Jihadist Narratives in the Aftermath of India’s Airstrikes on Pakistan

Executive Summary:

• In the aftermath of the Indian air strikes on Pakistan on May 6, militant groups active in and around Pakistan took a variety of approaches to responding to the brief escalation within their respective propaganda apparatuses:
  • Al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) initially stood behind the Pakistani state against India—an unusual position for the group—before returning to its historical antagonism of the Pakistani military after it was clear that the conflict was not escalating further.
  • The bulk of the Pakistani Taliban (TTP) accused the Pakistani military of having stage-managed the entire exchange with India as a way to attack its bases without risking the potential backlash that could come from having conducted said attacks itself. Smaller factions within the Pakistani Taliban remained mostly silent, either because they concur that the whole affair was a farce or out of fear that rallying behind the state could lead to increased sympathy for the military.
  • The Afghan Taliban officially stayed out of the conflict, declaring neutrality. While some elements within the group suggested that what had occurred between Pakistan and India was comeuppance for Pakistan’s own strikes against TTP strongholds in Afghanistan in the past, the bulk of the Afghan Taliban’s opinion appears to have been that staying out of the diplomatic row was the best course of action.
  • As might be expected, Islamic State–Khorasan Province condemned both Pakistan and India as states run by infidels but focused most of their propaganda toward deriding the Afghan Taliban’s call for peace and empathy on both sides.

Pakistani jihadist groups, including al-Qaeda and the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (the TTP, the largest faction of the Pakistani Taliban), the Afghan Taliban, and Islamic State–Khorasan Province (ISIS-K), reacted in varying ways to the Indian air strikes on Pakistan on May 6. Their differences help illuminate the groups’ differing objectives, propaganda strategies, state and geopolitical relationships, and current moves in positioning themselves within the broader jihadist ecosystem. Each of these factors ultimately indicates the manner in which the jihadist landscape in Pakistan is evolving.

The deadliest of these strikes occurred in Bahawalpur, where suspected Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) targets were hit. The attack killed ten close relatives of its leader, Masood Azhar, including women and children (AAJ News, May 7). India asserted the strikes were in retaliation for an April 22 terrorist attack on tourists in Pahalgam, Kashmir, for which The Resistance Front (TRF), an offshoot of the longstanding jihadist group Lashkar-e-Taiba, claimed responsibility (The Hindu, April 27).  Indian authorities claim the militants are supported by the Pakistani state (Hindustan Times, May 7). These developments warrant attention when viewed against the backdrop of previous instances of military tension between Pakistan and India.

AQIS’s Strategic Communications

Al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) issued two statements in response to the Indian strikes in Pakistan that were strikingly different. The first response came on May 7 (X/@SaleemMehsud, May 7). In its statement, the group condemned the Indian strikes and characterized participation in the defence of Pakistan as a religious duty for militants. In a one-page press release titled “Regarding Indian Aggression on the Land of Pakistan,” AQIS described the defence against the Indian assault as a struggle for the survival of Muslims. The statement accused India of advancing a Hindu extremist agenda under the leadership of Prime Minister Narendra Modi, alleging that, following its actions in India and Kashmir, the Modi government seeks to spread religious hatred against Muslims across the region and suppress Islam. AQIS urged all militants to prepare for involvement in this conflict, which the group declared a “jihad.”

The AQIS statement conspicuously lacked any criticism of the Pakistani government or military. This is a significant point, given that AQIS has made the Pakistani military its primary target in propaganda, branding the institution as the main obstacle to jihadists’ ambitions in Pakistan. AQIS advocates for the establishment of an Islamic system of governance in the country through jihad. However, its declared agenda extends beyond Pakistan, with the ultimate goal being the imposition of Islamic rule across India, Kashmir, and Bangladesh within the broader Indian subcontinent, with cells in these countries working toward this common objective. [1]

Once the threat of further Indian attacks diminished with the announcement of a ceasefire, AQIS reverted to its traditional rhetoric. It issued a strong criticism of the Pakistani military, accusing it of serving U.S. interests rather than those of Pakistan. On May 22, AQIS published its detailed response to the Pakistan–India tensions in the editorial of its flagship Urdu-language magazine, Nawa-e-Ghazwa-e-Hind. The editorial sharply criticized the Pakistani military for the recent escalation and condemned Pakistan’s decision to agree to a ceasefire following the intervention of U.S. President Donald Trump, alleging that this decision served as evidence of the military’s subordination to the United States. AQIS had expected the Pakistani military to continue hostilities against India, particularly in light of initial successes, such as the downing of Indian aircraft and the targeting of military sites (Breaking Defense, June 1). The group asserted that prolonging the conflict would have resulted in a significant defeat for India. In the wake of the ceasefire, AQIS intensified its rhetoric against the Pakistani military, urging the public to abandon any expectations that the country’s armed forces would protect national or Islamic interests, instead painting it as a pawn of U.S. policy. The shift was aimed at cultivating public resentment toward the military and bolstering support for militant groups, consistent with AQIS’s broader narrative directed at Pakistani audiences.

The Pakistan Taliban Incites Against the Army

The Pakistan Taliban took an opposite stance to AQAP. The TTP also issued a statement in response to the Indian strikes in Pakistan on May 7 (X/@ihsantipu, May 8). The statement expressed sorrow over the killing of Masood Azhar’s family, and conveyed the TTP’s condolences to him for his loss. In contrast to AQIS’s approach, the statement lacked any condemnation of India; instead, the focus was on blaming the Pakistani military as the TTP attempted to incite public anger against it.

