Beijing’s Political Machine Makes Inroads in New York Politics

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Lester Chang (right), who represents the 49th district of the New York State Assembly, is backed by organizations with links to the united front system. (Source: Wikipedia)

Executive Summary:

  • The united front operates abroad as a political machine, helping to get people elected by fielding candidates, mobilizing votes, and building power bases.
  • Asian-Americans are growing in numbers yet remain key swing voters. Beijing’s role in shaping the political leanings of this demographic could have an enduring impact on who the United States’s leaders are.
  • In New York City, individuals and networks connected to the Party’s united front system have helped elect at least three local politicians in the last three years.
  • John Chan, a power broker whose networks span U.S. and Chinese officials, supported a 2022 proposal that would have created New York City’s first majority-Asian district, opposing established Asian-American community groups in the process. This likely would have given united front-linked groups a more dependable way to select and back elected representatives.

In April, the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) newly-appointed Deputy Consul General in New York met with overseas Chinese community leaders from across the city (World Journal, April 28). The meeting was hosted by BRACE (Asian-American Community Empowerment; 美国亚裔社团联合总会), a grassroots organization founded by John Chan, a prominent power broker with extensive connections to the PRC government (Washington Post, September 3, 2024; The New York Times [NYT], December 9, 2024). The Deputy Consul General praised BRACE for providing community services and safeguarding the rights and interests of overseas Chinese, while Chan thanked the consulate for its continuing support.

Just one month earlier, Chan’s close connections were on display once more—this time with New York politicians. Chan successfully persuaded two representatives to petition the U.S. Consulate in Guangzhou to revisit a previously rejected visa application, in order to facilitate a crucial medical procedure for a local resident he met through BRACE (Huaren Toutiao, April 23). Chan’s position as a power broker, with his close ties with U.S. and PRC officials, as well as to a network of local community organizations, is illustrative of a key strategy underpinning Beijing’s influence efforts: cultivating individuals with links to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) at the core of ethnic Chinese communities with a view to building up a political influence machine over the long term.

United Front Builds Grassroots Machine

The Party’s foreign influence activities can take many forms, from the harassment of dissidents to public protests against a Taiwanese president’s visit. Many of these activities are managed under the umbrella of the “united front” (统一战线), an amorphous global network of official and grassroots organizations tasked with mobilizing friends, suppressing enemies, and promoting Beijing’s interests. At the central level, united front work is the responsibility of the United Front Work Department, a Party organ.

The united front operates abroad as a political machine. Its work extends beyond pro-Beijing advocacy and rubbing shoulders with those in power. It is also about getting people elected, by fielding candidates, mobilizing votes, and building power bases. At a time when Asian-Americans are growing in numbers yet remain key swing voters, Beijing’s role in shaping the political leanings of this demographic could have an enduring impact on who the United States’s leaders are (NYT, August 13, 2024). The machine operates through societal organizations (社团) such as community and grassroots associations. These play a key role as “channels” (渠道) to build links with broader ethnic Chinese communities while maintaining Party connections. [1] They wear dual hats, providing public goods that help ground their legitimacy while engaging in political mobilization on behalf of the Party (China Brief, October 21, 2024). [2]

United front tactics can be hard to detect. In the United States, united front work is frequently carried out under the guise of America-centric community mobilization rather than overtly adopting a pro-Beijing banner. In 2009, the then-director of the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office—which merged with the United Front Work Department in 2017—called for Chinese people to actively participate in local politics and make their voices heard, framing this participation as defending the interests of minority groups (Overseas Chinese Affairs Office, 2009; China Brief, October 7, 2024). The united front also mobilizes ethnic Chinese communities to engage in protests by tapping into explosive “wedge” issues, such as race and identity (Foreign Policy, March 6). Issues such as anti-Asian hate, public safety, homeless shelters, bail reform, and standardized testing for high school admissions have been framed as part of longstanding racial discrimination toward and political exclusion of Chinese-American and Asian-American communities. Crucially, such mobilization is further directed toward explicit political goals—getting Chinese-Americans to vote for endorsed and preferred candidates.

Candidates and Campaigns Across the Spectrum Have United Front Ties

In New York City, individuals and networks connected to the united front system have helped elect at least three local politicians in south Brooklyn in the last three years. They have also participated in the electoral redistricting process to ensure a mobilization advantage for their favored candidate, even though this put them in opposition to other established Asian-American civil society groups.

