Israel’s Assassination of Hamas Head Creates Dilemma for Tehran

Executive Summary:

• The July 31 assassination of Hamas’s head, Ismail Haniyeh, after the inauguration of Iran’s new president in Tehran was a significant victory for Israel, signaling that Jerusalem could eliminate any leader of the Islamic Republic at will.
• This appears to reflect a deeper strategic shift in the way Israel’s policymakers view Iran and its proxies, and could spell the end of the longstanding shadow war between the two.
• Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s change in strategic posture is likely due to political pressures emanating from domestic opposition and fatigue over the ongoing war in Gaza and long-term concerns over Israel’s ability to restore deterrence in the face of continuous attacks from Iranian proxies.
• Iran could respond to Haniyeh’s assassination in a number of ways, including an all-out surprise attack, a coordinated strike from its proxies, assaults on Israeli citizens and/or Jewish communities abroad, threatening total war to force a ceasefire, or deciding to wait and see until it knows who will win the U.S. presidential election in November.

The assassination of Ismail Haniyeh, chairman of Hamas’s Political Bureau, in Tehran on July 31 was a significant tactical and propaganda victory for Israel (Middle East Monitor, August 19). The operation both eliminated the leader of a hostile terrorist group aligned with the Iranian regime and demonstrated Israel’s ability to penetrate Iran during a major international political event—in this case, the inauguration of President Massoud Pezeshkian (see Terrorism Monitor, July 31). [1] The assassination was a clear statement that Israel could target any leader of the Islamic Republic at will.

Netanyahu’s Short-Term Concerns

The operation should be seen first in the context of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s immediate concerns. Netanyahu is under intense pressure from various quarters. Domestically, moderate opposition figures have been pushing to oust Netanyahu and reverse his government’s judicial reforms (Al Jazeera, November 16, 2023; Anadolu Agency, August 28). Internationally, the Arab world, some Western countries, international organizations, as well as Russia and China are all pressuring Israel to end the war in Gaza—and in some cases, to recognize a Palestinian state (New York Times, May 31; Amnesty International, February 20; Moscow Times, November 6, 2023; Egypt Today, May 30). During Netanyahu’s recent trip to Washington, American leaders urged him to try to reach a ceasefire with Hamas before all of his conditions were met (AP News, July 25). Israel’s failure so far to achieve its primary objective in the war—eliminating the threat of the Islamist terrorists backed by both the Iranian regime and the Muslim Brotherhood—further compounds these pressures.

Netanyahu also likely aimed to thwart Khamenei’s plans to demonstrate “heroic flexibility” by tapping a putative “Reformist” to lower tensions with the West (see Terrorism Monitor, July 31). Choosing to assassinate Haniyeh in Tehran in the early hours of the night after President Pezeshkian’s inauguration indicates a desire to humiliate the Iranian regime in front of its international guests. This will exert significant psychological pressure on the regime, potentially pushing the IRGC to escalate the conflict and dampening prospects for a normalization of relations between Tehran and the West.

Israel’s Long-Term Concerns

Beyond Netanyahu’s immediate political concerns, Israeli policymakers have come to see the need for a direct confrontation with Iran as crucial for its long-term survival. Tehran continually inflicts damage on Israel through its proxy forces, while Israel lacks equivalent means for retaliation. Israel’s attacks on these proxies outside Iran have had a limited deterrent effect so far (Times of Israel, January 18, 2018; Middle East Forum, October 31, 2023). Rather than strike at the Islamic Republic’s many proxies, Israeli leaders appear compelled to strike directly at what they perceive as the “octopus’ head” in Tehran—a strategy that the Netanyahu government has pursued since the Hamas terrorist attack on October 7, 2023. This approach has broad support in Israel, including from Netanyahu’s political opponents like Naftali Bennett.

Since October 7, Israeli leaders have sought to restore deterrence, which they believe has been eroded. Israel’s new policy move emphasizes excessive force, unlimited retaliation, and direct attacks on Iran. This marks a departure from its previous regional military strategy which focused on lower-intensity conflicts with the regime’s proxy groups. [2] At the same time, Israel has stepped up its attacks on Iran’s proxies, including paralyzing the Houthi-controlled port of Hodeidah in Yemen in July and assassinating key leaders of Hezbollah and Hamas the Revolutionary Guards across the Middle East, including Sayyed Razi Mousavi, Mohammad Reza Zahedi, and Muhammad Deif (Amwaj.media, August 12; Al Jazeera, December 25, 2023; The Jerusalem Post, April 2; Times of Israel, July 13). Netanyahu’s insistence on continuing the Gaza war until all of his objectives are fulfilled is part of this broader effort to restore deterrence.

