Khamenei-Enabled Election of ‘Reformist’ Pezeshkian in Iran Trades Expediency for Succession Security

Executive Summary:

• Western media outlets have incorrectly portrayed Massoud Pezeshkian, who was elected as Iran’s new president on July 5, as a “moderate” and a “Reformist.” Though Pezeshkian’s background as an ethnic Azeri may strengthen efforts to try to calm rising ethnic tensions in Iran, he offers no meaningful domestic reforms, and Pezeshkian’s foreign policy views are in alignment with the reactionary/hardliner “Principalist” wing of Iranian politics.
• In the long run, the fact that Khamenei was forced to elevate Pezeshkian rather than a loyal non-partisan like the late Raisi will lead to increased internal conflict within the regime.
• Pezeshkian represents the latest Reformist president permitted by Supreme Leader Khamenei to take power in order to present a friendly face with the West and stave off the worst effects of domestic dissatisfaction with the regime.

On July 5, the relatively unknown, supposed “Reformist” Masoud Pezeshkian was elected president of the Islamic Republic of Iran (Iran International, July 9). According to the official announcement, Pezeshkian won the second round of the election with 54.7 percent of the vote, though voter turnout was historically low (Tehran Times, July 6). [1] Elections in Iran—especially presidential elections—are carefully engineered and tightly controlled processes. Pezeshkian’s election must be understood as reflecting the Iranian regime’s current “flexible” stance in response to intense foreign and domestic pressure. Rather than being uniformly oppressive, the rigidity of the regime’s institutions instead fluctuates according to expediency and the Supreme Leader’s interests.

A Reformist in Name Only

Many mainstream Western media outlets have portrayed Massoud Pezeshkian as a “moderate” and a “Reformist.” However, his track record clearly shows that this is not the case. Pezeshkian’s views on the United States, Israel, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), and Iran’s proxy forces across the Middle East are not much different from those of his predecessor, Ebrahim Raisi. Pezeshkian has repeatedly denounced the United States for its actions in the region and made repeated efforts in parliament to defend the IRGC as well as members of the “Axis of Resistance,” which includes Syria, Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthis. [2]

Pezeshkian is merely Reformist window dressing for the regime: he has been allowed to assume his current position so as to make Khamenei’s system seem less oppressive domestically and more open internationally. In particular, Pezeshkian’s election was intended as a concession to domestic unrest, as well as an opportunity to lessen foreign pressure by presenting a less hostile face to the U.S., the EU, and Israel. Pezeshkian may also serve to signal a softer Iranian presence on the world stage, which the regime views as especially important for its survival if Donald Trump wins the 2024 U.S. presidential election. Pezeshkian laid out his views more fully in a recent Tehran Times article (Tehran Times, July 12).

Past Elections

In 1997, Tehran was isolated internationally due to the assassination or attempted assassination of several prominent dissidents in Europe. These included but by no means not limited to Kazem Rajavi, Shapour Bakhtiar, Fereydoun Farrokhzad, as well as various Kurdish leaders (Iran Wire, November 18, 2021, November 23, 2021; Iran Human Rights Documentation Center, February 3, 2011). [3] Both to save face internationally and to contain the ambitions of then-president Akbar Hashimi Rafsanjani, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei allowed the restrictions around the 1997 election to be “loosened,” [4] permitting the so-called Reformist/“Line of Imam” candidate Mohammad Khatami to win (Student News Network, July 25, 2014; Tasnim News Agency, May 28, 2013; see Terrorism Monitor, June 20).

When Rafsanjani tried to run for president again in 2005, Khamenei blocked him by “tightening” the elections to ensure the victory of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (BBC Persian, June 19, 2005 [1] [2]). Similarly, when Line of Imam-adherent Mir-Hossein Mousavi attempted to challenge Khamenei’s power in the 2009 presidential elections (Aftab News, April 6, 2009; BBC Persian, February 14, 2017), the regime ensured Ahmadinejad’s victory, despite widespread popular support for Mousavi, prompting the 2009–10 “Green Revolution.”

In essence, until the mid-2000s, a kind of oligarchic democracy existed among the factions of the totalitarian Islamist regime. Khamenei did not completely block the Reformist faction and/or Rafsanjani’s supporters, allowing them some victories. As a result, despite their lower status within the regime’s ranks, they tolerated Khamenei’s dominance without displaying serious dissatisfaction publically.

In the mid-2000s, however, Khamenei disrupted this balance, seeking to advance his own absolutist rule. This upset other factions, who accused him of breaking the traditional balance of power. To some extent, Khamenei reacted to this—and to the need to present a facsimile of leniency to the Iranian public after the harsh crackdown following the 2009 election—by conceding to the Reformists and Rafsanjani supporters again in 2013, allowing Hassan Rouhani to become president.