The united front political machine now dominates multiple layers of local politics in the Bensonhurst area in southern Brooklyn, a neighborhood with diverse immigrant communities that includes a large and growing number from the PRC mainland (NYT, April 15, 2015). John Chan connects many of the individuals involved in local politics there. A 2024 article by Sing Tao, a PRC government-linked media outlet registered as a foreign agent in the United States since 2021, noted that John Chan had been involved in Brooklyn elections for the past 20 years and claimed that almost every politician who had risen to power has a close relationship with him (Sing Tao, June 18, 2024). [3]

A state senator, two state representatives, and a city council member, whose districts overlap in Bensonhurst, have all frequently appeared with John Chan and his affiliates. Chan publicly endorsed Republican Steve Chan (no relation), who won a tight 2024 State Senate race against Taiwan-born Democrat incumbent Iwen Chu (YouTube/eStarTV第一直播, October 13, 2024). Steve Chan also participated in several united front-linked homeless shelter protests (Fox News, March 19, 2024). Long-time state representative William Colton is a regular fixture at united front-linked events, and has sponsored multiple bills to make the PRC’s National Day a New York state holiday (The Diplomat, December 2, 2021). Staff of City Councilwoman Susan Zhuang, who is Colton’s former chief of staff, allegedly used their work email accounts to solicit donations for BRACE, John Chan’s community organization (New York Daily News, March 13, 2024; New York Post, July 28, 2024). (Zhuang has denied being a part of BRACE.)

Even unsuccessful candidates reveal the united front’s reach and resources, indicating how intertwined these networks can be. Pro-CCP actors can field candidates simultaneously in Democrat and Republican primary races, in essence covering their bases and vastly increasing the likelihood of a united front-favored politician winning election. Lin Yu, who ran in the 49th State Assembly District Democratic Party primary in 2022, is one such candidate (YouTube/Louis Zhao, February 7, 2022). In the late 1990s, when he was eight years, Lin immigrated to the United States from Fujian Province. On April 11, 2022, the youthful Chinese-American spoke to fellow immigrants from his hometown, Changle (Sino-US Innovation Times, February 14, 2022). Lin—who Chan had also endorsed—promised to change the Democratic Party from within and speak out for the Chinese community. A bright blue poster hanging on the wall as he spoke read “Fuzhou Police Overseas Service Station” (福州警侨事务海外服务站) (New York News Agency, April 11, 2022). Lin was hosted by the America Changle Association, whose offices the FBI raided in October 2022 for functioning as one of hundreds of Chinese overseas police stations (NYT, April 17, 2023). Lu Jianshu, also known as Harry Lu, a former president of the organization who was arrested for assisting agents from the PRC’s Ministry of Public Security, had attended Lin’s event in 2022.

Lin dropped out of the primary when the seat’s incumbent, Peter Abbate, challenged his candidacy in court. Abbate nevertheless subsequently lost his seat to a little-known Republican challenger, Lester Chang, who also has close links to Beijing and is supported by Chan (US China Press, December 5, 2022; Sohu, January 1, 2023). As an elected official, Chang has repeatedly met with representatives from a known united front organization, the China People’s Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries—once in the PRC and twice in the United States (US China Press, January 26, 2024; World Journal, June 15, 2024; China Brief, June 21, 2024). In June 2024, Chang welcomed a delegation from the Hainan Provincial People’s Congress to New York (The Voice of Chinese, June 30, 2024).

Chang’s win, an upset for Abbate, was unexpected—in part because of the latter’s warm relations with John Chan. From 2013 to 2022, Chan personally donated hundreds of dollars to Abbate’s campaigns and invited him to appear at events organized by Chan’s community groups, including BRACE’s fifth anniversary celebration (Toutiao, January 3, 2019). [3] Abbate also had a remarkably PRC-friendly policy orientation. He attended meetings with PRC officials (alongside Chan) and supported PRC-friendly legislation, telling the New York consul-general in 2019, “We are here, New York state, no matter what happens with our Washington, we are here to work with you” (The Diplomat, December 4, 2021). In this case, the favor—or disfavor—of united front-linked organizations appears to have been a powerful factor in shaping electoral outcomes. Of more concern, even if Abbate had won, the united front system would still have had a sympathetic advocate elected to office.

Activities Expand to Other Districts and Electoral Reforms

Public statements by a close affiliate of John Chan, Ling Fei, point to motivations underlying united front activities. Ling, whose real name is Ni Xuhui, is State Senator Steve Chan’s communications director. He spoke at a December 2024 fundraiser for Councilwoman Zhuang’s re-election, where he presented his vision for further developing the political and civic prowess of New York’s Chinese community (YouTube/美国华讯, December 20, 2024; World Journal, December 21, 2024). Noting that improved Chinese voter turnout has already caused New York’s politicians to be more attentive to the needs of the Chinese community, Ling argued it would be critical to find and cultivate the right political candidates, especially those of ethnic Chinese descent, who can truly unify and empower the community. While this is a reasonable argument on its face, the potential domination of the process of identifying and grooming candidates by united front-linked organizations could mean effectively allowing the PRC government to have a say in U.S. elections.

