Armenian Local Elections a Barometer for Pashinyan’s Political Future

Executive Summary:

• Recent local elections in the Armenian municipalities of Gyumri and Parakar revealed growing political challenges for Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan ahead of the 2026 parliamentary elections. Civil Contract, the ruling party, failed to secure a majority in Gyumri and lost outright in Parakar.
• These results highlight Pashinyan’s declining popularity and a reinvigorated, if still divided, opposition. The outcomes complicate Pashinyan’s broader agenda, including moving closer to the European Union and normalizing relations with Azerbaijan and Türkiye.
• Pashinyan faces mounting pressure to restore political momentum and redefine his leadership amid a shifting domestic and international landscape, including moves to re-engage with Russia.

Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan finds himself facing a turbulent political landscape following snap local elections in the municipalities of Gyumri and Parakar late last month (see EDM, November 27, 2024). Despite municipal votes often being dismissed as minor, the outcome of the March 30 elections carries national weight (Azatutyun, March 31). In both Gyumri and Parakar, Pashinyan’s ruling political party, Civil Contract, failed to secure a majority of the votes. The elections were widely considered a referendum on Pashinyan’s premiership. Pashinyan’s approval ratings hover around 11 percent, according to a survey published in January of this year (News.am, January 31; Groong, February 2). This, combined with the election results in Gyumri and Parakar, means that Pashinyan’s political survivability may be in question.

In Gyumri, Armenia’s second-largest city and home to the Russian 102nd military base, Pashinyan’s approval ratings are particularly symbolic given that he embarked on a pivotal march to unseat his predecessor, walking 117 kilometers (72 miles) from Gyumri to Yerevan in 2018, almost seven years ago to the day (ArmInfo, March 31, 2018). Despite most Armenians expecting Pashinyan’s Civil Contract party to outright win the elections, there was the possibility that another party could strike a deal for it to still govern.

In September 2023, Civil Contract had also failed to win an outright majority in the Yerevan municipal elections, attracting just 33 percent of the vote. Pashinyan’s candidate, Tigran Avinyan, had to instead rely on an extra-parliamentary Public Voice led by a former policeman and controversial video blogger, currently detained in the United States, to retain power (Azatutyun, September 18, 19, 2023, February 28). In Gyumri last month, however, there was no political force to make a deal. Even a new pro-European Union extra-parliamentary force believed close to Pashinyan failed to pass the six percent threshold (Armenian Central Electoral Commission, March 31).

Civil Contract’s Sarik Minasyan led Gyumri with 36.21 percent of the vote (EVN Report, April 16). His main challenger, controversial former mayor Vardan Ghukasyan (not to be confused with the candidate of the same name in Yerevan’s 2023 municipal vote), now representing the Communist Party, followed with 20.5 percent. Martun Grigoryan from the opposition Our City Alliance came in third at 15.5 percent, Ruben Mkhitaryan of My Strong Community with 7.9 percent came in fourth, and Karen Simonyan of Mother Armenia with 6.11 percent came in fifth, respectively. This meant that Pashinyan’s party would only obtain 14 seats, unable to form a majority (Armenian Central Electoral Commission; Azatutyun, March 31).

Ghukasyan’s election as mayor is particularly surprising given his track record under the unpopular administrations that preceded Pashinyan. Despite accusations of corruption, violence, and the death of a child allegedly during a shootout involving Ghukasyan’s son during and after his 1999–2012 tenure, Ghukasyan was supported by the other parties (Azatutyun, July 12, 2007; A1 Plus, April 24, 2013; ARKA, December 18, 2023). This even included Grigoryan, despite a personal history with Ghukasyan, whose nephew was sentenced to 17 years imprisonment in 2014 for the murder of one of his associates (Epress, July 22, 2014).

The outcome leaves Gyumri under opposition control at a time when Pashinyan is looking westward. A bill to eventually seek EU membership was recently passed by Armenia’s National Assembly, championed by the European Alliance. This extra-parliamentary bloc, however, failed to gain sufficient votes in the Gyumri election. This all unfolds against a backdrop of larger geopolitical shifts with Pashinyan especially eager to normalize relations with Türkiye, including eventually reviving the Gyumri–Kars railway (see EDM, May 6, 2024).

