Evolving Blue Economy Propels PRC Maritime Ambitions

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Age: 22 hours

A still from the documentary “Walking to the Sea.” (Source: CCTV)

Executive Summary:

  • Beijing’s maritime strategy hinges on expanding what it calls the “blue economy,” which is increasingly integrated with broader strategic ambitions under the rubric of becoming a “strong sea power.”
  • Central government policies and five-years plans call for deeper cross-regional integration to support the blue economy, which in 2024 accounted for nearly 8 percent of GDP. Recent initiatives include vast canals projects and creating a “National Maritime Economic Development Demonstrative Zone.”
  • Beijing sees the waters it claims—including disputed waters—as its “blue territory,” ripe for aquaculture, deep-sea mining, energy projects, and other technologically-advanced resource extraction.

In June, a China Central Television (CCTV) documentary series titled “Walking to the Sea” (向海而行) highlighted developments in the economic aspects of the country’s maritime strategy. Jointly produced with the Ministry of Natural Resources, the series focuses on the “blue economy” (蓝色经济), and aims to make the country’s dream of becoming a “strong sea power” (海洋强国) tangible to ordinary people (Xinhua, November 17, 2012; CCTV, January 21; CCTV, June 8). But this framing also foregrounds an increasingly securitized approach to the maritime domain, which suggests tensions with neighboring states is set to continue to rise.

Canalizing the Country to Support the Blue Economy

Interest in the blue economy has been evident for over a decade. In 2011, the State Council announced the establishment of the “Shandong Peninsula Blue Economic Zone” (山东半岛蓝色经济区), aimed at building a world-class maritime economic development zone (NDRC, January 12, 2011). Later that year, the 12th Five-Year Plan identified the zone as a national development priority (Xinhua, March 16, 2011). By 2018, the Ministry of Natural Resources and the National Development and Reform Commission expanded the concept by designating 14 coastal areas as “Maritime Economic Development Demonstrative Zones” (海洋经济发展示范区), each with tailored industrial focuses (Ministry of Natural Resources [MNR], December 10, 2018).

In 2021, PRC’s 14th Five-Year Plan included a chapter titled “Actively Expanding the Space for Maritime Economic Development” (积极拓展海洋经济发展空间). It reaffirmed plans to deepen integration between maritime industries, promote technological innovation, and enhance governance mechanisms (Xinhua, March 13, 2021). By 2024, the PRC’s maritime economy had reached a value of renminbi (RMB) 10.5 trillion ($1.5 trillion), accounting for 7.8 percent of GDP and spanning sectors such as tourism, transport, fisheries, energy, pharmaceuticals, construction, chemical production, manufacturing, and education (MNR, February 24).

The government has even begun promoting blue economy expansion in inland regions. General Secretary Xi Jinping has called for deepening industrial coordination across the country, as has Premier Li Qiang (李强), whose 2025 government work report called for establishing a unified “National Maritime Economic Development Demonstrative Zone” (全国海洋经济发展示范区) (Xinhua, December 12, 2024, March 5).

A surge in canal construction projects now supports this integration drive. Since 2023, at least six major canal initiatives have been launched across Guangxi, Hunan, Jiangxi, Zhejiang, Guangdong, and Hubei, with investments totaling approximately RMB 850 billion (around $120 billion) (CNA, August 30, 2024). In “Walking to the Sea,” the director of Guangxi’s Oceanic Administration highlights the Pinglu Canal project as a key example of fostering a “new pattern of land-sea coordinated development” (陆海协同发展新格局) (CCTV, June 12). This closely aligns with Xi Jinping’s repeated emphasis on “land-sea synergy, mountain-sea coordination, and resource integration” (坚持陆海统筹、山海联动、资源融通) (Xinhua, December 17, 2024).

The Meaning of the Blues

The growth of the PRC’s blue economy has fostered a parallel narrative centered on the concept of “blue territory” (蓝色国土), a phrase first referenced in 2010 in China’s Ocean Development Report (中国海洋发展报告). [1] A 2016 state media article expanding on the topic claimed 3 million square kilometers of ocean as the PRC’s “blue territory,” equating it in importance to the country’s land territory (Xinhua, September 28, 2016). Since then, the idea of blue territory has expanded in scope through PRC’s emphasis on advancing into the “deep and far sea” (深远海).

Part of this concept includes a growing interest in harnessing the ocean’s resources. As a result, promoting deep-sea technologies are now a strategic priority and vast swathes of the Pacific and Indian Oceans are identified for deep-sea exploration and—potentially—mining critical minerals (China Brief, January 31). Meanwhile, the country intends to expand its offshore wind farms further afield, in 2023 launching its first “deep- and far-sea floating wind power platform” (深远海浮式风电平台) (the PRC is already responsible for more than half of global offshore wind capacity) (National Energy Administration, June 1, 2022; Qizhi, February 22, 2024; Global Energy Monitor, July 2025).

Aquaculture, including offshore fish farming, is another sector to receive top-level foucs. Xi Jinping has urged turning the ocean into a “blue granary” (蓝色粮仓) (Xinhua, June 6, 2024). In 2019, the PRC launched “Penghu” (澎湖号), a “semi-submersible wave-energy aquaculture platform” (半潜式波浪能养殖平台). The facility can generate its own power via wave and solar energy, allowing it to remain in the far seas for extended periods (CCTV, June 10). Simultaneously, its distant-water fishing fleet continues to expand, encompassing operations as far away as Argentina’s territorial waters (European Parliament, May 2023; Fundación Andrés Bello, March 14).

Expanding Interests Cause Tensions, Securitization

In the PRC conception that tightly fuses security and development, the blue economy is a crucial pillar supporting the construction of the nation as a strong sea power (CCTV, July 11). Since 2013, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has been tasked with advancing this goal; and in 2017, the State Council formally called for greater military-civil integration in maritime domains (Xinhua, April 16, 2013; State Council, December 4, 2017). Most recently, a white paper titled “China’s National Security in the New Era” called for “adhering to land-sea synergy and the integration of safeguarding sovereignty, security, and development interests” (坚持陆海统筹，坚持维护国家主权、安全、发展利益相统一) (State Council, May 12).

This integration has direct implications for PRC’s behavior in disputed maritime zones. The country’s rhetoric around “maritime rights and interests” (海洋权益) frames such regions both as strategic frontiers and as essential to the livelihoods of PRC citizens. This dual framing complicates diplomatic tensions, especially as the PRC expands its economic footprint in contested waters.

For years, the PRC has conducted oil and gas exploration in disputed parts of the East and South China Seas (South China Morning Post, April 9, 2021; Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, September 29, 2022). In April, it was discovered constructing offshore aquaculture facilities in waters contested with South Korea in the Yellow Sea (Financial Times, April 22). Meanwhile, fishing activities in the South China Sea have grown more intensive and are increasingly supported by institutionalized maritime law enforcement operations (People’s Daily, November 21, 2014).

Conclusion

As the PRC’s blue economy expands, its maritime sector is expected to increase in strategic and economic significance, and integration across regions and industrial sectors will deepen. The Party views this growth as complementary to its broader maritime ambitions. By fusing development, security, and territorial claims, the PRC is steadily advancing along its “path to maritime strength with Chinese characteristics” (具有中国特色的向海图强之路) (Xinhua, July 1).

Notes

[1] 蓝色国土 is also sometimes translated literally as “blue national soil.”