Island Hopping: the PRC’s Quest for Strategic Maritime Influence and Resource Security through the Cook Islands Partnership

Executive Summary:

• The People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the Cook Islands signed two agreements in February that extend Beijing’s engagement in the South Pacific to include deep-sea exploration and dual-use maritime infrastructure.
• Beijing seeks to overcome U.S.-imposed containment in the Pacific. The Cook Islands agreements include provisions for port infrastructure, potentially offering logistical support for the People’s Liberation Army Navy and expanding its presence in the third island chain.
• Since 2009, PRC state-led studies have identified critical minerals in the deep sea around the Cook Islands, especially cobalt, which is crucial for battery technologies. The island nation now is expected to facilitate Chinese mining operations, securing a supply chain advantage for Beijing.

Mark Brown, the Prime Minister of the Cook Islands, led a delegation to the People’s Republic of China (PRC) on February 10–14. The two key outcomes of the talks were the signing of a “Action Plan 2025–2030 for the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership between the Cook Islands and the People’s Republic of China” and a “Memorandum of Understanding on Deepening Blue Economy Cooperation between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Immigration of the Government of the Cook Islands and the Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Immigration, Accessed March 3, [1], [2]). [1]

The agreements provide an opening for the PRC to engage in deepsea exploration in the South Pacific, as well as the use of maritime infrastructure that could have dual-use functions, providing Beijing a stronger foothold in the third island chain. The announcements prompted immediate concerns from New Zealand, who argued that the Cook Islands had not consulted Wellington on the agreement’s details as required by constitutional arrangements (1News, February 9). PRC state media dismissed New Zealand’s concerns (Global Times, February 9).

Breaking Containment

PRC collaboration with the Cook Islands dates back to the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1997. The next year, the two countries signed a trade agreement, followed by economic and technological cooperation agreements in 2004 and 2013, a joint declaration in 2012 on a water supply project involving New Zealand, and a multilateral memorandum in 2018 to join the “21st Century Maritime Silk Road”—part of One Belt One Road (一带一路) (PRC Embassy to New Zealand, February 21, 2013; MFA, October 2024). Most of these accords are limited to economic and trade cooperation that fall entirely within the Cook Islands’ sovereign domain. [2] By contrast, the new agreement extends beyond this, disregarding New Zealand’s constitutional prerogatives.

Over the last decade, Beijing has proactively expanded its influence in the South Pacific. In 2024, the leaders of Nauru, Micronesia, Vanuatu, the Solomon Islands, Fiji, and Samoa all made trips to Beijing (Global Times, March 24, 2024; Xinhua, April 9, 2024; July 12, 2024; MFA, July 11, 2024; August 18, 2024; November 26, 2024). Among the agreements signed, there is a correlation between those countries that have received interest from the PRC and their strategic value to Beijing (China Brief, June 7, 2024).

Breaking out of the third island chain—and what it perceives as U.S.-imposed containment—is part of what motivates Beijing to deepen its relationship with the Cook Islands. [3] Amid ongoing experiments to breach the second island chain, the PRC must secure an anchorage beyond it that can provide maintenance and logistical support for naval vessels on long-range missions while also deterring U.S. forces in the region. The memorandum on “Deepening Blue Economy Cooperation” potentially provides this to the PRC. Article 3 emphasizes that the two sides will engage in investment cooperation in “port wharves, shipbuilding and ship repair, and ocean transportation.” While this appears to be aimed at fishing vessels or scientific exploration ships, the inclusion of “port wharves” and “ship repair” suggests a potential for dual-use applications. [4]

(Source: New Lines Institute)

Advancing Deepsea Exploration

In recent years, Beijing has become interested in deep-sea mining, through which it hopes to dominate access to critical minerals. The country has heavily invested in new deep-sea technologies and also actively participates in shaping deep-sea mining regulations at the International Seabed Authority (China Brief, January 31).

