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Cross-strait Relations In Taiwan’s Presidential Elections
Publication: China Brief Volume: 4 Issue: 6
No military action for the Taiwan Strait–not even
psychological warfare oriented missile drills such
as those undertaken in late 1995 and early 1996 — is
being planned by the People’s Liberation Army
(PLA) for the coming year or so. And this will be
true whether President Chen Shui-bian or his
challenger, Kuomintang (KMT) Chairman Lien Chan,
wins in the hotly contested polls on March 20.
However, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
leadership is readying hardball solutions to the
reunification problem for the medium-term.
A triumph for the head of the pro-independence
Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) will of course
disappoint the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
leadership, particularly President Hu Jintao, who
heads the policy-setting Leading Group on Taiwan
Affairs (LGTA). As of early this month, Beijing’s
cabinet level Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) had
predicted a narrow victory for Lien. Apart from the
much circulated argument that Chen’s is an
“administration by boy scouts,” the TAO made its
call mainly based on two factors. The first is that,
while four years ago Chen had enjoyed the support of
a sizeable number of big name businessmen, this time
the corporate world in Taiwan has pretty much
deserted the DPP president en masse. The other
reason is that a significant portion of the DPP’s
traditional supporters–those of the under-40
generation–are having second thoughts because of
relatively high unemployment and their fear of
losing their lives in a battle with the PLA.
However, Beijing sources have said that in the event
of a Chen victory the CCP leadership’s official
response would still be: “œWe’€™ll weigh his words
and watch his actions.” This relatively
conciliatory stance is evident from Premier Wen
Jiabao’s press conference at the end of the
National People’s Congress (NPC) last week. When
asked about Beijing’s attitude toward the
election, Wen said his government would “œexert
[its] utmost efforts” to resume cross-Straits
dialogue and negotiations under the one China
principle. Cadres in Beijing who handle
Taiwan-related issues will be looking closely at
Chen’s inaugural speech on May 20 for signs that,
after dealing perhaps a body blow to the demoralized
KMT, the apparently pragmatic president may
gradually climb down from his provocative,
Beijing-baiting campaign rhetoric–and move back to
a more centrist position.
Most importantly, given that most Taiwan experts in
Beijing have very little trust left in Chen, the CCP
leadership will be scrutinizing how the DPP
administration goes about revising Taiwan’s
constitution. Late last year, Chen had vowed to
update the island’s charter in such a way as to
“reflect Taiwa™n’s full statehood,” meaning,
for example, that its official name will be changed
from the Republic of China to the Republic of
Taiwan. The Taiwan president also pledged that the
new constitution would be ratified by a referendum
to be called in late 2006. However, Beijing still
harbors hope that intense opposition from the
island’s business community and non-DPP
parties–as well as pressure from the United
States–will oblige Chen to significantly tone down
the constitutional revision process.
However, if by mid-2005 or so it has become obvious
to Beijing that Chen is persevering with what the
CCP leadership calls his “ambition of becoming the
father of the Taiwan nation,” the Hu team will
likely unleash something drastic. One option that
has been suggested by LGTA experts is the enactment
of a Law on National Reunification (LNR). After the
statute is ratified by the NPC, the government–and
the PLA–will be obligated to achieve national
reunification within a certain time frame.
According to a source familiar with Beijing’s
Taiwan policy making apparatus, a possible version
of the LNR will spell out that Beijing will
immediately invite Taiwan authorities to begin
negotiations under the broad framework of
“peaceful union under the one China principle.”
If, however, Taipei refuses to respond to
Beijing’s offer, the Chinese government will, in
accordance with the LNR, have to attain unification
by whatever means before the deadline falls due.
“Beijing is convinced that the LNR is in
accordance with international law and global norms
because with the exception of two dozen-odd small
nations, all countries in the world recognize the
‘€˜one China principle,’ including the fact that
Taiwan is part of China, the source said.
The source added that the LNR idea was still being
fine-tuned. He said the “final date” for
reunification had not yet been fixed–and both 2008
and 2010 were mentioned in internal circles as
possibilities. For example, the year 2008 is
perceived as a “reasonable” deadline given that
it would coincide with the end of Chen’s second
term. More significantly, both Chen and his putative
mentor, former president Lee Teng-hui, have cited
the same year as the best time for Taiwan to achieve
formal or de jure independence.