The TTP accused the Pakistani military of providing intelligence to India on the whereabouts of Masood Azhar’s family members, suggesting that the entire episode of bilateral tension was a staged drama. The apparent aim of this narrative was to counter the growing public support for the Pakistani military, which followed its immediate retaliatory response to the Indian strikes. The TTP issued no further statement on the subject following May 7.

Apart from the TTP, other key factions of the Pakistani Taliban, such as Tehrik-e-Taliban Ghazwa-e-Hind (also referred to as the Hafiz Gul Bahadur Group, or HGB), Lashkar-e-Islam (LI), the new Tehrik-e-Inqilab Islami Pakistan (founded in March 2025), and Ittihad-ul-Mujahideen Pakistan, remained silent on the military escalation between Pakistan and India. This silence was noteworthy, given that these groups (like the TTP) have developed more robust media outreach in the past year, and have regularly issued statements on major events, such as the victory of Hay’at Taḥrīr al-Shām (“Committee for the Liberation of the Levant”) in the Syrian Civil War (X/@abdsayedd, December 8, 2024; X/@Valle_Riccardo, December 9, 2024). Their collective silence in the current context may suggest that, like the TTP, the various factions view the conflict as a staged performance or otherwise wish to avoid generating any sympathy for the Pakistani military among their own fighters and supporters that might have resulted from issuing statements against India.

The Afghan Taliban’s Non-Interference

On May 7, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Afghan Taliban issued an official statement regarding the conflict between Pakistan and India, adopting a position of neutrality (X/@MoFA_AFG, May 7). The statement urged both countries to resolve the conflict through dialogue rather than warfare. This remained the official stance of the Taliban government in Afghanistan throughout the escalation.

Meanwhile, influential individuals affiliated with the Afghan Taliban advised their supporters and the Afghan public not to interpret the Pakistan–India conflict as a religious war, but rather as a struggle rooted in political interests, emphasizing there was no religious obligation to support Pakistan in this conflict. One of the most widely circulated messages of this type came from Mullah Abdul Salam Zaeef, the former Afghan Taliban ambassador to Pakistan (X/@abdulsalamzaeef, May 7). His statement gained significant traction on social media in both Afghanistan and Pakistan, receiving criticism in Pakistan and support from Afghans.

Among Afghan Taliban supporters, notable voices also refrained from expressing support for Pakistan (X/@Uqab_afghan98, May 7). Instead, some described the Indian strikes as a form of retribution for Pakistan’s facilitation of U.S. bombings in Afghanistan in 2001, as well as similar airstrikes during the Afghan Taliban’s current rule. One such figure was Sheikh Abdul Sami Ghaznavi, a religious leader associated with the Afghan Taliban, who expressed these views in a widely circulated video on social media (X/@MuslimKundzi, May 10). Like Ghaznavi, many Afghan Taliban sympathizers expressed satisfaction over the Indian strikes, claiming that Pakistan was now experiencing the kind of pain it had previously inflicted on them through similar operations in Afghanistan.

Still, given the end result, the voices in Afghan Taliban-affiliated circles calling for a more cautious approach ultimately won the debate. The country’s foreign ministry acknowledged the potential for escalation between Pakistan and India and urged others to adopt a neutral position in line with their own stance (X/@nahafghan, May 10). While denouncing the Indian government as anti-Islamic, they argued that religious principles do not justify supporting attacks on the Muslim population of Pakistan in response to the policies of the Pakistani state and military.

Conclusion

AQIS framed India’s attack on Pakistan as a religious war against Muslims, thereby declaring it the duty of every militant to defend Pakistan. However, AQIS did not spare the Pakistani military. Despite initial silence, it later accused the army of acting against national interests under the influence of the United States, citing the U.S.-mediated ceasefire with India as proof of said capitulation.

Unlike AQIS, the TTP did not direct its response toward India. Instead, it accused the Pakistani military of assisting India in targeting militant bases within the country. This reflected the group’s deep-seated hostility toward the Pakistani army.

Standing to the side, supporters of the Afghan Taliban appear to view the conflict as a political dispute between two nation-states, largely devoid of a religious dimension. It still remains the case, however, that the core reason behind the Afghan Taliban’s apathy was civilian casualties from similar airstrikes conducted by the Pakistani Air Force in Taliban-controlled Afghanistan after August 2021, which targeted alleged anti-Pakistan militant hideouts.

Even more significant may also have been the silence of Islamic State (IS) regarding the tensions between India and Pakistan. The sole response from IS–Khorasan Province (ISIS-K) appeared on May 8 through the News Hour Pashto podcast by Al-Azaim Media (X/AfghanAnalyst2, May 9). Under the pretext of these tensions, ISKP focused its criticism on its primary adversary, the Afghan Taliban. The critique targeted the Taliban government’s statement expressing sympathy toward both states, advocating for a peaceful resolution through dialogue rather than warfare. According to ISKP, both the Indian and Pakistani governments are considered infidels, and thus expressing sympathy toward them is impermissible. [3]

Notes:

[1] AQIS is the regional branch of al-Qaeda, formally announced by former Al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri in September 2014. Nonetheless, AQIS literature indicates that most of its leadership and membership comprises Pakistani militants who oppose the Pakistani military and state. For details, see Hafidh Sohaib Ghouri, Aise Hote Hain Islam Ke Rahnuma [in Urdu] (Online: Hitteen, July 2020).

[2] Editorial, Nawai Ghazwa Hind [in Urdu], Vol. 18, Issue 3, pp. 6-8.

[3] Beyond this, no response was issued by ISKP or its Pakistani branch (Islamic State Pakistan Province, ISPP) regarding the India–Pakistan tensions.