Rouhani was tasked primarily with presenting a friendly face to the West to negotiate a nuclear deal with the Obama administration, but the regime also allowed government affiliates, especially President Rouhani himself and Foreign Minister Javaad Zarif, to try to placate the Iranian public by promising further reform (Jamaran News, December 5, 2017; Iranian Diplomacy, August 8, 2013). In turn, the movement to open up the country was tamped down when Khamenei promoted Ebrahim Raisi.

Raisi’s untimely death disrupted Khamenei’s succession plans but also provided an opportunity for the regime to temporarily appease the Iranian public and the international community, escaping the intense pressure following the Mahsa Amini protests/“Woman, Life, Freedom” revolution (see Terrorism Monitor, June 20). Some in the regime even claimed Raisi’s death was an example of divine intervention, averting the regime’s collapse (Iran International, June 13, June 14; Mehr News Agency, June 1). In other words, Khamenei and his allies took advantage of Raisi’s death, both in order to scapegoat the late president for the country’s recent woes and to use his passing as a national tragedy to rally the people around (Asriran News, May 21).

2024 Presidential Election

With neither of the main election candidates preferred by Khamenei, he faced two choices. If the Supreme Leader allowed a so-called hardliner to become president, it would be a continuation of the previous path, reassuring Khamenei that his radical line would survive after his death—at the cost of increasing pressure on the regime. If he allowed the Reformist Massoud Pezeshkian to become president, considering the favorable media environment and the possibility of support from the West, Khamenei calculated that this option, somewhat akin to Khatami and Rouhani, could temporarily ease domestic and international pressure (Reuters, July 18). At home, while economic liberalization is out of the question, [5] Pezeshkian’s background as an ethnic Azeri may strengthen efforts to try to calm rising ethnic tensions in Iran, which have grown dramatically since the Mahsa Amini protests. [6]

In response, Rafsanjani’s supporters and Reformists actively campaigned for Pezeshkian shortly before the election, [7] sensing that Khamenei might once again concede the presidency to them based on expediency. Khamenei knew that encouraging the Reformists could create public enthusiasm, giving the closed process of the Iranian election a veneer of badly needed legitimacy, especially in the wake of the “Woman, Life, Freedom” revolution. The regime viewed a Reformist victory as a way of showing the people that many among them don’t want regime change, but rather are willing to participate in elections and work within the boundaries of the regime. Likewise, “loosening” restrictions to permit Pezeshkian to win also offered the Supreme Leader a chance to rebuild goodwill in the West—important for future negotiations over nuclear weapons and missiles, as well as for avoiding the consequences of the actions of Tehran’s proxies—and to renew confidence with these same proxies that the regime is able to manage its internal tribulations.

Conclusion

Once again, the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic has demonstrated “heroic flexibility” by notionally allowing Iran and its politics to swing toward the West and greater freedom for the Iranian people. This will likely provide some short-term relief from the pressure the regime has faced in the aftermath of the “Woman, Life, Freedom” revolution, at the cost of risking Khamenei’s plans for succession. None of the potential candidates offered Khamenei the opportunity to manage his eventual transition, and there was no time to groom another candidate as he had done with Raisi, who had enjoyed the Supreme Leader’s praise and support for years (Al Arabiya, July 6; Iran [Newspaper], July 18).

The fact that Khamenei could not produce a non-partisan (i.e., non-Reformist or non-Principalist) president entirely loyal to him will, in the long run, lead to increased internal conflicts within the regime. This is almost sure to cast a shadow over the future of the Islamic Republic, especially after Khamenei’s death. Different internal factions within the regime will increasingly jockey for a better position in advance of the future power struggle that is sure to follow Khamenei’s death. This process will no doubt involve internal alliances, outreach to the opposition, and foreign assistance. When the time comes, Khamenei’s succession will not be as smooth as Khomeini’s, likely leading to intense conflicts that can trigger a coup or start a civil war.

Notes:

[1] Official election results announced by the regime should be viewed with much skepticism, as there are no independent mechanisms by which to assess the truth of the numbers presented. It was felt that Khamenei needed a considerable turnout, and so the regime likely tried to engineer it through the methods mentioned previously. Under the circumstances, a 50 percent turnout was considered satisfactory. Notably, even the first round of the election officially fell short of 40 percent turnout, the lowest in the regime’s history, and a number Khamenei previously derided in 2001 as “shameful” and evidence that “people do not trust, care, hope for the political system” when seen in Western democracies (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, July 3; YouTube/VOA Farsi, March 1). It is alleged on the ground, however, that turnout could have been considerably lower than official numbers suggest, perhaps as low as one-third of what was announced (X/@Tavaana, July 3; Zeitoun, June 30).

