Turkish Journalists are Now ‘Telling the Xinjiang Story Well’ for Beijing

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Image of visiting Turkish journalists. (Source: Tianshannet)

Executive Summary:

  • Türkiye could be a key player in the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) strategy of coopting foreign journalists in order to create a more favorable image of its policies in Xinjiang.
  • Türkiye’s participation in PRC state-backed tours for journalists, along with recent economic deals, indicates a shift in Ankara’s stance on Xinjiang.
  • The timing of this media outreach is strategic, capitalizing on anti-Western sentiment in Türkiye due to the Palestine-Israel conflict and tensions with the EU.
  • The content produced about Xinjiang promotes a narrative of “unity, harmony, and prosperity” that starkly contrasts with reports of severe human rights violations, and completely ignores ongoing abuses in the region.

The People’s Republic of China (PRC) has employed various strategies in attempts to influence and control narratives about its human rights violations in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR). These include inviting foreign journalists and social media influencers to the region to present a more favorable image of Xinjiang. This is intended to “break Western discourse hegemony (打破西方话语霸权),” creating a favorable international media environment for “Chinese modernization (中国式现代化建设).”

In July, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan visited the PRC (FMPRC, July 26). There, he met with senior officials, including Director of the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) Foreign Affairs Commission and Minister of Foreign Affairs Wang Yi (王毅). He also visited the XUAR. Shortly after Fidan’s trip, the PRC invited 11 journalists from major Turkish media outlets on a carefully curated tour of the region. This is part of Beijing’s strategy to use foreign media to “Tell the Xinjiang story well (讲好新疆故事),”—one facet of the broader CCP project to “tell China’s story well.” In the words of PRC President Xi Jinping, this means describing Xinjiang as “stable” and its people as “very happy and content.” The promotion of this narrative is aimed at countering the widespread allegations of human rights abuses and cultural destruction that have drawn international condemnation (Xinhua, September 2, 2023).

The invited journalists were part of a dubiously named program titled “Media Trip in Xinjiang: Always More to Discover (最是新疆看不够),” cohosted by the Xinjiang Cyberspace Affairs Commission and state-owned media organization Guangming Online (Guangmingwang, August 8; altxw.com, August 8). The program consisted of a nine-day tour across several cities, including Urumqi, Ili, Aksu, and Kashgar. These tours, conducted under the close supervision of the PRC authorities, were designed to “vividly showcase a beautiful Xinjiang” marked by “unity, harmony, prosperity, progress, security, and ecological well-being.”

The journalists’ reports echoed the PRC’s favored narrative. A video posted by the PRC Consulate-General to Türkiye in Istanbul showcases some of their reactions. One journalist, Erdal Emre, praised the region’s cultural richness and the hospitality of its people; Mustafa Birol Güger, who reports for Cumhuriyet, remarked on the smiling faces at an Urumqi bazaar; and Tunç Akkoç, the founder of a digital media company, expressed surprise at the stark difference between his experiences in Xinjiang and what he had observed in Western reporting. All emphasized that the Uyghur people’s lives were peaceful and happy (X.com/Çin İstanbul Başkonsolosluğu Sözcüsü中国驻伊斯坦布尔总领馆发言人, August 13).

The PRC leverages its ability to influence foreign media to whitewash its actions. The recent visit by Turkish journalists constitutes just one recent instance of this. By participating, these journalists have become instruments in a campaign to reshape the narrative on the XUAR. The portrayal of a harmonious and culturally vibrant XUAR, however, is pure propaganda. Since 2017, PRC authorities have embarked on a systematic campaign to erase Uyghur cultural and religious identity (see China Brief; May 14, 2017, February 14, May 24). According to a 2020 report by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI), approximately 16,000 mosques—about 65 percent of the total in the XUAR—had already been destroyed or damaged (ASPI, September 24, 2020). This has continued in the years since and throughout the rest of the country (Financial Times, November 27, 2023). This is part of a strategy of cultural erasure, aimed at forcibly assimilating the Uyghur population into the dominant Han culture. Sacred sites, community practices, and even the Uyghur language have been targeted in this campaign of Sinicization (Getty Publications, 2022).

Turkish media outlets’ complicity in promoting Beijing’s “Xinjiang story” is particularly troubling given Türkiye’s historical support for Uyghur rights. However, despite the Turkish government’s vocal criticism of Beijing’s policies, a shift that has gradually accelerated over the last eight years or so toward accommodating Beijing has become increasingly evident. A resumption of direct flights between Istanbul and Urumqi in August also exemplifies this (CNR, August 5). The route was suspended in July 2016 amid reports of severe human rights abuses in Xinjiang. New economic deals have also been announced, such as a $1 billion agreement with electric vehicle giant BYD to build a plant in Türkiye (Reuters, July 8).

This round of media outreach from the PRC has been well-timed. Türkiye is experiencing growing anti-Western sentiment, fueled by the Israel-Palestine conflict and tensions with the European Union. The PRC can exploit this to erode support for Uyghurs by claiming that Western media narratives cannot be trusted. Türkiye’s influence in much of Africa, where similar views critical of Western actions regarding Israel are prevalent, likely makes it a key node in the PRC’s push for influence across the world.

For over a century, the CCP has invited sympathetic journalists from across the world to report on its achievements. This is now being enhanced with the additional invitation of foreign social media influencers. The content they produce is then amplified on Western social media platforms by accounts controlled by PRC government-affiliated actors (ASPI, December 10, 2021).

The involvement of Turkish media and influencers in this whitewashing effort illustrates how the PRC’s influence extends far beyond its borders. This allows it to shape the views of foreign audiences. The reports from Turkish journalists and posts from social media influencers that focus exclusively on cultural preservation and economic development in the XUAR fail to acknowledge the ongoing cultural destruction and human rights violations. This effectively legitimizes Beijing’s actions in the eyes of the international community.

Conclusion

Turkey’s strengthening ties with Beijing prioritizes economic and geopolitical interests. But this comes at the cost of human rights concerns. There is a complex interplay between media, propaganda, and diplomacy. The alignment of Turkish media narratives with Beijing’s preferred frame for “telling the Xinjiang story well” could significantly impact global understanding of the situation in Xinjiang. That this trip followed a high-level diplomatic visit indicates that the Turkish government supports this frame too. This media strategy not only threatens to distort perceptions but also risks normalizing grave human rights violations under the guise of economic cooperation and cultural exchange.