PRC Advances New International Order In Astana

Executive Summary:

• The People’s Republic of China (PRC) sees the Shanghai Cooperation Organization as an important part of a wider strategy to construct a new international order.
• Beijing projects soft power through promoting norms, discursive constructs, and policy preferences in the SCO which member states officially endorse. These include language about comprehensively reforming the UN and supporting all PRC efforts to achieve “national reunification” with Taiwan.
• Military exercises that take place via the SCO provide the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) unique opportunities to gain practical experience outside its borders and normalizes basing of Chinese forces in other countries through international treaties.

The Astana Declaration, the result of the most recent annual Council of Heads of State of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in early July, proclaims an intention to make the SCO “one of the key multilateral organizations in a multipolar world (多极世界中重要的多边组织之一)” (SCO, July 4). At the summit, Russian President Vladimir Putin triumphantly stated that the multipolar world “has become a reality” (Kremlin.ru, July 4). In doing so, he was echoing what for SCO leaders is a self-evident truth. At last year’s summit in India, People’s Republic of China (PRC)s President Xi Jinping similarly stated that the “community of common destiny (人类命运共同体)”—a related concept—was “now being transformed from an idea into action, and from a vision into a reality (正在从理念转化为行动、从愿景转变为现实)” (Aisixiang, July 4, 2023). [1]

The SCO, a multilateral organization consisting of ten Eurasian member states, two observer states, and 14 dialogue partners, is the world’s largest regional organization, constituting over 40 percent of the world’s population and a third of its GDP based on purchasing power parity. As of January 2022, its general secretary is career diplomat Zhang Ming (张明); and as of this month, the PRC has taken over the reins of the rotating presidency. [2] The organization holds symbolic significance for its members, but increasingly is seen also as an important node for security-related, diplomatic, economic, and cultural value. It is often dismissed by commentators in the West as a “talk shop” that cannot “even manage to settle its own internal conflicts,” or derided as “ineffective and irrelevant” (China Global South Project, July 4; ECFR, September 16, 2022; Carnegie India, July 5). But its value to the PRC, both as an anti-Western multilateral organization and as a means of gaining military experience, makes it worthy of attention. [3]

PRC Discursive Power Projection At SCO

“In a spirit of partnership, the Parties shall strive to promote the multipolarization of the world and the establishment of a new international order … profound changes in international relations have taken place … [and] a growing number of countries are beginning to recognize the need for mutual respect, equality and mutual advantage—but not for hegemony and power politics.” These phrases are not recent, but rather are found in the Russian-Chinese Joint Declaration on a Multipolar World and the Establishment of a New International Order, signed by Jiang Zemin and Boris Yeltsin and adopted in Moscow on April 23, 1997 (UN.org, May 20, 1997). The reason this rhetoric will sound familiar is because it has been consistently articulated and rearticulated in the intervening quarter century by both countries. It is enshrined in the founding document of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), which frames the organization’s goals as including the promotion of a new international order in an era of developing multipolarity (UN Treaties, accessed July 10).

The SCO stands out as a multilateral organization established without reference to the liberal international order and is one of several vehicles through which the PRC pursues its aims outside of Western interference. (The Pacific Review, December 9, 2023). [4] Increasingly, the SCO is viewed as not just non-Western, but anti-Western. This is evident in both Iran’s and now Belarus’s accessions to the organization, but also in the rhetoric of the SCO’s two key leaders. Putin has recently spoken of “phasing out the military presence of external powers in the Eurasian region,” while Xi Jinping used his speech at the summit to argue that SCO countries must “defend the right to development in the face of the real risks of ‘small yards and high walls’”—a reference to US export controls (RFERL, July 3; CPC News, July 8).

