The following day, the mujahid strategy emerged in even more detail. Under the title “What now after the Denmark events?—A Plan of Action,” an individual named Abu Maria al-Qurashi set out nine specific action points:
• Intensify the boycott by appealing to the idea of “revenge for the Prophet”
• Talk up the “Osama was right” angle on the “war between Islam and Disbelief”
• Retell the accounts of the [Prophet’s] slaying of the enemies of God, making use of the book al-Sarim al-Maslul by Ibn Taymiyya, a medieval jihad ideologue
• Highlight the pusillanimity of the Arab governments’ stance and their disbelief
• Broaden the boycott among Arabs to cover Western thought and culture through targeting secularists, liberals and modernists
• Instill enthusiasm in the youth for revenge by showing them jihadi films of mujahid heroes
• Remind the masses of the doctrine of al-Wala’ wal-Bara’ (“Friendship and Enmity”), “since the people are now in a mood to hate the Infidel and keep themselves separate from them”
• Remind them of the tragedies of the [Islamic] Nation in Palestine, Iraq, Afghanistan, Chechnya and Kashmir, and how the enemies of God have defiled God’s Book
• Inform them how all accords of safe conduct [for the disbelievers] are specifically voided for those that have opposed God and His Prophet [like this], and that it is permissible to trick them by pretending to offer them safe conduct in order to kill them, as argued by [jihadi ideologues] Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya and Ibn Taymiyya (https://www.alghorabaa.net/forums).
As the main distribution vehicles for these radical views, the internet’s vital role is clear; it is a launch pad for ideology, commentary and electronic warfare (Terrorism Focus, February 7). Within days after the eruption of the crisis, sites such as https://www.no4denmark.com channeled the growing flood of anti-Danish postings, while a more concerted effort appeared with the Katibat al-Difa’ an al-Nabi (“Defense of the Prophet Battalion”). Located at https://www.kateba.44w.com, it is still in the process of formation, but its format, complete with news updates, electronic banners, links and discussion forum, indicates that it aims to be a permanent element in the jihadist panoply.
That the mujahideen see the cartoon crisis as a watershed moment in their campaign to re-define Islam can be gauged from the above discussions on how to widen the protest. For instance, already one participant on the Tajdeed forum has suggested restarting the controversy over the image of the Prophet, brandishing a sword on the entrance to the U.S. Supreme Court (https://www.tajdeed.org.uk).