Drills and Experts Suggest Beijing Favors Blockade on Longer Timeline

Executive Summary:

• The People’s Liberation Army increasingly emphasizes blockade scenarios in its exercises and drills, signaling a strategic shift in Beijing’s approach to a military contingency in the Taiwan Strait.
• Policy elites and current and former military officials corroborate this shift but largely project any military action as unlikely before 2027, citing economic challenges and geopolitical risks.
• Going forward, Beijing will act to normalize blockade tactics around Taiwan and bolster salami-slicing tactics, thus advancing coercive capabilities on a longer timeline.

Recent military exercises and drills conducted by the People’s Liberation Army around Taiwan have emphasized blockade scenarios, indicating a growing preference for a military blockade over direct invasion (Observer, April 3). Commentary and writings by Chinese academics, think-tank scholars, and current and former military officials reflect this shift. Where these writers discuss potential a timeline for such actions, they appear to extend far beyond 2027, often citing the PRC’s current economic woes and potential blowback from retaliatory sanctions as reasons to prolong any Taiwan timeline.

Drills and Commentary Focus on Blockade Scenario

Prominent military scholars within the People’s Republic of China (PRC) have observed a shift in PLA military exercises in the Taiwan Strait toward emphasizing a potential blockade or quarantine of the island. PLA exercises conducted in response to former House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan in 2022 were the first to include blockade scenarios (China Brief, October 4, 2022). Zheng Hao (郑浩), a senior news commentator at state-owned network Phoenix TV, stated that Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan was a “great opportunity” (极好的机会) for the PLA to “thoroughly rehearse various operational plans” (充分演练各种打击). One such plan entails “imposing a blockade on the island—encircling without engaging” (而封控台岛、围而不战) (Sohu, August 3, 2022). Major General Meng Xiangqing (孟祥青), a professor at PLA’s National Defense University, noted that earlier exercises were “mainly along the mainland” (主要是在大陆沿线) and that the proximity of live-fire exercises to the island represented “an unprecedented siege of Taiwan in the history of our military” (我军历史上前所未有的合围台岛). Meng explained that “the demarcation of [training areas] had special meaning” (它蕴含着深刻的内涵). For example, two areas to Taiwan’s northeast were specifically chosen for drills to practice blocking the Taiwanese port of Keelung (PLA Daily, August 6, 2022). Retired Senior Colonel Zhou Bo (周波), now a senior fellow at Tsinghua’s Center for International Security and Strategy, noted then that “through these actions, the PLA proved that it could coordinate operations and implement a comprehensive blockade as long as it wanted” (解放军通过这些行动证明，只要它愿意，它可以协调行动，实施全面封锁) (CISS Tsinghua, August 15, 2022).

The Joint Sword-2024B exercises conducted in October 2024 marked the first time the PLA explicitly emphasized blockade scenarios in exercises (China Brief, November 1, 2024). During these drills, the China Coast Guard fully encircled Taiwan—also for the first time. Shen Yi (沈逸), an international politics professor at Fudan University, observed that the blockade of key ports and areas was a “new subject” (新增 … 科目). He highlighted the presence of four China Coast Guard formations, including 10,000-ton-class coast guard vessels as demonstrating “a uniquely Chinese approach to the ‘gray zone’” (富有中国特色的灰色区域) (Guancha News, October 14, 2024). [1] Zhang Chi (张弛), an associate professor at the PLA National Defense University, commented that exercise represented how an “unprecedented strength of the squeeze” (挤压的力度是前所未有的) over Taiwan (CCTV, October 14, 2024).

Military drills announced by the Eastern Theater Command (ETC) in April 2025—called Strait Thunder-2025A—further highlighted “blockades on key areas and sea lanes to test the joint operations capabilities of its troops” (要域要道封控等科目，检验战区部队联合作战实战能力) (Weibo/ETC, March 31; China Brief, April 11). Zhang Junshe (张军社), a former researcher at the PLA Naval Research Academy, commented that the PLA had carried out simulated strikes on ports in Keelung, Kaohsiung, and Hualien with the express aim of “blocking the channels” (堵疏泊暗道) through which Taiwan obtains energy, weapons, and other forms of military assistance (Ta Kung Pao, April 3). Wang Zhenwei (王贞威), director of the Institute of Politics under the Taiwan Research Center at Xiamen University, stated that the exercises showcased the PLA’s ability to “block and control key areas and roads” (要域要道封控) and to target Taiwan’s “energy and water ways” (能源、航道相关能力的管控) (Xiamen University, April 3).

