Cyberspace Force Equipment at the 2025 Military Parade

Executive Summary:

• The parade equipment of the Cyberspace Force indicates that the PLA has drawn lessons from the Russia–Ukraine war, seeking to avoid making the same communications mistakes on future battlefields.
• The reorganized Cyberspace Force has already demonstrated its battlefield communications capability during disaster relief operations in the Tibet earthquake, but it still requires training and validation in actual combat conditions.
• There is a clear discrepancy between official reports and the actual equipment of the Cyberspace Combat Formation, suggesting that the PLA is deliberately releasing misleading information.

On September 3, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) held a military parade to commemorate the 80th anniversary of the end of World War II (China Brief, August 28; Xinhua, September 3). For the CCP, the parade provided an opportunity to present the results of military reforms initiated by General Secretary Xi Jinping in 2015. As the People’s Republic of China (PRC) pursues great power status, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) views demonstrating capabilities commensurate with that status as a crucial task.

The Cyberspace Force (CSF) is a key unit in the PLA’s pursuit of intelligentized warfare. Formed alongside the Information Support Force (ISF) and the Aerospace Force (ASF) when the Strategic Support Force dissolved in 2024, it is a critical part of PLA reforms over the last decade (PLA Daily, April 20, 2024; China Brief, April 26, 2024 [A], [B], April 25, July 11). CSF equipment showcased during the parade offers valuable insights into the force’s technical and strategic developments.

An appendix containing 14 images of equipment referenced in the text appears in a PDF attached at the end of this article.

Information Operation Groups in the Military Parade

The 2024 reorganization of the Strategic Support Force established the PLA’s organization into four services and four branches (PLA Daily, April 20, 2024). The 2025 military parade was therefore the first opportunity to observe the PLA’s new structure. As newly established units, the ISF, ASF, and CSF each took part as branch-level formations in the march-past column and participated in the mobile column under the information operations group (YouTube/CCTV, September 3). [1]

Official media coverage of the equipment on display included detailed model specifications for other formations, but not for the CSF. This suggests a desire to maintain secrecy regarding telecommunications and cyber-related equipment, while also allowing the PLA to employ official publicity as a means of intelligence deception. For example, media reports on the Cyberspace Combat Formation stated that the unit displayed four types of equipment. Footage from the parade’s live broadcast, however, revealed that the CSF in fact displayed six types of equipment (see Figure 1, 2, 3 & 4) (YouTube/CCTV, September 3). This discrepancy indicates that the CCP is using misinformation to obscure external understanding of its cyberspace capabilities.

The six types of Cyberspace Combat Formation equipment on display corresponded to the functions ascribed to it in official PLA propaganda. These include command and control, reconnaissance and sensing, and cyber-electromagnetic countermeasures. These functions can be inferred by examining the external features of equipment on show and comparing them with similar equipment in past parades. They include the following:

1. New unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) data relay system: Positioned in the front row of the Cyberspace Combat Formation, this system included a total of four units. Since the start of Russia’s war in Ukraine, the PLA has been developing UAV-mounted communications equipment to avoid the communications failures faced by the Russian military. These units were equipped with multi-rotor UAVs and supplemented by a square-shaped cooling device. This suggests that the system is a battlefield network communications relay, using UAVs to link front-line communications and information systems and transmit signals to the unit, which then functions as a temporary base station (see Figure 5).
2. Data spectrum monitoring vehicle: The PLA has previously displayed vehicles similarly equipped with multiple antennas capable of detecting VHF, UHF, and microwave signals (Ministry of National Defense (Taiwan), December, 2021). This latest model features noticeably larger antennas, expanded equipment compartments, and a larger carrier vehicle, suggesting it may be an upgraded version of earlier vehicles (see Figure 6).
3. Signal-jamming vehicle: This was one of the systems not advertised in official coverage. With a circular dish mounted on the vehicle’s roof, it resembles the signal-jamming vehicle displayed in the 2019 parade, suggesting that it performs the same battlefield signal-jamming function (see Figure 7 & 8).
4. Electromagnetic reconnaissance and jamming vehicle: Like the data-spectrum reconnaissance vehicle, this vehicle is fitted with a fishbone antenna array and mounted on a truck chassis. Its likely function is battlefield electromagnetic spectrum reconnaissance and jamming (see Figure 9 & 10). Similar equipment was also exhibited at the 2019 parade, although in that instance it was mounted on the Chinese “Mengshi” (猛士) armored vehicle. Both likely serve the same purpose, but an enlarged equipment compartment on the new model suggests additional functionalities.
5. Network communication node vehicle: This is the other system that was not mentioned in official coverage. This vehicle’s exterior resembles the electromagnetic reconnaissance and jamming vehicle. It is similarly fitted with a fishbone antenna, though the tip of this antenna is formed by different elements. The vehicle also has a larger equipment compartment, more cooling devices, and fewer antennas (see Figure 11 & 12). Based on these features, it is likely a battlefield network communications node/center.
6. Information jamming vehicle: Identical in appearance to the information jamming vehicle displayed at the 2019 parade, this vehicle is fitted with additional cooling systems (see Figure 13 & 14). It is therefore assessed to be an upgraded version, with a likely function of battlefield signal jamming.