Israeli policymaker’s more deep-rooted concern, however, is that the Iranian regime’s long-standing strategy to encircle Israel might have succeeded. By maintaining an active presence in the “Shia Crescent,” Tehran has surrounded Israel from the east via Syria, from the north via Lebanon, from the south via the Sinai, and from within via the West Bank and Gaza (for more on the Shia Crescent, see The Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, March 7, 2021). Iran’s proxies in Iraq and Yemen have also contributed to the sense among Israeli policymakers that Iran is tightening the screws on Israel from a distance. Israeli leaders see the October 7 attack as a display of Hamas’s confidence in Tehran’s growing power and presence in the region. This suggests that an eventual confrontation between Israel and the Iranian regime is very likely, especially in the context of Tehran’s potential nuclearization.

April Crisis

Iran and Israel recently came close to war, which pulled their long-standing conflict out of the shadows. Israel launched a missile attack on the Iranian regime’s consulate in Damascus on April 1, killing several IRGC commanders (Asriran, April 1; Alalam News Network, April 2; Al Arabiya, April 21). This represented a deliberate escalation aimed at provoking a direct conflict with Tehran.

On April 13, the Islamic Republic launched an unprecedented assault on Israel, deploying nearly 300 drones and missiles in a show of force (Al Jazeera, April 13). The attack’s inefficacy made it less escalatory than it could have been. This was so in part because Tehran postured aggressively in early April, but delayed its missile attacks and telegraphed its eventual course of action to the West, allowing time for the United States and its allies to intervene and prevent significant damage to Israel (Euronews, April 14). Additionally, Western pressure on Netanyahu to avoid further escalation led to a symbolic Israeli response—an attack on the radar system guarding one of Iran’s nuclear facilities—after which tensions temporarily cooled off (Axios, April 14; Times of Israel, April 19).

Iran’s Potential Responses

Should Iranian authorities eventually decide to retaliate for the assassination of Haniyeh as they did on April 13, they might once again launch a large-scale strike of comparable magnitude. This time, however, Tehran could seek to maximize the impact by adopting a more clandestine approach, launching the attack without prior announcement or warning to Israel’s allies, thereby enhancing the element of surprise. Their strategy may focus on targeting Israel’s military and civic infrastructure while attempting to minimize civilian casualties, a calculated effort to inflict significant damage without provoking widespread international condemnation (Etemad, April 15).

Iranian authorities may view the assassination of a key leader of one of their proxy groups as an act warranting a proportional response. In such a scenario, they would require full commitment from their proxy forces across the region. Iran might coordinate a multi-front offensive against Israel, involving Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen, Shia militias in Iraq, and the remaining forces of Hamas and Palestine Islamic Jihad in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. While these groups have historically launched missiles at Israel in relatively quick succession, the attacks have been small in scale. A major, synchronized rocket barrage—alongside other attacks—would be unprecedented, potentially overwhelming Israeli defenses and demonstrating Iran’s capacity to reach into Israel without firing a single shot itself.

Another possible response to Haniyeh’s assassination could involve targeting Israeli officials or citizens abroad. Over the past decade, Iran has been implicated in multiple attempts to assassinate Israeli citizens and leaders on foreign soil. These plots have been part of a broader strategy by Iran to retaliate against Israeli actions and to exert pressure internationally. For example, in 2022, Iranian operatives attempted to kill Israeli citizens in Cyprus, and in 2021, Iranian agents were arrested in Turkey for planning attacks on Israeli tourists (Radio Farda, March 28, 2023; Independent [Farsi], July 25, 2022). Additionally, Israeli intelligence services have thwarted assassination attempts in Georgia and Thailand, where Iranian operatives were believed to be targeting Israeli diplomats and other officials (Iran International, November 16, 2022; Afghanistan International, December 24, 2023).

