Arambai Tenggol: The Meitei Militia Threatening India’s Manipur State

Executive Summary:

• On January 24, an ethnic Meitei militia, the Arambai Tenggol, forced the government of India’s insurgency-wracked Manipur State to capitulate to a six-point list of demands. While this event was unprecedented, it was made possible by “tacit patronage” from the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and its local officials.
• The Arambai Tenggol are a revivalist cultural outfit alleged to have engaged in mass killings, rapes, looting, and arson. Their demands represent the political aspirations of the majority Meitei ethnic group in Manipur, and risk further destabilizing a territory that was already engaged in near-civil war-level violence a year ago.

On January 24, the Manipur state government in India publically capitulated to a radical ethnic Meitei militia, the Arambai Tenggol. While elected representatives succumbing to the pressure of militias and armed separatists in India’s insurgency-wracked northeastern states is hardly a recent phenomenon, this event was unprecedented. Four days earlier, the Arambai Tenggol summoned all legislators of the Meitei ethnic majority to the Kangla Fort in Manipur’s capital, Imphal, warning that anyone who did not participate would be treated as “an enemy of the Meitei community” (Sangai Express, January 20). This event highlights the importance of understanding the Arambai Tenggol, from its evolution to the factors behind its spectacular rise.

Manipur’s Capitulation

As many as 37 members of the Manipur state legislative assembly and two members of the state’s representation in the national parliament showed up for the event. In the presence of Korounganba Khuman, leader of the Arambai Tenggol, and scores of his commanders, the lawmakers proceeded to sign a six-point pledge in support of the militia’s key demands. Manipur Chief Minister Biren Singh of the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) did not attend the event, but nevertheless eventually signed on to the militia’s demands (Indian Express, January 25; Imphal Free Press, January 26).

If the prolonged violent chaos in Manipur since May 2023 revealed the weakness of the state and its inability—and even unwillingness—to restore the rule of law, events on January 24 underscored the state’s “abject surrender” to a militia that is alleged to have engaged in mass killings, rapes, looting, and arson (Scroll, January 26). Although there was a heavy deployment of Indian security forces in Imphal on the day of the capitulation, there was no question that the Arambai Tenggol called the shots. Dressed in military fatigues and brandishing weapons, its commanders openly rode into Kangla Fort in jeeps as crowds lined the streets to cheer them on. While the militia’s leaders could not carry heavy weapons into the fort, the entry gate was conspicuously manned by Arambai Tenggol foot soldiers, not the Manipur police (Scroll, January 26; The Hindu, January 24).

Who are the Arambai Tenggol?

Founded in early 2020, the Arambai Tenggol (meaning “dart-wielding cavalry” in Meitei) initially seemed to be a revivalist cultural outfit. Its goals were primarily to
preserve Meitei indigenous culture, tradition, and identity as well as restore the “glorious past of Kangleipak” [the old name of the Meitei kingdom before King Pamheiba/Gharib Niwaz changed its name to Manipur in 1724]. Further, the group claimed to protect the culture and interests of the Meitei, promoting a mix of the indigenous Sanamahi religion and Meitei nationalist rhetoric (Indian Express, January 27).

It was not long, however, before the Arambai Tenggol’s nationalism targeted the “other”— in this case, their crosshair fell on the largely Christian Kuki-Zo-Hmar hill tribes, who were quickly demonized in social media. In May 2023, violent clashes erupted between the Meitei and Kuki-Zo ethnic groups, which plunged Manipur into a civil war-like situation. After this, the Arambai Tenggol led Meitei mobs in the looting and torching of Kuki villages as well as the murder of the ethnic group’s civilians (Whither Manipur, June 10, 2023).

The Kangla Fort oath-taking ceremony marked a milestone in the transformation of the Arambai Tenggol from a “socio-cultural and revivalist organization” to an armed militia with clearly articulated political aims. [1] Its six-point charter demanded, among other things, the implementation of the National Register of Citizens, the revocation of the tripartite Suspension of Operation agreement with Kuki-Zomi armed groups, and the deletion of Kukis from the Scheduled Tribes list—all extremely contentious issues in Manipur’s sectarian atmosphere (Indian Express, January 25). [2] At a time when Manipur is riven by interethnic violent conflict, the Arambai Tenggol have successfully articulated the political aspirations of the majority Meitei.

State Patronage

The Arambai Tenggol’s capacity for muscle-flexing, intimidation, and vigilante violence has grown rapidly in its four years of existence. [3] On February 27, around 200 of its members stormed the residence of a senior police official in Imphal East and held him and his guards hostage for several hours (Hindustan Times, February 29). The militia also prohibited political parties from using loudspeakers and holding public meetings to campaign in this year’s Indian general elections (Imphal Times, March 30).