As early as 2009, the Qingdao Marine Geology Research Institute (青岛海洋地质研究所) under the Ministry of Land and Resources conducted a study on deep-sea mineral resources in the South Pacific. One of its main conclusions was that polymetallic nodules are densely distributed in both the northern and southern waters of the Cook Islands. These nodules contain critical minerals such as manganese, copper, nickel, and cobalt, which is crucial for battery technology. The policy recommendations in the study advised that Beijing establishes bilateral or multilateral cooperation agreements with these resource-rich island nations (High-Technology & Industrialization, February 2009).

From 2013, the PRC began exploration for deep-sea mining in the region. That year, the China Ocean Minerals Resources Association (中国大洋协会), together with other Chinese mining and mineral corporations, organized a delegation to visit South Pacific island nations including the Cook Islands, expressing their intention to participate in the exploration of deep‑sea resources (COMRA, July 21, 2015). In 2016, the Legislative Affairs Office of the National People’s Congress Committee on Environmental and Resource Protection (全国人大环境与资源保护委员会法案室) conducted a detailed study of deep‑sea mining legislation in various countries (National People’s Congress, March 29, 2016).

French Polynesia and the Solomon Islands rejected requests from Beijing to lease islands or the seabed for development. Beijing now has turned to the Cook Islands, who have agreed to do so (Reuter, October 29, 2019; Tablet, August 29, 2022). Both documents signed in February mention that the two sides will engage in investment and cooperation in the field of deep-sea mineral resource development. In the more significant “Comprehensive Strategic Partnership” agreement, the Cook Islands states that the development of deep-sea mineral resources is “a national priority” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Immigration, Accessed February 24). During the five-year term of the agreement, the Cook Islands is set to facilitate PRC-affiliated deep-sea mining or exploration entities via domestic policies and regulations.

Conclusion

Beijing’s new partnership with the Cook Islands is part of a broader strategy to secure a critical maritime foothold in the South Pacific to expand its strategic logistics and naval capabilities. The PRC also aims to leverage the Cook Islands’ deep-sea resource rights to strengthen its supply chain security. By embedding itself in the region’s maritime infrastructure and regulatory frameworks, Beijing seeks to reshape the regional order in its favor while countering Western influence.

 Notes

[1] The PRC has am implicit hierarchy to its international relations. The recent upgrade of the Cook Islands to the level of “Comprehensive Strategic Partnership” aligns with the diplomatic relationship level that the PRC maintains with Iran, as well as with ASEAN. In the South Pacific region, the PRC established such a partnership with the Solomon Islands in 2023. There are no direct economic or institutional implications to becoming a “strategic partner” of the PRC, nor are there necessarily material benefits to advancing to the level of “comprehensive strategic partnership.” Such promotions can be significant in other ways, however. For partner countries, being officially designated a close partner can provide opportunity for real cooperation (China Brief, September 20).

[2] New Zealand was also a signatory to the water infrastructure project, and the Maritime Silk Road initiative was a multilateral document involving multiple nations.

[3] For a long time, Beijing has assessed that it is hemmed in by three concentric island chains—strings of islands that are largely part of the United States’ security umbrella (Baidubaike, November 10, 2023). This has been a major source of insecurity, and breaking out of these chains has become a benchmark for enhancing national security and maritime defense (Global Times, July 8, 2013; September 17, 2017; Shangyou News, November 2, 2021). Beijing believes that the first island chain now may be dominated by the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) (Taihai Net, September 3, 2019; Taiwan.cn, January 25, 2022). Breaking through the second has become a short-term goal of PLAN modernization (Global Times, June 24, 2013; The Paper, January 8, 2017).

[4] In recent years, the PLAN has frequently visited ports in Oceania, especially in Melanesia and western waters of Polynesia (Naval News, December 31, 2023). The PRC has also invested heavily in deep-water ports in the South Pacific that can accommodate its warships (China Brief, June 7, 2024). Even some ports built to support aquaculture farms owned by PRC fisheries companies have the potential to be converted into logistics and supply hubs (The Diplomat, June 23, 2022).