Islamic State in Khorasan Province’s Increased Activity Threatens Central Asia

Executive Summary:

• The Islamic State in Khorasan Province (ISKP) is increasing external operations and expanding recruitment in Central Asia through media wings that publish Central Asian militants and present them as role models for existing or potential supporters to follow.
• ISKP’s growing reach and international operational capabilities are causing concern about rising terrorism among many states on all sides of the geopolitical divide, including the United States, China, Russia, India, and Iran.
• The ISKP leadership looks set to intensify efforts to incite violence and direct external operations into Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and the other former Soviet republics to expand influence for recruitment and foment unrest. 

The Islamic State in Khorasan Province (ISKP) attack in Moscow on March, which killed 145 people, awakened the international community to the resurgent terrorist threat emanating from Afghanistan (see EDM, March 26, 28; Terrorism Monitor, May 1; TASS, June 3). However, this was only the latest in Islamic State’s (IS) expanded external operations. Its militants were also involved in the double suicide bombing in Kerman, Iran, on January 2, which killed 91 and wounded 102, as well as the lethal Istanbul church attack in Türkiye later that month (The Moscow Times, May 16). For the first time, on July 1, in the latest issue of IS’s flagship English-language magazine Voice of Khurasan, the organization claimed credit for these external operations. The article boasted, “Khurasan Wilayah of the Islamic State has become an imminent danger for the infidels of the world, particularly in the past few months in which the mujahidin hit several major foreign targets, such as the ‘Rafidi Mushrikins’ in Kerman, then the bloody attack on Crusader Russians” (Jihadology, July 10). The authors conclude by chiding the Taliban for its inability to stop ISKP’s attacks and promised future operations. The increasing action of ISKP demonstrates a rise in militarism in Central Asia, which will likely lead to more security risks for the region as citizens become dissatisfied with their governments’ responses to the unrest.

The Moscow gunmen hailed from Tajikistan and belonged to ISKP’s increasingly active Central Asia contingent. Likewise, Tajiks were involved in both the Kerman and Istanbul attacks (Eurasianet, March 29). ISKP has taken advantage of the structural shifts following the 2019 fall of the caliphate in Iraq and Syria to position itself as the premier destination for pro-IS Central Asian jihadists. In revamping its regional and international strategy, the Afghanistan- and Pakistan-based ISKP assessed that this favorable environment presented opportunities to expand its reach into neighboring countries, with the most immediate emphasis placed on bolstering influence, support, recruitment, and fundraising throughout Central and South Asia (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, June 18). ISKP’s growing propaganda reach and international operational capabilities are causing increasing concern among a broadening range of designated enemy nations on all sides of the geopolitical divide, including the United States, China, Russia, India, and Iran.

ISKP began to revamp its militant doctrine and developed a strategy of regionalization and internationalization in the lead-up to the US withdrawal from Afghanistan and the Taliban seizing power in August 2021 (The Diplomat, August 26, 2022). This involved building up multilingual propaganda production capacity and dramatically increasing output to extend its reach throughout South and Central Asia. ISKP rolled out Uzbek and Tajik media arms in 2022 and profiled Central Asian militants in its magazines, presenting them as role models for existing or potential supporters to follow (CACI Analyst, August 31, 2022). ISKP seeks to win over extremists by portraying the Taliban as Pashtun-centric and hostile to other ethnic groups. It points to examples such as the Taliban’s decimation of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) after the group switched allegiances in 2015 and joined IS, claiming the wives and children of IMU fighters were also killed. This has yielded notable success. Consequently, ISKP fighters from Central Asia have been increasingly involved in attacks both inside and outside Afghanistan. The organization’s networks have rapidly expanded westward with several plots involving Central Asia across Europe and North America (Radio Ozodi, June 11).

ISKP operational activity is surging in Central Asia, despite more attention given to the plots in the West. The group presents itself as the lone vehicle available in the region to take the fight to those Central Asian governments that members of these countries have fled and want to attack the most. ISKP has even been carrying out outreach efforts to the Tajik Jamaat Ansarullah group, the Uyghur Turkistan Islamic Party, and others, deriding organization leadership for preventing attacks on the primary enemies of these organizations (X.com/KhorasanDiary, February 27, 2023).

Central Asia produced some of the highest foreign fighter flows to Iraq and Syria during the caliphate era. It is now a primary source of international militants joining ISKP. A history of attacks inside Central Asia itself has plagued the region, including the July 2018 ramming of foreign cyclists with a vehicle in Tajikistan’s Danghara district, the November 2019 incursion and gunfight with Tajik security forces along the Tajik-Uzbek border, and incidents of prison violence in the city of Khujand in November 2018 and in May 2019 in a prison east of Dushanbe in May 2019 (The Diplomat, April 29, 2022; Terrorism Monitor, April 14, 2023). In 2022, militants fired rockets into Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, and ISKP announced that its “great jihad to Central Asia” had officially commenced (Eurasianet, April 25, 2022).

More recently, Central Asia has seen a marked rise in ISKP-linked arrests, violence, and foiled plots throughout the region, indicating an elevated operational prioritization of the region. In late December 2023, two teens were apprehended for a plot targeting multiple sites in the southern Kyrgyz city of Jalal-Abad (Xinhua, December 28, 2023). Months later, a car bomb exploded in Tajikistan’s Kulyab region and was linked to ISKP (Radio Ozodi, February 15). In June, 15 ISKP-associated individuals were arrested in Bishkek and other locations. They were accused of uploading videos on the Internet providing tactical advice on weapons and explosives use (Kaktus Media, June 14). Around that time, a female cell was said to be planning to attack a Western target, though the government denied IS involvement (KazTAG, July 12).

ISKP’s success in building support among and attracting Central Asians poses a considerable security threat to the region. A new UN report assessed that the group has strengthened its presence in northern Afghanistan and is increasing recruitment from Tajik and Uzbek communities, stockpiling arms and explosives in the area, and looking to establish control over territory for the purpose of infiltrating the countries of Central Asia (UN Security Council, July 8). Given these trends, ISKP looks set to intensify efforts to incite violence and direct external operations into Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and the other former Soviet republics.