The PRC projects its normative influence across not just central Asia, but increasingly into Europe and the Middle East and North Africa region, via the SCO (People’s Daily, July 9; CRS, December 7, 2022). Xi’s speech, as well as coverage in state media, made clear links between historic PRC foreign policy principles and current policy priorities. Xi noted that “the Shanghai Spirit and the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence [5] are inextricably linked and are the common values of the Organization, which should be cherished and followed at all times” (Aisixiang, July 5). He also mentioned that modernization—a core theme of the upcoming Third Plenum in Beijing—is a common goal of SCO countries. Similarly, PRC concepts that made their way into the official Astana Declaration were the “new type of international relations,” the “community of common destiny” [6] and the One Belt One Road initiative (OBOR), which all signatories except India are listed as supporting (SCO, July 4).

Two indicators suggest that SCO documents are more than just a venue for the PRC to launder its political rhetoric, however. The first of these is the involvement of the United Nations, which legitimizes the PRC’s actions. In September 2023, the United Nations approved a statement that described the SCO as an “essential regional organization for addressing security in the region” (UN Documents, August 28, 2023). [7] This, along with UN Secretary-General António Guterres’s presence at the summit, demonstrated what the Declaration referred to as “an affirmation of the international community’s recognition of the contribution of SCO to the realization of the United Nations’ goals, tasks, and agenda” (SCO, July 4). A notable outcome is a professed desire to use the SCO (and perhaps other regional organizations) as a vehicle to advance the PRC’s preferred norms within the wider international community—including the UN. A new SCO Initiative titled “On World Unity for a Just Peace, Harmony, and Development” argues that “the Charter of the United Nations and the universally accepted basic principles and norms of international law have been systematically undermined” and as such advocates for “the comprehensive reform of the UN” (People’s Daily, July 5). “Comprehensive reform of the UN” also appears near to top of the Astana Declaration (SCO, July 4).

The second indicator is the PRC’s ability to persuade SCO member states to sign on to its designs regarding Taiwan. At the meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers of SCO in May, PRC Foreign Minister Wang Yi (王毅) stated that he “believed” SCO member states “will continue to support the Chinese people’s just cause of opposing separatist activities for Taiwan independence and striving for national reunification” (Aisixiang, May 21). [8] The threatening tone of this framing, which follows an observation from scholars Garlick and Qin that the PRC government “expects partner countries … to model their behavior and discourse on the example set by the [PRC] without significant contestation,” [9] continues throughout Wang’s speech. He later warned that “the international community needs to follow the trend of history and make the right choice (国际社会需要顺应历史潮流，作出正确选择).” Other countries have followed suit. In a joint statement, Kazakhstan—which hosted the summit—declared that it “opposes any form of ‘Taiwan independence’ and external interference,” “reiterates that it will not conduct any form of official exchanges with Taiwan,” and, more troublingly, “supports all efforts made by the Chinese government to achieve national reunification” (People’s Daily, July 4). Similar sentiments were espoused by Belarus’ foreign minister Maxim Ryzhenkov in a meeting with International Department head Liu Jianchao (刘建超) (International Department, July 9).

PRC Uses SCO For Military Testing Ground

One of the more significant benefits of SCO membership for the PRC is an ability to gain experience and knowledge of various kinds of military operations through annual multilateral exercises. The 2018 Agreement of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization Member States on Joint Military Exercises has also provided a basis in international law for People’s Liberation Army (PLA) forces to deploy in Central Asian (and now European) countries and could serve as a model for basing arrangements elsewhere (MFA Treaties, July 18, 2018; EH4S, April 8).

In recent years, Chinese armed forces have had opportunities to practice long-distance mobilization, counterterrorism missions, stability maintenance operations, and conventional warfare. This also includes practice in negotiating the rights for overflight and the use of foreign airfields, transit of third countries, host country logistics support, operating in airspace it does not control, coordinating with foreign authorities, and gaining familiarity with larger-scale deployments. The PLA has also been able to learn from the Russian military’s recent combat experience, as well as from other militaries. The utility of the SCO for these purposes is explicitly referenced in the 2015 edition of the Science of Military Strategy, an important PRC military text (USCC, November 12, 2020).