PRC sources have extensively studied what Zhang Hua (张华), a distinguished researcher at the Chinese Academy of Social Science’s (CASS) Institute of Taiwan Studies, has referred to as Taiwan’s “extreme shortage of energy” (极度缺少能源) (Aisixiang, January 6; China Brief, March 29, 2024, August 23, 2024). Some believe that at certain points during the summer, Taiwan possesses only seven days of natural gas reserves (Sina Finance, April 3). In a recent article, Zheng Jian (郑剑), chair professor at the Taiwan Research Institute at Xiamen University, cited an incident in which a ship carrying liquefied natural gas was stuck in port during the April drills. He argued that this was evidence that “the exercise’s blockade zones—including the areas of operation for naval and air forces—were specifically designed and arranged” (此次演习封控区、包括海空兵力的活动区域，是经过特别设计、精准布局) (Beijing Daily, April 25). Meng Xiangqing extrapolated from the drill to argue that, “if Taiwan loses its supply lines, its domestic resources will be quickly exhausted and its social order will plunge into chaos” (还在失去海上供给线那么到位资源会快速消耗枯竭社会秩序陷入混乱) (PLA Daily, April 2).

This strategic shift toward a blockade-centric approach is corroborated by several prominent Chinese scholars and commentators. Zhang Weiwei (张维为), the director of Fudan University’s China Institute, has stated that “naval blockade has become the main choice for opposing Taiwan independence and promoting unification”(封锁台湾已成为“反独促统”的主要选项) (Guancha News, November 10, 2024). Military columnist Chen Feng (晨枫) has also observed “a shift in thinking from a focus on landing operations with strikes as a secondary effort, to one where strikes take the lead and landings play a supporting role, and now to a model where blockade takes precedence” (从以登为主、以打为辅，到以打为主、以登为辅，再到以封为主、打登为辅的思路转变) (Guancha News, April 3). Yu Yuan Tan Tian (玉渊谭天), an account on Weibo operated by the PRC’s state broadcaster, said that “if last year we established the ‘Kinmen Model’ of normalized operations in the waters near Kinmen and the Taiwan Strait, then in this new phase of drills this year, our operations toward Taiwan are evolving from expanding the scope of force projection to developing a ‘key-island control model’ that enables precise control over critical areas” (如果说，去年，我们实现了在金门附近海域及台湾海峡常态化行动的“金门模式”，那么在今年新一阶段的演训中，我们对台行动正在从扩大力量覆盖范围，发展到能够精确掌控要害的“控岛模式”) (Weibo/Yu Yuan Tan Tian, April 2).

Experts Opine on Longer Timeline

Escalated activity in the military, cyber, and trade realms does not necessarily indicate that the PRC will launch a military contingency in the Taiwan Strait in the near future. The PRC’s timeline for unification appears to be 2049, when Beijing is set to realize a great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation that is inextricably linked to the idea of national reunification. Sun Yafu (孙亚夫), vice president of the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits, has stated that the level of equipment and technological capability the PLA has demonstrated in the process of imposing military blockades on Taiwan will be “highly beneficial to the process of China’s unification” (会大大有利于中国的统一进程). He concedes, however, that it is “unlikely that individual exercises will accelerate that [unification] process” (不会因为这么一次行动一下子就会加速发展了). Sun’s argument is that Beijing must adopt an “overarching perspective” that takes into account the “broader strategy of national rejuvenation and profound changes unseen in a century” (从中华民族伟大复兴的战略全局和世界百年未有之大变局统筹中来考虑这个问题) (The Paper, August 17, 2022).