[2] In 2008, as a member of parliament, Pezeshkian, along with 39 other hardline MPs, signed an emergency bill titled “Obligating the Government to Fully Support Palestine,” which called for Iran’s full support of Hamas (Islamic Republic News Agency, December 30, 2008). In 2019, when the Trump administration designated the IRGC a terrorist organization, Pezeshkian and his colleagues in parliament introduced a controversial bill named “Strengthening the Position of the IRGC Against America” (Mehr News Agency, April 9, 2019). The bill labeled U.S. military, security, and intelligence forces as “terrorists” and obligated the Iranian government to treat them as such. After Qasem Soleimani was killed by the U.S., Pezeshkian put on an IRGC uniform and a keffiyeh in parliament and pushed for retaliatory measures against American leaders and military personnel (Iran International, June 30).

In his recent campaign debates, he called Soleimani a “national hero” and praised the IRGC’s drone and missile programs, stating that the Revolutionary Guards are the main reason the regime’s enemies dare not act against Iran (Al Arabiya, July 10). One week after winning the election, Pezeshkian sent letters to Bashar al-Assad, the Syrian president, Hassan Nasrallah, the leader of Hezbollah, and Hamas, promising to continue Teheran’s support to each of them.

In his message to Nasrallah, Pezeshkian declared that support for the “Axis of Resistance,” a term the Islamist regime uses to describe its militant proxy forces across the Middle East, “is rooted in the fundamental policies of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the ideals of Ruhollah Khomeini and Ali Khamenei,” adding that “this support will strongly continue.” The Islamic Republic News Agency (IRNA), which announces the official position of the government, wrote:

Pezeshkian’s letters to Hamas, Assad, and Hezbollah conveyed an important message to the West that, contrary to the perception of some individuals in Western policymaking circles, the fourteenth government will more strongly emphasize and support the core foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran in backing the Axis of Resistance and regional diplomacy in West Asia (Al Arabiya, July 11).

[3] There are several “levers” the Iranian regime tends to use to control elections. The first is the qualifying or disqualifying of relevant candidates by the Guardian Council, an unelected body answerable only to the Supreme Leader. The second involves the use of state-controlled or aligned media to provoke the populace into participating in the election. Thirdly, the regime uses ballot rigging and fabricates numbers to “fix” the election, ensuring the results align with what Khamenei sees fit.

[4] Khamenei permitted the rise of Khatami in part due to his personal conflict with Rafsanjani over who would serve as Iran’s paramount leader. While Rafsanjani and Khamenei had been close in the past—Rafsanjani was instrumental in making Khamenei the next Supreme Leader—Rafsanjani had ambitions to see the presidency raised up to the same level as the office of the Supreme Leader. This was not rooted in any liberal democratic sense of balance/separation of powers. Rafsanjani wanted to change the constitution so that he could seek a third term as president (Tasnim News Agency, May 18, 2013), and likely intended to become president for life. Khamenei opposed this move, breaking the political alliance between the two and eventually leading to public recrimination. This became important again in 2005, when Khamenei blocked Rafsanjani’s candidacy, paving the way for Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s victory (Tasnim News Agency, May 28, 2013).

[5] Economic liberalization is out of the question because the IRGC directly or indirectly runs most of the economy and the regime is totally dependent on it for both survival at home and supporting proxies overseas (Gulf International Forum, May 16, 2023).

[6] Pezeshkian has occasionally delivered speeches in Azeri when Persian/Farsi would normally be expected and has reached out to non-Persian ethnicities during his presidential campaign (X/@ebadgargari, July 17). This included talking about “nations inside Iran” in parliament (X/@IranianPlateau, July 16), and having a recent phone conversation with Azerbaijan’s president (Tasnim News Agency, July 10). This latter event prompted the reopening of the Azeri embassy in Tehran after an attack in January 2023 caused its closure, which has served as something of a barometer for the state of relations between Baku and Tehran (see Eurasia Daily Monitor, January 31, 2023).

[7] The distinction between Rafsanjani’s position and the Reformists is more historical than practical today. Rafsanjani and his associates were initially ideological conservatives who later supported economic liberalization. Reformists were initially left-wing Islamists who pushed for economic austerity and the export of the Islamic Revolution. The two sides clashed from the 1979 revolution up until the mid-2000s, when Khamenei’s crackdown on both groups drove them close together.