Brief: Wagner Massacre in Mali and Ukraine’s Kursk Operation Appears to Have Led to PMC’s Partial Withdrawal

Publication: Terrorism Monitor Volume: 22 Issue: 11

Wagner troops in the Central African Republic. (Source: Wikimedia Commons)

Executive Summary:

  • The loss of a large number of Wagner/Africa Corps fighters in northern Mali on July 28 and the Ukrainian offensive into Russia’s Kursk oblast that occurred a week later appears to have given the paramilitary group an excuse to return to Russia.
  • The attack in Mali demonstrated some form of collaboration between the secular ethno-nationalist Coordination of Azawad Movements (CMA) and the al-Qaeda-affiliated Group for Supporters of Islam and Muslims (JNIM).

The massacre of Wagner fighters in northern Mali on July 28 and the Ukrainian offensive into Kursk oblast in Russia only one week later is expected to have altered the private military company (PMC)’s force structure in Africa (TASS, August 19; see Eurasia Daily Monitor, July 31). If the massacre provided an incentive for Russia to “cut and run” from a seemingly doomed counter-insurgency mission in Mali, then Ukraine’s early success in taking territory in Kursk offered Wagner an escape route. As a result of the situation that developed in Kursk, Wagner forces were offered an excuse to return to Russia without looking like they were withdrawing from Mali as a result of the significant losses suffered at the hands of al-Qaeda-affiliated Group for Supporters of Islam and Muslims (JNIM) and the more secular ethno-nationalist Coordination of Azawad Movements (CMA) (Le Monde, August 2).

It is unlikely that Wagner will leave Africa (Le Monde, December 17, 2023). The group, which since Yevgeny Prigozhin’s death has been placed under the Ministry of Defense’s authority and has been reorganized and renamed the Russian “Africa Corps” (see Militant Leadership Monitor, April 18), have found themselves the number one target for JNIM in the Sahel—much like French and Western forces had been only years earlier. JNIM videos since the massacre have not only shown the scattered corpses of Wagner fighters from the July operation but also other Russian businessmen (Al Arabiya, July 27). Although these hostage videos have not captured the attention of the international media as much as the kidnapping of those from the West, JNIM has continued to make efforts to feature Russians in propaganda.

The massacre of Wagner fighters was conducted by both JNIM and CMA, with CMA likely conducting the initial assault, with JNIM performing the clearing of remaining Wagner troops and Malian soldiers. Such collaboration—even if not through an explicit partnership between the two groups—would be consistent with previous efforts of both groups to form non-aggression pacts and to exchange prisoners and vehicles captured by the opposing sides (Agenzia Nova, May 22). While their ideologies conflict, the two groups share mutual enemies, including the Malian armed forces and its Wagner fighter allies, facilitating JNIM and CMA’s collaboration. Because neither JNIM nor CMA want to be associated with each other—JNIM rejects CMA’s secularism and the CMA rejects JNIM’s jihadism and the international stigmatization that would accompany any such alliance—neither group acknowledges any role the other may have played in the massacre of Wagner fighters.

The Malian armed forces conducted airstrikes against JNIM or CMA bases following the massacre as retaliation, with the apparent use of Turkish-made drones (X/@MyLordBebo, July 31). This, however, was not sufficient to turn the tides against JNIM, which has continued expanding in the Sahel this year and has launched assaults in Togo and Benin since May (Le Monde, May 4). Instead, it appeared that Wagner was partially forced to retreat from the Sahel. Some Wagner fighters, for example, reportedly traveled from Africa to Kursk to support the Russian army’s response to the Ukrainian offensive there (Moscow Times, August 8). In the longer run, the counter-insurgency in Mali will continue and Wagner fighters will be forced to primarily guard the Malian junta leaders in Bamako. The junta’s failure to deliver on promises of both development and security has meant that they face an ever-increasing risk of popular protests.