Brief: JNIM Attacks in Benin Represented Group’s Growing Operational Strength in Periphery

Executive Summary:

• In late July, the Group for Supporters of Islam and Muslims (JNIM) claimed responsibility for an attack in Benin outside of its traditional areas of operation. JNIM propaganda from this and another operation in the weeks that followed showed the capture of weapons from the Beninese armed forces, increasing the group’s ability to conduct further attacks.

On July 25–26, just as the Group for Supporters of Islam and Muslims (JNIM) and Coordination of Azawad Movements (CMA) were conducting their massacre of dozens of Wagner fighters and allied Malian troops, another attack took place in Benin. This attack killed 12 individuals, including five park rangers and seven members of the Beninese security forces (BobNews24, July 28). The non-profit organization African Parks, which takes responsibility for the long-term management of protected areas in partnership with regional governments and local communities, acknowledged the deaths shortly after (African Parks, July 27).

JNIM, which has previously operated in Benin’s “Park W,” claimed responsibility for the attack several days later (X/@CEENASA396671, August 1). The photos from JNIM revealed a large stash of weapons that it pilfered from the Beninese forces. JNIM fighters in northern Benin were able to use this cache to conduct subsequent attacks, and two weeks later appeared to have gained momentum as a result of this.

On August 12, JNIM claimed responsibility for another attack in Borgou, Benin and released a photo of dozens of captured rifles, which only added to the group’s war chest (X/@war_noir, August 12). Only weeks before the Borgou attack, JNIM had also attacked Togo and killed 12 soldiers in Kpinkankandi (Benin Web TV, July 21). Altogether, the JNIM attacks in Benin and Togo represented a continuous effort by JNIM to expand its area of operations into coastal West Africa.

The entry point for JNIM in Benin is Park W and neighboring national parks, whose vast, lightly inhabited, jungle-like areas allow for the establishment of small jihadist cells. For example, Beninese Colonel Faizou Gomina acknowledged in May that Park W as well as two neighboring parks, Pendjari and Arly, had been ignored by the Beninese government. This made the country’s north ripe for infiltration by jihadist groups, especially JNIM and its rival, Islamic State in Greater Sahara (ISGS) (Africa Defense Forum, May 7).

The first jihadist attack in Benin was in 2021, when suspected ISGS militants infiltrated Porga in the north of the country and killed two soldiers (La Nouvelle Tribune, February 12, 2021). Since then, attacks or violent incidents have occurred regularly along the country’s border, despite the establishment of a specialized border protection unit within the Force Armée Béninoise (FAB) (Le Monde, January 25). Historically, JNIM and ISGS have shown strategic patience while steadily increasing their influence in the periphery of their main operational heartland along the Niger, Burkina Faso, and Malian borders. The attacks in Benin and Togo, including weapons captures, suggest JNIM and likely ISGS have grown more capable of conducting operations in those countries if the groups’ leadership so chooses.