The Arambai Tenggol’s rise was enabled by the fact that it enjoys state patronage. According to an officer of an Indian paramilitary force, “This group had been raised with the blessings of [the state’s] Chief Minister” and “was allowed to loot arms from the state armories” (The Telegraph [India], July 1, 2023). In a social media post from August 2022, the Arambai Tenggol further claimed to have met the Manipur Chief Minister, Biren Singh, and subsequently posted a photograph of the meeting. The Facebook page of Manipur’s titular king and BJP parliamentarian, Leishemba Sanajaoba, also displays a video of Arambai Tenggol members participating in an oath-taking ceremony at his residence (Facebook/Maharaja Sanajaoba Leishemba, September 25, 2022; Indian Express, February 29). Both instances underscore officials’ close ties with the Arambai Tenggol.

Without the “tacit patronage” of Chief Minister Singh and BJP parliamentarian Sanajaoba, armed Arambai Tenggol cadres would not have been able to roam freely across various valley districts and the foothills of Manipur. Likewise, the militia’s takeover of a school owned by an ethnic Zomi in what was known as Paite Veng (now renamed as Kwakeithel Ningthemkol) at the heart of Imphal would not have been possible without the complicity or support of the state government. [4] Importantly, despite the Arambai Tenggol’s open flouting of the rule of law, engaging in mass violence, and challenging the Indian state and its Constitution, no Arambai Tenggol leader has been arrested to date. Neither the central BJP government nor Manipur state officials have condemned the group’s violence. [5]

Conclusion

By presenting itself as the guardian of the Meitei people against Kuki attacks, the Arambai Tenggol has garnered massive support among the Meitei. This has also led to a situation where youths have joined its ranks in droves amid the chaos and mounting insecurity gripping Manipur over the past year. Fighters of banned terrorist organizations, such as the United National Liberation Front (UNLF) and the Kanglei Yawol Kanna Lup (KYKL), have also joined the Arambai Tenggol (see Terrorism Monitor, March 22). These militants are further armed by weapons looted from police armories. [6]

As a result, the Arambai Tenggol poses a threat to the Indian state and the people of Manipur. In spite of this, the Indian government has taken virtually no action against the militia, perhaps because it has a broad base of local support and is a useful asset of the ruling BJP. Its rapid rise is nonetheless a matter of serious concern for the security and stability of Manipur and northeastern India more generally.

Notes:

[1] Author’s Interview with Kham Khan Suan Hausing, professor of Political Science, University of Hyderabad, India, April 7.

[2] In full, the six demands are (according to E-Pao, January 24):

• The implementation of the National Register of Citizens (NRC) in the state, using 1951 as the base year, as well as the deportation of “those … who do not have their names in the updated NRC to their native places;”
  • The NRC is a politically contentious proposal aimed at identifying and deporting those deemed to be illegal immigrants. It has thus far been implemented only in the state of Assam (in 2013), though its expansion to all of India was promised by the BJP in 2019 (Times of India, December 20, 2019).
• The abrogation of the Suspension of Operation (SoO) agreement with Kuki militant groups, allowing immediate “initiation of action against Kuki militants;”
  • The SoO was an agreement originally signed with a majority of Kuki militant groups in 2008, notably confining them to designated camps and requiring that their weapons be regularly monitored and kept in locked storage; two of the roughly 32 Kuki organizations were removed from the agreement by the Manipur state government in 2023 over allegations that they had violated the ceasefire (see Terrorism Monitor, March 22).
• The deportation of an estimated 5,500 Burmese refugees currently in Manipur to the neighboring state of Mizoram (Radio Free Asia, May 17);
• The erection of fencing along Manipur’s border with Myanmar;
• The replacement of the Assam Rifles with other paramilitary forces; and
  • The Assam Rifles are a paramilitary force run by the Indian government that traces back to efforts by the British to secure northeastern India in the early 19^th They are considered to be friendly with the Kukis (The Wire [India], August 7). In their place, a contingent of 2,000 Central Reserve Police Force officers are scheduled to be brought in, drawing protests from the Kuki population (The Hindu, August 1).
• The deletion of the Kukis from the Scheduled Tribes list.
  • While the history and state of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in India are complicated, put simply, they represent a form of positive discrimination aimed at offering disadvantaged groups political, educational, financial, and employment benefits (Union of Catholic Asian News, January 12).

[3] Author’s Interview with an Indian bureaucrat based in Imphal, India, April 5.

[4] Author’s Interview with Kham Khan Suan Hausing, professor of Political Science, University of Hyderabad, India, April 7.

[5] Author’s Interview with an Indian bureaucrat based in Imphal, India, April 5.

[6] Author’s Interview with an Indian bureaucrat based in Imphal, India, April 5.