Yet another potential reaction could be the targeting of Jewish communities in other countries. The Argentine Israelite Mutual Association (AMIA) bombing in Buenos Aires on July 18, 1994, for example, killed 85 people and injured hundreds (The American Israel Public Affairs Committee, July 18, 2020). The bombing remains the deadliest attack on Argentina’s Jewish community to this day and has been widely attributed to Hezbollah, with support and planning allegedly having been provided by Iran. Argentine prosecutors have implicated senior Iranian officials in ordering the attack as part of Tehran’s broader campaign against Israeli and Jewish targets worldwide. Given Tehran’s history of supporting such attacks, it could respond similarly to the assassination of Haniyeh.

Menacing Israel to try to force its leaders to negotiate a ceasefire in the Gaza Strip with Hamas offers another manner in which to respond to Haniyeh’s assassination. At present, a ceasefire appears to be unlikely unless the looming threat of an Iranian attack and intense U.S. diplomatic pressure causes a breakthrough. The successful brokering of a ceasefire could significantly enhance the Iranian regime’s prestige, allowing Tehran to showcase the leverage it wields by claiming a diplomatic victory to both its allies and adversaries. This would send a powerful message to the Arab world if it succeeded: where their efforts to achieve Palestinian rights through years of compromise with Israel have failed, Iran’s willingness to escalate toward an apocalyptic confrontation secured a long-awaited victory. For the regime, this option is by far the most advantageous, as it allows Tehran to claim a major win without a full-scale war, achieving the regime’s strategic objectives in a manner that aligns with international norms.

Lastly, Tehran may choose to swallow its pride and take no immediate action against Israel. Khamenei has recently spoken of the advantages of a “tactical retreat,” and the regime’s overall rhetoric has shifted from “hard revenge” to a “calculated response” (Al Arabiya, August 31). This change reflects the regime’s uncertainty with regard to taking any action in the short term. The Iranian authorities are aware that any attempt to trigger a larger Middle Eastern conflict would have a number of undesired effects, including on the upcoming U.S. elections. A full-scale war would likely hurt the incumbent party and strengthen the odds that Donald Trump retakes the presidency. Given the Trump administration’s closeness with Netanyahu and previously aggressive stance toward Iran, Tehran may prefer to wait and see what the outcome of the U.S. election is before taking any further action.

Tehran’s Challenges

A few hours after Haniyeh’s assassination, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei vowed that the Islamic Republic would “retaliate for our dear guest’s blood.” Since then, military, political, judicial, and religious leaders have promised a “teeth-breaking response,” “retaliation in kind,” and/or “severe revenge” (Office for the Preservation and Publication of the Works of the Grand Ayatollah Sayyid Ali Khamenei, August 1; Donya-e-Eqtesad, August 26; Asriran, August 7). Despite this fiery rhetoric, the regime has not yet responded to the assassination. Any sharp retaliation risks provoking a severe response from Israel and its allies, which could lead to devastating consequences for the regime. Khamenei and his supporters fear instability and internal uprisings, should a counter-strike inflict significant damage against Iran’s infrastructure.

The assassination also exposed the Iranian regime’s security and intelligence weaknesses, highlighting its inability to prevent Israeli operations within its borders. For decades, Khamenei and his supporters have touted their ability to keep Iran at peace as a major achievement (Office for the Preservation and Publication of the Works of the Grand Ayatollah Sayyid Ali Khamenei, January 9; Siasat Rooz, January 10, 2009; Radio Farda, June 3; Asriran, March 6; Student News Network [Iran], accessed August 30). However, Haniyeh’s assassination on Iranian soil undermined that claim, damaging the regime’s credibility. This incident could also negatively affect Tehran’s relationship with its proxy forces—after all, if the regime cannot protect an important individual in its capital during a presidential inauguration, how well can it protect them? This might weaken Tehran’s control over its proxies, potentially pushing them toward seeking accommodations with their adversaries for survival.

