Russia Strengthens ASEAN Nuclear Ties

Executive Summary:

• Russia’s state-owned nuclear corporation, Rosatom, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) have taken the most tangible step thus far in nuclear energy cooperation from the bilateral to the institutional level, with the signing of a new Memorandum of Understanding.
• The Kremlin uses Rosatom as an extension of its foreign policy goals. ASEAN member states, however, appear to be acting out of practicality rather than a desire to partner with Russia, as few other countries offer similar solutions for their immediate-term energy needs.
• As long as Russia can position itself as a necessary partner for energy security solutions in Southeast Asia and globally, it will continue to undermine any meaningful Western sanctions pressure.

On October 15–17, on the sidelines of the annual Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Energy Business Forum (AEBF) in Malaysia, Russian state-owned nuclear corporation Rosatom signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on nuclear energy cooperation with ASEAN Centre for Energy (Rosatom; TASS, October 21).[1] Until now, most Russian nuclear engagements in Southeast Asia have been bilateral in nature. This MoU marks the most tangible step thus far toward broader institutional cooperation, as envisioned in the Russia–ASEAN Comprehensive Action Plan for the Implementation of the Strategic Partnership for the period 2021–2025 (President of Russia; ASEAN, October 28, 2021).  

Since January, Russia has publicly announced a number of nuclear energy roadmaps and intergovernmental cooperation agreements with ASEAN member states, including Laos, Myanmar, and Cambodia (RIA Novosti, July 31, September 26; Lao News Agency, August 1; Rosatom, September 19). Vietnam and Russia have signed an MoU to resume construction of the Ninh Thuận nuclear power plant (NPP), which was suspended in 2016 due to financing and insufficient electricity demand (Vietnam News, September 27). Rosatom is also discussing options to provide its small modular reactor (SMR) or floating NPP technology to Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand (TASS, June 30, September 4, 19; Rosatom, July 28, October 21; Atomic Energy, October 30; Nikkei Asia, November 4; Interfax, November 5). 

Rosatom is widely recognized as an extension of Russian foreign policy, including in Southeast Asia (see EDM, January 29, June 25, July 15, 21, September 19, October 8). Rosatom International Network General Director Vadim Titov, who signed the MoU on behalf of Russia, has been appointed as the new head of Russia’s Directorate for Strategic Partnership and Cooperation (RIA Novosti, October 24). Russian President Vladimir Putin announced the creation of the new department in August as part of an overall shakeup of the executive office (President of Russia, August 29). Titov now reports directly to Sergei Kiriyenko, Putin’s first deputy chief of staff (see EDM, October 20, 28).

Rosatom’s intentions may be strategic, but ASEAN members appear to be aligning with Russia for practical reasons. ASEAN Secretary-General H.E. Dr. Kao Kim Hourn has stated that collaboration with Russia, particularly in civilian nuclear energy, supports ASEAN’s energy security, economic resilience, and sustainability as the region’s energy demand continues to rise (ASEAN, February 19). Hourn said this during the opening of an exhibition on the prospects for Russia–ASEAN nuclear cooperation at the organization’s headquarters in Jakarta earlier this year (Mission of the Russian Federation to ASEAN, February 18). 

Civilian nuclear energy is a crucial component of the energy transition and energy security objectives outlined in ASEAN’s Plan of Action for Energy Cooperation (APAEC) 2016–2025 (ASEAN, 2016). Electricity demand across ASEAN is on track to triple by 2050—from 1,200 terawatt hours (TWh) in 2022 to 4,300 TWh in 2025 (Energy for Growth, June 30). Many ASEAN member states consider nuclear energy to be a viable low-carbon solution to meet that demand (ASEAN Hub, September 10). 

For ASEAN member states interested in nuclear energy, the options Russia offers are more feasible and accessible than those provided by the West, and even the People’s Republic of China (PRC), in the immediate term. Most ASEAN members are interested in SMRs or floating NPPs rather than conventional NPPs. This places Rosatom in a position to gain an advantage over other potential vendors, as it was the first to operate a commercial floating SMR, and it is on track to become the first country to export an SMR after signing an agreement with Uzbekistan in 2024 (Rosatom, June 2024; Kun.uz, September 11, 2024). Other SMR options are not yet commercialized for export. The PRC’s Linglong is the first commercial land-based SMR (Global Times, October 16). It was expected to enter commercial operation in late 2025, but testing is still underway, and it is unclear if this goal will be met (Chinese National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC), October 24). CNCC has partnered with ASEAN member states in the past to introduce nuclear and radiation technologies for medical, agricultural, and environmental applications (Nation Thailand, August 18, 2024). The PRC has, however, yet to move beyond the discussion phase and complete any agreements for nuclear energy capabilities with ASEAN member states (CNNC, September 19, 2023; Cambodia National Council for Sustainable Development, accessed November 4). Beyond Russia and the PRC, European, Canadian, and U.S. SMR construction projects are mostly in the design, site assessment, or licensing phases (Nuclear Engineering International, June 4, October 28; World Nuclear News, August 6, August 21, October 28; Canada Energy Regulator, August 20; Ansaldo Energia, September 16; European Industrial Alliance on SMRs, 2025). 

Political and legal obstacles remain in ASEAN–Russia nuclear cooperation. Western sanctions do not currently prohibit civilian nuclear cooperation with Rosatom. A number of its senior personnel and subsidiaries, however, have been directly sanctioned (U.S. Department of State, January 10). This includes Rosatom’s Deputy Director General for Mechanical Engineering and Industrial Solutions, Andrey Nikipelov, who jointly hosted the session at the ASEAN AEBF, where the MoU was signed (Rosatom, October 21; Nuclear Asia, October 31; Companies House; Office of Foreign Assets Control; U.K. Sanctions List, accessed November 1). 

Further complicating ASEAN–Russia nuclear cooperation is the divergence in ASEAN member states’ positions toward Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. ASEAN itself has not condemned Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, instead expressing deep concern and attempting to remain somewhat neutral (ASEAN, February 26, 2022). Cambodia, Singapore, and the Philippines have directly condemned Russia and, along with Brunei, Malaysia, Myanmar, Timor-Leste, and Thailand, voted in favor of Russia withdrawing all military forces from Ukraine at the UN General Assembly in 2022 (European Union External Action, March 2, 2022; CamNess, March 28, 2022; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Singapore, June 16, 2024; Manila Bulletin, March 2). Laos and Vietnam abstained. Singapore has gone so far as to impose its own sanctions on Russia (Singapore Ministry of Foreign Affairs, March 5, 2022; Vedomosti, April 4). 

Rosatom’s stance toward Southeast Asia suggests a Kremlin-directed strategy to position itself as a necessary partner in the region’s long-term energy needs. The states in this region are left with few nuclear-related options to resolve their immediate-term energy needs without Russia, while also attempting to balance their commitments to a clean energy transition and energy security. This makes ASEAN a prime environment for Russia, via Rosatom, to ensure its indispensability to the global nuclear industry. The more Russia is able to do this, the more difficult it becomes to place meaningful pressure on the Kremlin through sanctions.

Note:

[1] ASEAN is an intergovernmental organization established in 1967, which now includes a total of eleven member states: Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic (Laos), Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam, and  Timor-Leste (East Timor) (ASEAN, October 26).