Beijing analysts have pointed out that, despite
historical and other differences, the “œdeadline”
contained in the LNR will have a similar impact–one
of inevitability–as the 1997 time frame for Hong
Kong’s return to the Chinese motherland. Moreover,
Beijing believes that since the United States has
never ruled Taiwan, Washington will have much less
legal–or moral–authority over Taiwan than Britain
had had over Hong Kong, its erstwhile Crown Colony.
Apart from China’s growing economic and diplomatic
clout, Beijing will of course be relying on naked
military power to enforce the LNR. And there is
little question that China’s arms buildup,
particularly with reference to Taiwan, will escalate
in the coming year or so. Western military analysts
expect unprecedented resources to be devoted to
equipment and weapons in areas including missiles,
satellite surveillance and IT warfare. It is
noteworthy that when Finance Minister Jin Renqing
announced an 11.6 percent boost for the PLA budget
at the NPC, he made reference to the need for
military preparation for the purpose of national
reunification.
And what if victory is clinched by the KMT’s Lien,
who is running on a joint ticket with the
charismatic chairman of the People’s First Party
(PFP), James Soong? The so-called Pan Blue
Alliance’s chances have been boosted by a larger
than expected turnout of around 3 million people at
a rally on March 13. The rally called for the end of
the “incompetent and degenerate” Chen
government. There was talk in the Chinese capital
that after seeing the massive anti-DPP rally, some
Taiwan-related cadres in Beijing had ordered
champagne and Mao Tai liquor for a party on March 20
to celebrate the “final demise of splittist
Chen.”
Diplomatic analysts in Beijing and Taipei say that
for the near term the Hu-Wen administration may
heave a sigh of relief on seeing Lien occupy the
Presidential Palace in Taipei. However, the KMT,
which may then merge with the PFP, has undergone a
significant metamorphosis over the past year–in the
direction of stressing the “native Taiwanese
identity” of the century old party. This was
symbolized by the climax of the March 13 anti-DPP
demonstration, when both Lien and Soong fell flat on
the ground and kissed the earth in an emotional
display of their “loyalty to Taiwan.”
In other words, while the KMT and PFP had until
about a year ago vigorously advocated eventual
reunification with the mainland, Lien, Soong and
their colleagues have recognized a shift of public
opinion. To survive, a merged KMT-PFP must build
better bonds with the more than 70 percent of
Taiwan’s 24 million residents who consider
themselves “Taiwanese,” and not “Chinese.”
There are even suggestions from younger KMT cadres
that the party change should its name to the Taiwan
Kuomintang to better reflect its native Taiwanese
orientation.
Thus, while Lien may live up to his campaign promise
of making a “private trip” to the mainland
before the May 20 official presidential
inauguration, the future president must deflect
criticism that the KMT is “selling out Taiwan to
the mainland.” It is likely that the Lien team
will be able to forge ahead with economic ties with
the mainland, particularly the establishment of
direct air and shipping links between major cities
in Taiwan and coastal China. But as for formal
reunification talks under the one-China framework,
Lien, Soong and their advisers are unlikely to make
any commitment without a clear-cut popular mandate.
Given that during its first term, from 2002 to 2008,
the Hu-Wen administration’s goal is to prevent
Taipei from going further down the road of
independence–and not to achieve reunification as
such–Beijing will, at least in the near term, steer
clear of drastic measures following a Lien victory.
However, after the Fourth Generation leadership has
consolidated power at the Seventeenth CCP Congress,
due to take place in late 2007, it is likely that
Beijing will contemplate hardline solutions along
the lines of an LNR.
After all, although the commercial imperative is
working toward economic integration across the
Taiwan Strait, the laws of culture, history and
demographics seem to favor the accentuation of a
distinct Taiwan identity on the island. And this
means that even if the DPP is defeated this time
around, Chen’s younger colleagues will lose no
time in trying to recoup power by appealing to the
sense of quasi-nationhood that is growing among the
Taiwanese. And emboldened by China’s fast growing
international clout as well as the PLA’s prowess,
the Hu-Wen team may decide soon after the Beijing
Olympic Games in 2008 that it had better take
decisive action before the momentum toward Taiwan
independence becomes irrevocable.
Willy Wo-Lap Lam, one of Asia’s best known
journalists and authors, is a senior China analyst
at CNN’s Asia-Pacific Office in Hong Kong.