Amid Geopolitical Tensions, Baloch Militant Attacks Undermine Sino–Pakistan Projects

Executive Summary:

• The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) has become a prime target for Baloch separatists and jihadist groups, with attacks escalating since 2021 and culminating in high-profile incidents like the March 2025 Jaffar Express hijacking.
• These attacks reflect deeper regional and geopolitical tensions, as CPEC’s trajectory is increasingly entangled with conflicts involving Iran, India, and the marginalization of Baloch communities.

The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), a flagship project of the People’s Republic of China’s “One Belt One Road (OBOR)” Initiative, aims to connect Kashgar in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region to Pakistan’s Gwadar port. This would provide a shortcut for China’s oil imports from the Persian Gulf, in addition to numerous economic benefits for Pakistan. However, the project faces persistent threats from Baloch separatist and Islamist militant groups, with attacks targeting Chinese nationals and infrastructure escalating since 2021. The Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) has intensified its campaign against the CPEC, exemplified by Operation Dara-e-Bolan in Mach, Balochistan, on January 29, 2024, along with a series of coordinated attacks in March 2025. The March attacks included the high-profile hijacking of the Jaffar Express train on March 11, which killed 59 people and took hundreds hostage (see Terrorism Monitor, May 6, 2024).

While Pakistani officials claim BLA attacks aim to sabotage Pakistan’s close alliance with China, the targeted killings of Chinese nationals highlight the CPEC’s significant security vulnerabilities (Dawn, June 10, 2024). For example, Baloch militants killed nine Chinese workers at the Dasu Hydropower Project on July 14, 2021 (The Hindu, July 31, 2023). The signing of six new pacts in 2023 to inaugurate CPEC’s second phase further motivated Baloch separatists, leading to attacks on Chinese workers since 2024. These included yet another attack at the Dasu Dam. These attacks cast doubt on the effectiveness of security measures protecting CPEC projects and Chinese personnel, as well as the project’s future viability.

Impact of CPEC Attacks

Attacks on Chinese nationals and CPEC infrastructure threaten project delays and financial losses. This includes critical initiatives like roads, power plants, and the expansion of Gwadar port (The Diplomat, August 15, 2023). The BLA’s Jaffar Express in March hijacking and July attacks in Mastung, which targeted government installations and CPEC routes, have heightened fears of further delays, deterring Chinese and other foreign investors (The Diplomat, March 13). This insecurity exacerbates Pakistan’s economic challenges and risks inflaming ethnic tensions, particularly against the Baloch, which could fuel wider social unrest throughout Pakistan (First Post, March 19).

Following the March 2024 Dasu attack, China pressured Pakistan privately by sending investigators (The Indian Express, March 29, 2024). The Chief Minister of Punjab, Maryam Nawaz, noted that Chinese nationals often fail to adhere to security protocols, with China’s Gezhouba Group Company admitting to violating standard operating procedures by not using bulletproof vehicles or bombproof buses (The Hindu, April 7, 2024). Pakistan responded by forming a joint investigation team, establishing an inquiry committee to enhance security for Chinese nationals, and launching Operation Azm-e-Istehkam to counter militant threats (ANI, June 25, 2024).

In July 2024, a BLA attack on a convoy of Chinese engineers in Gwadar prompted an intensified crackdown on separatists, straining Pakistan–China relations further. China urged stricter security measures, leading to new surveillance systems and counterterrorism units around CPEC sites (Al Jazeera, March 29, 2024). Meetings in August 2024 between Chinese and Pakistani officials focused on reassessing security protocols, with China exploring the deployment of private security firms while deepening joint security operations and intelligence-sharing to protect its citizens (Sentinela Assam, November 14, 2024; for more on China’s use of private security firms, see Jamestown project Guardians of the Belt and Road).

CPEC Amid Regional Tensions

Baloch separatists appear to be growing more audacious in their efforts to secure independence. Examples of this include the BLA’s public declaration of Pakistan’s Counter-Terrorism Department as a “national enemy,” which came alongside the group’s takeover of Mastung and ambush in the Amach region (Tribune India, July 4). These incidents hold increased significance amid regional tensions, including the Israel–Iran conflict in June and India–Pakistan clashes in May, which amplified security concerns around CPEC-related projects in Balochistan (The Diplomat, June 26). The BLA, an umbrella organization for Baloch separatists, argues that CPEC projects exploit Balochistan’s resources without benefiting local communities (The Economic Times, May 11). Concurrently, jihadist groups like Islamic State–Khorasan Province (ISKP), the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), and Tehreek-e-Jihad Pakistan (TJP) have all targeted CPEC sites in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province (in the country’s northwest, bordering Afghanistan). These groups are collectively driven by ideological opposition to the People’s Republic of China’s influence and its policies toward Muslim Uyghurs (South China Morning Post, April 8, 2024).

The Israel–Iran conflict in June 2025 raised fears in Pakistan of Iranian Baloch militants collaborating with Baloch militants in Pakistan in an attempt to undermine the Islamic Republic, further complicating CPEC security (Reuters, June 19). Similarly, India–Pakistan tensions following the April 2025 Pahalgam attack in Kashmir have drawn Chinese attention to Balochistan, where the BLA expressed solidarity with India (Durand Dispatch, May 12). BLA activities have thus coincided with broader geopolitical rivalries, intensifying Beijing’s concerns over the CPEC’s viability (East Asia Forum, June 7).

Conclusion

The escalation of Baloch militancy poses significant consequences for Pakistan’s relationship with one of its most important allies. The insurgency in Balochistan is an excellent example of the diplomatic challenges that states wracked by militancy face, given the insurgents’ corrosive effects on existing political ties and efforts at economic development. Similarly, militancy and terrorism prove to be a feedback loop, often arising in situations of poverty—such as can be seen in marginalized Balochistan—which only goes to further work against future development in the region. The BLA campaign can also be a factor in the complicated patchwork of geopolitical issues regarding Pakistan and its neighbors, Iran and India. All these underscore the challenge of balancing development ambitions with the impact of local grievances among Pakistan’s Baloch population.