It remains unclear whether a pro-Russian, anti-Turkish figure such as Ghukasyan complicates matters (X/@hayqmets, April 3). Since becoming mayor, he has already called for a Union State with Russia similar to the model in place for Belarus (Caucasus Watch, April 17). Normalizing relations with Türkiye is considered key for Armenia to effectively diversify away from Moscow (see EDM, January 28). Meanwhile, a criminal investigation was launched on April 1 against Ghukasyan for allegedly attempting to coerce voters. He had been briefly detained before the vote for suspected illegal arms possession (Azatutyun, February 20). The new city council officially elected Ghukasyan while Pashinyan’s Civil Contract boycotted the vote.

In Parakar, a village near Yerevan, the opposition-aligned Country of Living party—reportedly linked to Russian-Armenian businessman Ruben Vardanyan, now on trial in Baku—won decisively with over 56 percent (Armenian Central Electoral Commission, March 31). Civil Contract lost outright, prompting one political activist and analyst, whose own party failed to win seats in Gyumri, to declare both results as the beginning of the end for Pashinyan’s rule (Facebook/surenyants, March 31). Such forecasts, however, may be premature.

Government supporters point out that Civil Contract lost Gyumri in local elections even after winning the 2021 parliamentary vote. Voter turnout in Gyumri, moreover, was up significantly—from 24 percent in 2021 to 42.68 percent this year (Armenian Central Electoral Commission, October 17, 2021, March 31). In a written statement, Pashinyan took a more optimistic tone, congratulating all candidates and considering it an example of a democratic vote (ArmenPress, March 31).

The political implications of these results are hard to ignore. As Pashinyan eyes a constitutional referendum—a prerequisite for signing a peace agreement with Azerbaijan—he needs not only to win in 2026 but to do so with an absolute majority in parliament (see EDM, March 24). He needs to accomplish this to ensure an attempt to normalize relations with Azerbaijan and Türkiye. With the opposition energized, the road ahead remains uncertain.

Pashinyan could consider changing the parliamentary system in any referendum. This has been hinted at before (see EDM, January 31, 2024). Speaking about the Gyumri vote, however, Yerevan mayor Avinyan dismissed such speculation (News.am, April 11). The broader regional context complicates matters. A peace deal with Azerbaijan remains linked to constitutional changes, while the potential re-engagement of Russia in the region further muddles the water (see EDM, June 25, 2024).

Re-engagement with Russia is would explain why, on March 14, Pashinyan accepted an invitation from Russian President Vladimir Putin to attend the annual May 9 Victory Day celebrations in Moscow to mark the end of World War II (Azatutyun, April 15). Last year, Pashinyan did not attend. This move has been taken as a step to defuse what had been growing antagonism between Armenia and Russia (Eurasianet, March 25). Six days following the invitation, Pashinyan was believed to have instructed officials to resume contact with their Russian counterparts (Business Online, March 20).

Diversifying away from Moscow does not necessarily mean abandoning Armenia’s aspirations to further integrate with the European Union completely. Armenia still relies on Moscow for most of its economic and energy needs, while Yerevan still lacks an open border with Türkiye, central for the European Union to make inroads into Central Asia via the South Caucasus (ArmenPress, April 4). That stated aim has already irked Baku, which also views this as a way to marginalize Georgia, given its souring relations with the European Union (Topchubashov Center, April 8; Caliber, April 11).

For now, Pashinyan must balance westward aspirations with the ever-present shadow of Russia and an increasingly assertive opposition at home. If he can offer voters a compelling vision of a “Real Armenia”—one that overcomes military defeat, economic stagnation, and regional isolation—he might still chart a path to re-election. The 2018 Velvet Revolution, however, feels distant for most Armenians now, as demonstrated in Gyumri. The loss of Karabakh and the attempted control of power in the regions of Armenia define his tenure today (Civilnet, November 27, 2024).

On the eve of the first Gyumri council meeting, Pashinyan’s predecessor, Serzh Sargsyan, lambasted his own forerunner, Robert Kocharyan. Both accuse each other of facilitating Pashinyan’s rise to power in 2018 (Azatutyun, April 15). Pashinyan has so far been fortunate that no alternative third force could unite a large part of the population that neither supports him nor the opposition. This, however, still risks electing a hung parliament for the first time in Armenia’s post-independence history.