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Brief: Oman Suffers First Islamic State Attack in Muscat
Publication: Terrorism Monitor Volume: 22 Issue: 10
By:
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Executive Summary:
- On July 16, three Islamic State-associated gunmen killed six worshippers at a Shia mosque in Muscat. This was the first al-Qaeda or Islamic State attack in Oman, despite its proximity to Islamist hubs and relatively friendly relationship with Israel.
- The three attackers were brothers, suggesting radicalization within the family rather than a broader, societal-level issue in Oman.
For many years, Oman has represented an island of relative stability in the volatile Middle East. Until July, the country had experienced no attacks by al-Qaeda or Islamic State (IS), nor proxy warfare by Iranian-backed groups or other similarly aligned entities. One factor favoring Oman’s security is its ideological distance from jihadist or Shia militias. This is due to the fact that nearly half the country—including many of its key leaders, such as the Sultan, Grand Mufti, and Minister of Awqaf and Religious Affairs—are Ibadi Muslims.
Although often seen as being closer to Shia than Sunni Islam, Ibadism is distinct from both sects (Al Jazeera, January 11, 2020). It is also closely linked historically to Kharijism, which today is associated with the tendencies of IS and other jihadist groups. Ibadism, however, has tended to be more moderate than Kharijism (Morocco World News, December 3, 2014). As a result, despite the prevalence of IS and al-Qaeda cells in neighboring Yemen and Saudi Arabia, Omanis have shown no tendency toward joining radical Islamic cells or similarly inclined Iranian proxy groups.
Oman’s resilience to militant Shiite or Sunni Salafist–Jihadist ideology is even more extraordinary considering the fact that the Omani state has become friendlier with Israel over the years. To that point, in February 2018, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu secretly met with the Omani foreign minister in Germany to discuss bilateral ties. Other parts of the conversation included the situation with Iran at the time and Netanyahu’s subsequent visit to Oman’s capital, Muscat that October (Times of Israel, November 2, 2018). This second trip, which was officially a surprise visit, included a meeting between Netanyahu, his wife, National Security Adviser Meir Ben-Shabbat, Mossad intelligence head Yossi Cohen—who oversees Israel’s clandestine talks with Gulf governments—and Sultan Qaboos (Al Jazeera, October 26, 2018; Middle East Monitor, December 28, 2023). Notionally, this would render the country even more of a target. Although the warming relations between Israel and Oman were all but halted after Hamas’s October 7 attack on Israel and the subsequent war in Gaza, Oman suffered no terrorist attacks and very little hostility for its relative friendliness with Tel Aviv.
Whatever good fortune Oman had in evading attacks was undermined on July 16, when three gunmen—later revealed to be brothers—shot six worshippers to death at a Shia mosque in Muscat. Typical of IS, they targeted Shia Muslims and refused to surrender. The trio were killed by the Royal Omani Police after failing to drop their weapons. Although the brothers were all Omani, the victims included four Pakistanis, an Indian, and a local police officer who died in the shootout (Dawn, July 18). The fact that the attackers were all brothers (as opposed to three separate Omani recruits working together) suggests that their recruitment was an isolated case, as opposed to hinting at broader societal-level radicalization in Oman.
It remains to be seen whether IS will follow up with another attack in Oman. Still, the fact that IS claimed responsibility for the attack and that the attackers pledged their loyalty to IS on video points to the fact that IS is still capable of expanding its area of operations to new theaters (X/@BeauGossePreten, July 16). Roughly ten years since Abubakar al-Baghdadi declared the caliphate, therefore, IS may not be as strong in its Middle Eastern heartland as it once was, but it is still baqiya wa tatamadad—“remaining and expanding,” as the group’s motto says.