Some Western analysts have interpreted Xi’s instruction that a military option be ready for Taiwan by 2027 as a definitive deadline for invasion (Stanford, April 2, 2023). In reality, Beijing appears more likely to prioritize its increasingly severe economic woes instead. Yan Xuetong (阎学通), Dean of the Institute of International Relations at Tsinghua University, argued at the end of 2024 that Beijing “will not formulate a timetable for the unification of Taiwan in the next four years” and instead “focus on revitalizing the economy” (未来四年会将注意力主要集中在重振经济上，不会在关注国内经济增长的同时制定统一台湾时间表) (Lianhe Zaobao, December 25, 2024). Sheng Jiuyuan (盛九元), Director of the Taiwan Research Center at Shanghai Jiao Tong University, similarly has warned that unification “cannot be rushed” (急不得), instead emphasizing “making unification more attractive—that is, by accelerating the process of Chinese-style modernization” (应当塑造统一的吸引力更强，也就是加快中国式现代化进程；中国式现代化就是「让统一的治理更容易」) (CNA, May 11). Wang Yingjin (王英津), director for the research center for cross-strait relations at Renmin University, has stated that the Taiwan issue “has not yet developed to the point where it must be solved” (尚未发展到非解决不可的地步). He believes that even if the PRC were to prevail in a cross-strait conflict, the resulting sanctions imposed by the United States and others could “impact or even delay the process of the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation that is getting closer and closer every day” (蒸蒸日上的中华民族复兴进程将会遭受重大冲击，甚至有可能被迟滞) (CRNTT, February 10).

Beijing might be comfortable delaying military action as it perceives time as being on its side. Wang Jisi (王缉思), President of the Institute of International and Strategic Studies at Peking University, has argued that although Beijing has “increased military, political, and economic pressure in response to ‘Taiwan independence [trends]’” (加大了对“台独”的军事、政治、经济压力), “the situation in the Taiwan Strait can be controlled to a certain extent in the next few years” (为未来几年台海局势可以得到一定程度的管控) (China-U.S. Focus, January 4). Jin Canrong (金灿荣), a prominent international relations professor at Renmin University, has likewise declared that “as time goes by, the final situation will become more and more unfavorable for Taiwan” (随着时间推移，我相信最终局势对台湾地区将越来越不利) (Guancha News, October 15, 2024). Zhang Weiwei has expressed a similar view, stating that “the later unification is delayed, the fewer options Taiwan will have” (统一的时间越往后拖，台湾的选择余地就越小) (Guancha News, July 14, 2024). Another influential political scientist, Zheng Yongnian (郑永年), has recently concurred, stating that “with the socioeconomic development of mainland China, time is on our side” (随着中国大陆的社会经济发展，时间是站在我们这一边) (CRNTT, March 27).

Conclusion

In the coming years, Beijing is likely to escalate coercive activity toward Taiwan while continuing to refine and expand its blockade and quarantine tactics in preparation for a potential military contingency. Liu Kuangyu (刘匡宇), an associate research fellow at CASS’s Institute of Taiwan Studies, has stated that the “six-direction encirclement of Taiwan military exercise model” (六向锁台) is being continuously refined and strengthened and that “‘island encirclement’ and ‘Taiwan blockade’ have become the new normal for PLA exercises around Taiwan” (“环岛”“锁台”成为解放军对台军演的新常态) (The Paper, May 24, 2024). Tang Hua (唐桦), deputy director of the Institute of Politics under the Taiwan Research Center at Xiamen University, recently foreshadowed the possibility of bolstered ‘salami-slicing’ by Beijing, with the China Coast Guard playing a leading role, given that Strait Thunder-2025A “signaled normalized law enforcement operations in the disputed waters of the Taiwan Strait for the future” (预示着未来可能在台海争议的海域实施常态化的执法) (Xiamen University, April 3). In early 2025, PRC vessels also began practicing maneuvers anticipated during a future blockade, such as cutting the international undersea cables that keep Taiwan connected to the internet (Lianhe Zaobao, February 25).

Since 2022, the concept of a blockade has gained significant traction among PRC policy and military elites. This strategic shift does not signal an accelerated or imminent timeline for military action; instead, PRC sources indicate that any military contingency is more likely to occur after 2027. PRC analysts widely agree that Beijing will prioritize economic recovery and stability in the near term and that, on the Taiwan question, time is on Beijing’s side. It is important not to downplay the long-term risks of a potential blockade—especially given Taiwan’s limited energy reserves—and equally critical to avoid alarmist predictions of an impending attack that could damage investor confidence or induce public panic.

Notes

[1] Shen defines gray zone activities as “the capability to operate in this space using non-lethal force and military assets deployed in non-lethal ways” (即非致命武力和军事力量在非致命运用领域的行动能力).