Herat to Mazar-i-Sharif Railway Project May Shift Uzbekistan’s Transit Role

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(Source: Pajhwok Afghan News)

Executive Summary:

  • Afghanistan, Iran, and Türkiye agreed on October 22 to jointly construct a railway between Afghanistan’s cities of Herat and Mazar-i-Sharif as a part of the Five Nations Railway Corridor (FNRC).
  • The development of the FNRC—spanning the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Afghanistan, and Iran—will greatly benefit Tehran and Kabul as they increasingly facilitate trade to the PRC and seek to diversify their eastern trade routes.
  • The Herat–Mazar-i-Sharif line may alter Uzbekistan’s transit role, offering it new access to Iran’s ports but also risking loss of cargo traffic to Tajikistan and Iran if Tashkent does become involved in the FNRC.

Afghanistan, Iran, and Türkiye have agreed to jointly construct a railway between Afghanistan’s Herat and Mazar-i-Sharif (Tolo News, October 24). Representatives from the three countries reached the agreement on October 22 at the Regional Assembly of the International Union of Railways in Istanbul. Each country will contribute financial, technical, and human resources to the project. A $10 million technical and economic feasibility study is scheduled for completion by March 2026, with cargo trials to follow a year later (South Asian Desk, October 25).

The extension of railway lines along Afghanistan’s northern provinces positions it as a key transit hub in East–West connectivity through Eurasia. The October 22 agreement marks another milestone in the implementation of the Five Nations Railway Corridor (FNRC) concept, which gained momentum in the early 2000s (see EDM, December 15, 2020). The 2,100-kilometer (1,205-mile) route features a single 1,435 millimeter standard gauge and spans the borders of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Afghanistan, and Iran, with additional access to Türkiye and the European Union. The FNRC is designed to provide the shortest land connection between East Asia, the Middle East, and Europe, posing serious competition to transit routes from the PRC to the European Union via Central Asia, including the Middle Corridor, also known as the Trans-Caspian International Transit Route (TITR).

The development of the FNRC will have long-term consequences for transit through Uzbekistan. The launch of the railway from Herat to Mazar-i-Sharif could provide Tashkent with additional access to Iran’s road transport and port infrastructure, bypassing Turkmenistan. This access, however, may hinge on Uzbekistan’s investment in the FNRC. The FNRC could also negatively impact Uzbekistan’s role as a transit hub, redistributing cargo traffic between the PRC and Europe from Uzbekistan to Tajikistan and Iran.

In 2007, Tehran took the lead in implementing the FNRC, launching the construction of a 225-kilometer (140-mile) railway line from the Iranian city of Khaf to Herat, Afghanistan (Railway Technology, December 16, 2020). The final section of this route is expected to be commissioned by next year. Once completed, the project would enable Afghanistan and Iran to transport up to 3 million tons of cargo across their shared border each year, mostly in transit flows. In March, 200 tons of Afghan dried fruit were transported to the European Union via the Khaf–Herat route (Afghanistan International, March 27). The possible extension of the railway to Afghanistan’s northeastern provinces, and then on to Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, could result in cargo flows traveling in the opposite direction, with final delivery to the PRC. This holds great promise for Iran, which is developing trade relations with the PRC and seeks to diversify its supply routes to the East (PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs, accessed November 12).

In 2017, Uzbekistan and Afghanistan signed an agreement to construct the Mazar-i-Sharif–Sheberghan–Maimana–Herat railway, which could subsequently be connected to the Khaf–Herat railway (President of the Republic of Uzbekistan, December 5, 2017). To complete the Afghan section of the FNRC, the railway would only need to be extended from Mazar-i-Sharif to the Sher Khan Bandar in Kunduz Province, which borders Tajikistan. In 2019, Kabul reached an agreement with Dushanbe to construct a railway from the Afghan Sher Khan Bandar to the Tajik settlement of Jaloliddini Balkhi (Kolkhozobod) through Panji Poyon (Asia-Plus Tajikistan, November 5, 2019). Both projects, however, remain unfinished. In the first case, Tashkent decided to pursue an alternative trans-Afghan route toward Pakistan, known as the Kabul Corridor (see EDM, January 15, October 16). In the second, the railway line in Tajikistan lacked funding.

Following the Taliban’s 2021 seizure of power in Afghanistan, the issue of establishing a railway connection between the cities of Mazar-i-Sharif and Herat was once again on the agenda. In May 2023, the Taliban-controlled government approved the 1,468-kilometer (912-mile) Mazar-i-Sharif–Herat–Kandahar railway project, which they pitched to Russia as the shortest route to India through Afghanistan and Pakistan (ATN News, May 2, 2023). The first phase involves constructing a 657-kilometer (408-mile) railway from Mazar-i-Sharif to Herat. In April, Moscow announced expanded cooperation with Uzbekistan on the Trans-Afghan Railway project (Russian Ministry of Transportation, April 8). This announcement followed a statement by Mullah Baradar Akhund, the Afghan Deputy Prime Minister for Economic Affairs, following his visit to Tashkent in February (RTA, February 23). Akhund unexpectedly announced that Uzbekistan intends to extend the railway from Hairatan to Herat—a project that was put on hold in 2017—and will finance preliminary studies along this route. The Uzbek side, however, has not confirmed these plans.

The construction of the Mazar-i-Sharif-Herat railway by Russia or even Uzbekistan would require introducing the railway standards of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), including the 1,520 millimeter gauge, to Afghanistan. These standards would facilitate the objective of connecting northern and central Eurasia with South Asia. If Iran and Türkiye build the route, as recently announced, they would use the European standard gauge of 1,435 millimeters, making the primary purpose of the project to activate the Five Nations Corridor rather than the Trans-Afghan Corridor to Pakistan via Kandahar.

The FNRC is a shorter route than transport corridors passing through Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan to the west. These three Central Asian republics are developing the Southern Railway Corridor to the European Union via Iran and Türkiye. Construction connecting the China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan railway with the Southern Corridor began in April 2025 and is expected to shorten the trade route between East Asia and Europe by approximately 900 kilometers (559 miles) (see EDM, July 17, 2024, April 8). This shortened distance could give Tashkent a competitive advantage in interregional transit transportation, but Uzbekistan risks missing out on this opportunity if the Five Nations Corridor continues to be developed. Tashkent could create a China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan–Tajikistan–Uzbekistan railway corridor, with the possibility of extending it to Afghanistan and Iran. This route would involve Uzbekistan in the FNRC, making it a beneficiary of the Mazar-i-Sharif to Herat railway project.