Most of the equipment displayed by the Cyberspace Combat Formation are intended for network relay and jamming purposes, judging by their appearances. This indicates that the CSF is primarily responsible for battlefield network communications and electronic interference, specializing in the development of integrated cyber-electromagnetic warfare capabilities. At the same time, the PLA’s introduction of vehicle-mounted communications systems integrated for the first time with UAVs suggests that it has drawn lessons from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, deciding to incorporate them into its equipment development.

The Frontline and Rear-area Missions of the Cyberspace Force

Past research on the PLA’s cyber units has often centered on PLA-linked advanced persistent threat (APT) groups and their intrusion techniques, with relatively little analysis of hardware systems. The 2025 parade provides an opportunity to examine equipment and assess the CSF’s potential missions beyond cyber intrusions. The CSF is now clearly developing with a stronger emphasis on integrated cyber-electromagnetic warfare (网电一体战).

The CSF and the ISF have already proven their ability to conduct frontline communications and line restoration. In January, when an earthquake struck Shigatse in the Tibetan Autonomous Region, the PLA dispatched units for disaster relief, with the CSF deployed to the affected area to establish communications, followed later by the ISF, which carried out fiber-optic network repairs (Xinhua, January 8; PLA Daily, March 13). While maintaining communications in a disaster zone differs from operating under battlefield conditions, the Tibet earthquake relief effort indirectly demonstrated the wartime functions of the two PLA branches and provided them with operational experience.

The CSF’s activities clearly extend beyond exploiting network vulnerabilities and creating malware for cyber intrusions. Like other PLA services, it instead is required to conduct cyber and electronic warfare on battlefield frontlines. This may explain why it maintains technical reconnaissance bases and other military facilities in each major theater to support its front-end communications and jamming tasks as well as its back-end cyber-intrusion missions (China Brief, April 25). As a newly established service, however, the CSF will likely need time and training to integrate with other PLA services before it can achieve truly effective joint operational capabilities.

Conclusion

Cyberspace Force equipment displayed in the September 3 military parade were clear upgrades to the PLA communications and electronic jamming systems seen in 2019, and also included the debut of new UAV-integrated systems. These upgrades suggest that the PLA has learned lessons from shortcomings in information and electronic warfare during the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

Discrepancies between official reporting on the Cyberspace Combat Formation equipment and those actually displayed can be interpreted as deliberate misinformation, obscuring an external understanding of the CSF. This indicates the persistent need to scrutinize the accuracy of official disclosures.

Finally, the CSF hardware on display demonstrates that the PLA’s cyber units are not limited to conducting cyber intrusions but are also tasked with frontline missions such as network relay and electronic jamming. While the force’s battlefield communications capability has been practiced during disaster relief operations in Tibet, its performance in an actual wartime environment has yet to be proven.

Notes

[1] The march-past columns (徒步方队) are composed of personnel from various PLA services, each representing the active branches and functional units of the PLA. The mobile columns (装备方队) showcase the PLA’s equipment, displaying the active platforms used by different branches of the PLA.