In some cases, winning candidates backed by united front-linked organizations appear to have run very slim campaigns. Lester Chang claims to have spent just $25,000 when he ran for office, attributing his victory instead to on-the-ground canvassing supported by teams of enthusiastic Chinese-American volunteers (The Guardian, November 28, 2022). For context, Iwen Chu’s 2024 campaign expenditure exceeded $1 million, nearly double that of her opponent Steve Chan. Despite being a strong incumbent with the backing of deep-pocketed groups such as the New York State Democratic Party and local unions, she was unable to beat Chan, who also outperformed his party’s previous candidate by over 10,000 votes. (Chu improved her vote total by about 5,000.) This suggests that part of the efficacy of the united front’s political machine is its mobilizational capacity. United front-embedded political organizing networks can boost turnout, which is especially significant given the low levels of political participation in Asian-American communities.

This political machine has also attempted to shape election outcomes in Flushing, another New York neighborhood with a large ethnic Chinese population, although with less success. John Chan has said he finds the community organizations in Flushing to be “very complicated” (Sing Tao Daily, June 18, 2024). At least two united front-linked candidates have challenged Democrat State Assemblyman Ron Kim in primary elections there. Kenneth Chiu, a close associate of John Chan with ties to several local Democratic politicians, lost narrowly to Kim in 2022 (The Diplomat, December 2, 2021). In 2024, United front actors threw their weight behind Yi Andy Chen, a young contender who immigrated from Fujian Province to Queens when he was 13. Chen’s campaign website described him as an executive director of two Chan-affiliated community organizations (Yi Andy Chen for New York State Assembly, accessed June 25, 2024). He secured endorsements from the American Chinese Chamber of Commerce, led by Chan, and the Fujian Hometown Association, known for close ties with the PRC consulate. Speaking to the Fujianese association, Chen was flanked by two men who physically harassed anti-CCP demonstrators in San Francisco during Xi Jinping’s 2023 visit to the city (Washington Post, September 3, 2024).

Both challengers, Chiu and Chen, had previously worked as community liaison officers. In 2014, Chiu served as former 38th district City Councilman Carlos Menchacha’s Asian community liaison, and has continued to solicit Asian community liaison jobs on Twitter with mayoral candidates (X/@KennethChiuNY, October 15, 2020; The Diplomat, December 2, 2021). Chen, meanwhile, served as Asian American Community Liaison Director for Assemblyman Philip Ramos (World Journal, February 20, 2024). Both were active in grassroots political organizing, starting Democratic Party political clubs intended for Brooklyn’s Asian American and Pacific Islander (AAPI) community (PoliticsNY, March 7, 2018; X/@QCYD, January 22, 2023). Chen got his start working on a 2012 campaign for Congresswoman Grace Meng (World Journal, February 20, 2024). There, Chen would have worked alongside Linda Sun, a former aide to two New York state governors recently charged with spying for the PRC (Department of Justice, September 3, 2024).

The united front’s political machine has also been active in electoral reforms. In 2022, the city council’s Districting Commission proposed a preliminary redistricting plan that would have created the city’s first majority-Asian district while splitting up an existing Latino-dominated one. John Chan and his allies supported the proposal, likely because it would allow the united front’s political machine to lean on its existing clout among the Chinese-American population, rather than having to engage other groups. This put them in opposition to established Asian-American community groups, however, who advocated for maintaining a longstanding coalition with other minority groups (The City, August 16, 2022). Chan framed the dispute in binary terms, calling for keeping the Asian community “whole.” “We have to elect our own representatives,” he argued (The City, August 16, 2022). The Districting Commission’s eventual decision split the difference, though still with positive outcomes for the united front-linked actors. An Asian-majority district created as part of the reforms later elected Susan Zhuang, the councilwoman who has received open support from united front-linked organizations (Redistricting & You: New York City, accessed May 23).

Conclusion

United front actors are impacting electoral politics in New York City. They are not wedded to a particular party or ideology but instead seek the easiest footholds to access the halls of power. While candidates rarely campaign on pro-Beijing positions, the political machine consolidates its influence by cultivating candidates who successfully mobilize ethnic Chinese voters on local social and political issues.

Building influence from the ground up can have a powerful trickle-up effect, whereby city and state politicians are increasingly aligned with Beijing’s interests or beholden to CCP-linked actors. This could eventually influence the policy discourse of politicians at the federal level. For now, overseas Chinese are targeted not just as a threat but as a foothold on political power. Allowing united front organizations and individuals to dominate the political landscape in these areas, however, still disproportionately elevates Beijing’s voice while repressing alternative viewpoints in a diverse Chinese-American community.

Notes

[1] Kang Xiaoli. “New Changes in Overseas Chinese in the Era of Globalization—And on the Inspiration for Overseas United Front Work.” Journal of Shaanxi Institute of Socialism (2015)3: 23–30; Li Xiang and Mei Siyuan. “Basic Experience, Practical Challenges and Countermeasures of Overseas United Front Work in the New Era,” Journal of Hebei Institute of Socialism (2023)2: 58–66.

[2] For additional versions of this logic, see Kang, supra [1], and Li and Mei, supra [1].

[3] For campaign finance data, see contributions by “John Chan” or “John S. Chan” on the New York State Board of Elections Public Reporting website, https://publicreporting.elections.ny.gov/.