A Briefer on Islamic State’s Activities Throughout Africa

Executive Summary:

• In the first half of 2025, Islamic State’s five African provinces conducted 565 attacks across nine countries, with a sharp rise tied to the launch of its “Burning Camps” campaign targeting military bases and camps at night. Islamic State (IS) also appears to be working to entrench itself across the continent through community outreach efforts, increasingly acting as a parallel authority in parts of Africa where state presence is weak or absent.
• Of the five IS affiliates:
  • Islamic State–West Africa Province led the charge with 240 attacks across Nigeria, Niger, and Cameroon.
  • Islamic State–Central Africa Province carried out over 100 attacks in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda.
  • Islamic State–Mozambique Province expanded into Mozambique’s Niassa province despite military pressure.
  • Islamic State–Sahel Province saw renewed attacks in Niger and Mali.
  • Islamic State–Somalia remains active in Puntland, though the group’s activities have been constrained by local security operations.

In the first half of 2025, Islamic State (IS) increased its military activities and extended its control in Africa, broadening its areas of operations and attack repertoire. Altogether, from June 1 to 30, IS’s provinces in Africa carried out 565 attacks, 86 of which took place in June alone. [1] [2] The five IS provinces in Africa, which conduct operations in nine total countries, have also elevated the severity of their attacks partly due to the new “Burning Camps” strategy, which began in March and involves the targeting of military bases and armed camps, typically at night. [3]

Islamic State West Africa Province (IS–WAP)

Islamic State–West Africa Province (IS–WAP) is undoubtedly the most active of IS’s regional divisions in Africa. In the first six months of 2025, it carried out 240 attacks in Nigeria, Niger, and Cameroon (The New Humanitarian, July 24). In the “burning camps” campaign, it claimed responsibility for 54 attacks in four months, targeting military checkpoints and convoys in addition to camps and bases (The New Humanitarian, June 2). IS–WAP primarily attacked pro-government militias, Christian civilians, and tribal leaders.

IS–WAP has been attempting to reextend its area of operations to Yobe State from its main theater in Borno State in northeastern Nigeria. This is best evidenced by the rise in IS–WAP attacks in the territory. Furthermore, attacks have resumed in Adamawa State (along the border with Cameroon), as well as around the city of Maroua in the Far North Region of Cameroon and the Diffa Region of Niger. IS–WAP has also increased its tactical use of drones and night-time attacks (Africa Defence Forum, May 13).

Islamic State–Mozambique Province (IS–MP)

Islamic State–Mozambique Province (IS–MP) experienced difficulties in 2025 while still managing to expand its operations. The province carried out 69 attacks in the first six months of 2025 against pro-government militias, Christian civilians, and the Mozambican army. Since its inception, the franchise’s area of activity has been mainly the province of Cabo Delgado. It has also grown within the province, managing to strike consistently in 11 of the province’s 16 districts.

The biggest development related to IS–MP has been its attacks in the neighboring province of Niassa, particularly in the Niassa Special Reserve and in the district of Mecula (AIM News, April 25). The most significant attack was against a Mozambican army camp in the district of Macomia at the end of June. The attack ended with the jihadists destroying the camp, stealing weapons and ammunition, and killing between 13 and 30 soldiers, according to differing accounts (ACLED, 2 July; Amaq News Agency, June 29).

Islamic State–Sahel Province (IS–SP)      

IS’s activities in the Sahel have been inconsistent, with entire weeks passing without any attacks. Nonetheless, the general rate of attacks seems to be on the rise. In the first six months of 2025, Islamic State–Sahel Province (IS–SP) carried out 25 attacks in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger targeting those countries’ respective armed forces, as well as the al-Qaeda affiliate Group for Supporters of Islamic and Muslims (JNIM) and militias associated with the Malian Imghad Tuareg Self-Defense Group and Allies (GATIA) (for more on GATIA, see Terrorism Monitor, April 3, 2015).

IS–SP continues to operate in the Gao and Menaka regions of Mali, as well as the Sahel Region of Burkina Faso. Niger has seen an increase in IS–SP attacks in the country, including a major strike against the joint positions of the Nigerien army and the National Guard in Bani-Bangou territory in the Tillaberi Region (Amaq News Agency, June 17). In addition, IS–SP attacked a Malian army base in the town of Tessit in the Gao Region (Amaq News Agency, June 9). In addition to IS–SP’s usual activity in the Tillaberi Region of Niger, since May, the group’s attacks have reached as far as the Dosso and Tahoua regions in the southwest (Vanguard [Nigeria], May 6; Al-Naba, May 25).

Islamic State–Central Africa Province (IS–CAP) and IS–Somalia Province (IS–Somalia)

The only countries where there has been no expansion of IS’s areas of operations are Somalia and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Islamic State–Central Africa Province (IS–CAP) has claimed responsibility for three attacks in Uganda, including an attack where the group claimed to have destroyed a barracks and killed 10 soldiers, although these numbers have not been confirmed (Amaq News Agency, January 5). IS’s lack of success in Somalia can be explained in large part by effective counter-terrorism campaigns by the Puntland security forces against IS–Somalia (Idil News, November 30, 2024). Nevertheless, attacks by IS–CAP and IS–Somalia are increasing against military forces and, in the case of the DRC, against Christian civilians. Attacks by the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF; a prominent militia affiliated with IS–CAP) targeting local Christians in the northeastern Congo include a major attack in mid-May in Lubero Territory in North Kivu Province. In that attack, IS–CAP claims they burned and destroyed an entire Christian village and massacred its inhabitants (X/@G88Daniele, May 19). More recently, IS–CAP massacred churchgoers in the town of Komanda, Ituri Province, killing 70.

IS–Somalia carried out 128 attacks in the first six months of 2025 in the Bari region of Puntland, while IS–CAP carried out 107 attacks in the provinces of Ituri and North Kivu in the same period. This demonstrates that IS’s fighters are managing to maintain their tactical positions despite the military efforts of the U.S.-backed Puntland Security Forces and joint counterterrorism operations by the Congolese and Ugandan armies. Even where the jihadists have been repelled or defeated in some areas, they are still able to fall back to other positions, demonstrating significant resilience.

Conclusion

The data confirm the persistence and escalation of IS’s activities in Africa, despite ongoing counterterrorism operations. A rising number of attacks against Christian villages and civilians occur particularly in Nigeria, Mozambique, and the DRC, amounting to 135 attacks in the first five months of 2025. IS complements its attacks by controlling numerous areas in the nine African countries where it is involved with da’wah (Islamic missionary or preaching) activities and community involvement, allowing it to entrench itself as a parallel political authority to the de jure government (The New Humanitarian, July 24). With the start of the “burning camps” military campaign, there has been a further surge in attacks, both in frequency and intensity, including efforts to cause significant damage to infrastructure, as seen in the attempted destruction of a major bridge in Nigeria (Daily Post [Nigeria], July 4).

Notes:

[1] There is a difference of 10 attacks between the claims published in the al-Naba newsletter in the first six months of 2025 and the infographic published by Amaq News Agency summarizing attacks from January 1 to June 30, 2025.

[2] “Security Risk Monitoring and Threat Assessment of Islamic State in Africa: Military Operations June 2025”, Daniele Garofalo, https://www.danielegarofalomonitoring.com/p/security-risk-monitoring-and-threat-f42

[3] All data cited are presented in graphs and statistics in the Military Activity Monitoring section of the Daniele Garofalo Monitoring website. https://www.danielegarofalomonitoring.com/t/military-activity-monitoring