council, the main government building in Makhachkala. The action followed a deadly clash with the police. During the takeover, officials were reportedly held hostage, and several people were killed or injured before the stand-off ended after about a day.[27] The seizure of the State Council building in Makhachkala in May 1998 should be seen as a form of political pressure aimed at negotiating with the authorities. The effectiveness of these actions demonstrated that, at a particular stage, hybrid tactics could yield results outside the formal legal framework. After 1999, armed groups became active in Dagestan, declaring their goal to secede from the Russian Federation. These groups were not under a single control. Some of them, although they acted autonomously, recognized the dominance of the central leadership of the “Caucasus Emirate.” Others represented the interests of individuals or less organized movements.
Currently, the resistance is mainly represented by activists in exile and emigres, who conduct political activities outside of Dagestan and Russia. They establish organizations and foundations, host conferences, forums, and public events, drawing attention to Dagestan’s problems at the international level. In parallel, information and educational initiatives aim to counter the official Russian position and form an alternative public opinion in Dagestan. Despite the absence of a single center, the resistance movement maintains its goals within a decentralized structure. Contemporary political resistance, relying on historical tradition, does not strive for monoethnic dominance of any of Dagestan’s nationalities. Two factors form the basis of social cohesion. The first is Islam, which remains the central element of the cultural and spiritual self-determination of the majority of the population. The second is the emerging sense of common political affiliation, which goes beyond individual ethnic groups. Together, they can form the foundation for a unified political nation in the Republic of Dagestan.
[1] Anna Pavlova, Pavel Vasilyev, and Anisat Magomedova, “This is Not our War: Residents of Dagestan Protest against Mobilization,” MediaZone, September 25, 2022, https://zona.media/article/2022/09/25/dagestan.
[2] “UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples,” OHCHR, https://www.kavkazr.com/a/ubitye-v-chechne-dagestantsy-evropeyskiy-sud-naznachil-kompensatsii-rodstvennikam-zhertv/32220610.html.
[3] “Derbent Is One of the Oldest Early Christian Centers of Russia,” Unesco.ru, https://unesco.ru/en/news/52-derbent/.
[4] Persia recognized the transfer to Russia of Dagestan, Georgia, Megrelia, Imereti, Guria, Abkhazia and the northern part of Azerbaijan, where the khanates of Karabakh, Baku, Shirvan, Ganja, Sheki, Derbent, Quba were located. Part of the Talysh Khanate also went to Russia. The Treaty of Gulistan was signed | B.N. Yeltsin Presidential Library.
[5] Omelicheva, Mariya Y. “Colonial Redux: Explaining the Dominance of Russo-Centric Narratives About the North Caucasus.” Problems of Post-Communism, March 1–12, 2025. doi:10.1080/10758216.2025.2477488.
[6] Decision by the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation of June 7, 2000 N 10-P on the Constitutionality of Certain Provisions of the Constitution of the Republic of Altai, June 7, 2000, ConsultantPlus, https://www.consultant.ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_27571/92d969e26a4326c5d02fa79b8f9cf4994ee5633b/
[7] “IDPs Called Medvedev’s Decision to Give Dagestani Villages to Azerbaijan a Disaster,” Kavkazsky Uzel, May 10, 2017, https://www.kavkaz-uzel.eu/articles/302477
[8] Federal Law of 21.12.2021 No. 414-FZ on the General Principles of Organization of Public Authority in the Subjects of the Russian Federation”; “Putin Signs Law on Organization of Regional Government,” TASS, December 21, 2021, https://tass.ru/politika/13261871
[9] “The Constitution of Dagestan Was Brought Into Line With Federal Legislation,” TASS, October 27, 2022, https://tass.ru/politika/13261871
[10] Federal Law N 317-FZ of August 3, 2018 “On Amendments to Articles 11 and 14 of the Federal Law “On Education in the Russian Federation” https://www.garant.ru/hotlaw/federal/1211532/
[11] Ashakhan Yusupov, “Is your native language an unnecessary luxury?” Kavkazr.com, April 16, 2018, https://www.kavkazr.com/a/rodnoy-yazyk-nenuzhnaya-roskosh/29170207.html?utm_source=chatgpt.com.