What to Expect

Iran and Israel appear to be caught in an ever-escalating cycle of hostilities. With Yahya Sinwar now leading Hamas, the Iranian-aligned faction of Hamas has gained ground at the expense of its Brotherhood-linked branch (Al Arabiya, August 6; for more on Sinwar, see Terrorism Monitor, August 28). This shift is likely to sideline Hamas’s political leadership, which is backed by Qatar and is more open to Western diplomatic initiatives. Conversely, the military wing—which is closely tied to the IRGC—appears to have taken the reins. According to Al Arabiya, Sinwar, believed to be hiding somewhere in the Gaza Strip, opposed Qatar-based former Hamas head Khaled Mashal’s return to leadership (Al Arabiya, August 6). Mashal might have moved Hamas back toward the Muslim Brotherhood; instead, Sinwar’s preference for strong ties to Iran and Syria will lead to increasing Iranian influence within the terrorist group.

The role of other powers in these dynamics should not be overlooked. Some voices close to the Kremlin—which has drawn increasingly close to Iran—have advocated for a full-scale war in the Middle East, which would serve to further divide and distract the West from the Russian invasion of Ukraine (see Eurasia Daily Monitor, December 12, 2023; February 28; X/@MedvedevRussiaE, July 31; The Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, May 13). Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi also expressed support for Iran’s “sovereignty, security, and national dignity” in reaction to Haniyeh’s assassination (Global Times, August 11). Even so, both countries officially call for peace between Israel and Hamas but may be advocating for bold behavior from Tehran behind the scenes.

Meanwhile, Netanyahu’s strategic shift signals that the continuation of the conflict in the “gray zone” is increasingly unlikely. Especially since 2006, Iran has sought to squeeze Israel from afar through a network of proxies, a strategy Israel is determined to counter by taking away Tehran’s plausible deniability. The Israeli prime minister’s rhetoric has become increasingly aggressive toward Iran (AP News, April 17; Times of Israel, August 4). Even if the Islamic Republic manages to weather the current crisis with minimal harm to itself and its proxies, similar confrontations are likely to occur in the near future as part of Netanyahu’s new strategy. [3] Israel’s repeated attacks on Iran can spell the definitive end of the longstanding shadow war between the two, drawing in extra-regional actors and escalating into a full-scale war with far-reaching global consequences.

Notes:

[1] There have been two prevailing theories as to the methods used in the assassination. The first came from a New York Times article, which suggests that a bomb was planted ahead of time in an IRGC guesthouse and detonated remotely (New York Times, August 1). Tehran, which took several days to decide what story it was going to tell, later suggested Haniyeh was killed by a “short-range projectile” launched from outside the residence (Al Jazeera, August 3). Both theories suffer from deficiencies but may have been constructed in order to mitigate the impact of the operation and contain potential escalation. For example, if the operation to kill Haniyeh was military in nature and involved assets like the F-35 launching missiles at the building (as some have suggested; see Real Clear Defense, August 21), the incident would represent a serious violation of Iranian sovereignty. This would leave little room for maneuvering for either Washington or Tehran. Instead, individuals in Iran and the West seem to be focusing on the notion that the assassination was the result of Israeli infiltration. Another theory was put forward by one of Haniyeh’s sons, Abdul Salam Haniyeh, who suggested that the assassination was conducted by using a guided missile that targeted Haniyeh’s mobile phone (Middle East Monitor, August 17). This at least has the benefit of matching how Israel usually targets IRGC members and Iranian proxies in Syria and Lebanon.

[2] This approach itself had been adopted following Hezbollah’s rocket attacks during the 2006 Israel–Hezbollah War and Hamas’s takeover of Gaza the same year (The Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, July 20, 2020; Center for Security Policy, November 4, 2021; Middle East Forum, January 8). Before 2006, post-Revolutionary Iran waged what might be termed a “phoney war” against Israel, which generally was marked by hostile rhetoric rather than action.

[3] It may be the case that Israel has been covertly striking Iranian military sites on its own territory since Haniyeh’s assassination. There have been unexplained explosions in or around military sites in Kermanshah (western Iran) and Isfahan (central Iran; Iran International, August 12; Tabnak, August 29). Both cities are known to have significant military facilities and missile installations—Isfahan hosts Iran’s notorious Natanz nuclear facility. Kermanshah may have been hit once and Isfahan twice in the past several weeks. These have been reported by the regime, albeit in the guise of gas explosions or part of planned military exercises. If these allegations are true, it would provide concrete evidence of Israel’s willingness to escalate—and Iran’s fear to do so.