Beijing has gained experience in using diplomatic efforts to support its power projection. For instance, it has organized counterterrorism patrols from its military outposts in the China–Tajikistan–Afghanistan border area. The Ministry of Public Security has also spent a decade training officials from SCO countries in areas such as counterterrorism and combatting transnational crime, as well as sending People’s Armed Police units outside the PRC to conduct patrols alongside Central Asian military personnel (USCC, November 12, 2020).

Conclusion

The Astana Declaration, Xi Jinping’s speeches at the SCO summit, and other features of the summit itself point toward Beijing making progress on its early promise to create a new international order. By having its domestic policy priorities and preferred language inserted into the organization’s official documents and repeated by member countries in joint statements, and by enlisting the United Nations as a supportive partner, the PRC is achieving a degree of success in normalizing its preferences in the global south.

The PRC’s use of the SCO for a range of unique military exercises over the years—and most recently on the Polish border with newly-acceded member state Belarus—also make clear that the SCO enables the PRC to project its hard power far beyond its borders. The organization may never become a coherent or cohesive security alliance akin to NATO. But it nevertheless is already playing an important part in a broader PRC strategy to remold the world on its own terms.

Notes

[1] This formulation has recently been updated in English to “community with a shared future for mankind,” seemingly due to concerns over potential interpretation of the phrase “common destiny” (See China Brief, February 26, 2018).

[2] Initially established out of the “Shanghai Five” grouping of central Asian countries to enhance security cooperation, it has since expanded in terms of both its geographic scope and its aspirations as an organization.

[3] The United States applied for observer status in 2005, as did Iran. The United States’ application was rejected, while Iran’s was accepted.

[4] Others include, the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), the China-Arab States Cooperation Forum (CASCF), and the China-CELAC forum. These are ultimately subsumed under the logic and rubric of the One Belt One Road Initiative (OBOR). See, Jeremy Garlick & Fangxing Qin. “China’s ‘do-as-I-do’ paradigm: practice-based normative diplomacy in the global South.” The Pacific Review. December, 2023. DOI: 10.1080/09512748.2023.2290619.

[5] “The Shanghai Spirit” is the foundational ethos of the SCO, and refers to the principles of mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality, consultation, respect for diverse civilizations and the pursuit of common development. The Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence (mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non- interference in each other’s internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence) are PRC foreign policy principles first put forward by then-PRC Premier Zhou Enlai on 31 December 1953 during a meeting with a delegation from the Indian government. At the 1955 Bandung Conference, the Five Principles were included in the Ten Principles for conducting international relations that Indonesia adopted; and in 1970 they were included in the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. They are characterized as fundamental principles behind PRC foreign policy (see Embassy of the PRC in the Islamic Republic of Iran, June 29, 2014). The links Xi mentions were also echoed at a recent event in Beijing commemorating the 70th anniversary of the Principles (PLA Daily, July 8).

[6] This latter phrase was first used at an SCO summit in 2018 (PLA Daily, July 8).

[7] United Nations resolution A/77/L.107, titled “Cooperation between the United Nations and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.”

[8] Wang elaborated, saying that “the scandalous behavior of Lai Ching-te and his ilk in betraying the nation and their ancestors is disgraceful. But no matter how they toss and turn, they will not be able to stop China from eventually achieving complete reunification, and Taiwan will surely return to the embrace of the motherland. All ‘Taiwan independence’ separatists will be nailed to the pillar of shame in history (‘台独’分裂活动是台海和平最大的破坏性因素。赖清德之流背叛民族和祖先的丑行令人不齿。但无论他们如何折腾，都阻挡不了中国终将实现完全统一，台湾必将回归祖国的怀抱。所有‘台独’分裂分子都将被钉在历史的耻辱柱上).”

[9] Jeremy Garlick & Fangxing Qin, December 2023.