[12] Olga Lebedeva, “Printed version of “Chernovik” Stopped Publishing in Dagestan, Deutsche Welle, November 28/2022, https://www.dw.com/ru/v-dagestane-prekrasen-vypusk-pecatnoj-versii-gazety-cernovik/a-63916756.
[13] “Dagestani Journalist Abdulmumin Gadzhiev Sentenced to 17 Years In Prison,” BBC News Russian Service, September 12, 2023, https://www.bbc.com/russian/articles.
[14] “Two Makhachkala residents detained after search, their relatives report,” Caucasian Knot, December 9, 2023, https://www.kavkaz-uzel.eu/articles/234820/.
[15] “Memorial Human Rights Center Lawyer Murad Magomedov Brutally Beaten in Dagestan,” European Human Rights Advocacy Center, February 8, 2015, https://ehrac.org.uk/ru/memorial-hrc-lawyer-murad-magomedov-severely-beaten-in-dagestan/.
[16] Zaynab Abdulaeva, “Wrong Islam? How Mosque Raids Spread Beyond Dagestan,” RFE/RL, July 26, 2023, https://www.kavkazr.com/a/nepraviljnyy-islam-kak-reydy-v-mechetyah-vyshli-za-predely-dagestana-/32520544.html.
[17] Saida Omarova, “Terrorists Are Being Sought in Kindergartens,” RFE/RL, January 12, 2017, https://www.kavkazr.com/a/terroristov-ischut-v-detsadah/28227701.html;
[18] “Closing mosque in Khasavyurte. Knut and gingerbread for the Salafis of the Caucasus,” HolosIslama.RU, February 1, 2016, https://golosislama.com/news.php?id=29016
[19] Repressions in Dagestan, Political Association “Independent Dagestan,” September 2024, https://drive.google.com/file/d/1lD-oxLoiUjiU8yYY65OVNrfXfunPgmRk/view?pli=1
[20] Ruslan Magomedov, “Kurban Dalgatov Died from Torture in the Police Custody,” Chernovik.net, January 21, 2023, https://chernovik.net/news/kurban-dalgatov-umer-ot-pytok-v-otdele-policii
[21] “Fighting Terrorism or Working for Statistics? Experts on the Work of Security Forces in Dagestan,” April 28, 2025, KavkazR.com, https://www.kavkazr.com/a/borjba-s-terrorizmom-ili-rabota-na-statistiku-eksperty-o-rabote-silovikov-v-dagestane/33396596.html
[22] “Four Suspects in Preparation of Terrorist Attack Killed in Dagestan,” Chernovik.net, March 5, 2025, https://www.kavkazr.com/a/v-dagestane-ubity-chetvero-podozrevaemyh-v-podgotovke-terakta/33336838.html
[23] “Security Forces Killed Four People in Makhachkala,” Chernovik.net, March 5, 2025, https://www.kavkazr.com/a/siloviki-ubili-chetyreh-chelovek-v-mahachkale/33337403.html
[24] ECHR Found Russia Responsible for the Death of the Gasangusenov Brothers in Dagestan in 2016 | Memorial Human Rights Center, Memorial Center, March 30, 2021, https://memohrc.org/ru/news_old/espch-priznal-rossiyu-otvetstvennoy-za-gibel-bratev-gasangusenovyh-v-dagestane-v-2016-godu
[25] Andrey Krasno, “Dagestanis Killed in Chechnya: European Court Orders Compensation for Victims’ Relatives,” https://www.kavkazr.com/a/ubitye-v-chechne-dagestantsy-evropeyskiy-sud-naznachil-kompensatsii-rodstvennikam-zhertv/32220610.html
[26] Special forces disarm Wahhabis, Lenta.ru., August 30, 1999, https://gazeta.lenta.ru/daynews/30-08-1999/10vah.htm.
[27] “No Flag, No Power,” Notes from the Past 1998, Novoe Delo, No. 21, May 22, 1998,
https://ndelo.ru/novoe-delo/zapiski-iz-proshlogo-1998; “Armed Protesters Seize Russian Building.” The Washington Post, May 22, 1998. https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/national/1998/05/22/armed-protesters-seize-russian-building/c2b0ed5e-c7a2-4272-a720-17fdcef3d8ee/?utm_source=chatgpt.com.
