Kozak’s Departure Marks a Reset for Moscow’s Post-Soviet Policy (Part One)

Executive Summary:

• Moldova’s pro-European ruling party retained its majority in the September 24 parliamentary elections despite Moscow’s attempts to influence the elections in favor of pro-Russian parties.
• A series of setbacks in Russia’s policy toward Moldova undermined the position of Dmitry Kozak, former deputy chief of staff of the Russian presidential administration, who was long responsible for relations with Moldova and policy in the occupied territories of Ukraine.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin has decided to revise Russia’s approach to influence in neighboring countries, transferring Kozak’s responsibilities to First Deputy Chief of Staff Sergei Kiriyenko.

Moldova’s parliamentary election on September 28 brought victory to the incumbent, pro-European ruling Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS). With 99 percent of the votes counted, PAS surpassed the 50 percent mark, securing an outright majority in the newly elected parliament. The pro-Russian Patriotic Electoral Bloc led by former President Igor Dodon received 24.26 percent of the vote. The conservative Democracy at Home party also won enough votes to enter the Moldovan Parliament. The party, accused of its ties to the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB), advocates for Moldova’s unification with Romania. Dodon called on people to take part in rallies and declared that he would not recognize the election results (The Insider, September 29).

The recent parliamentary elections were widely viewed as a pivotal moment for the country’s future trajectory, particularly as it continues its path toward EU accession. While Moldovan President Maia Sandu’s PAS party has maintained a parliamentary majority since 2021, pre-election polls indicated potential declining support amid increased opposition activity and a resurgence of Russian influence in the lead-up to the election.

The Moldovan Information and Security Service raised accusations of Russian interference both during the campaign and on election day. Deputy Prime Minister for European Integration Cristina Gherasimov stated earlier this year that if pro-Russian forces win, the country will face a “Georgian scenario”—a government loyal to Moscow that would do everything possible to block the country’s accession to the European Union, while using pro-European rhetoric (IPN, March 25).

Moscow aimed to bring pro-Russian political forces to power in Moldova, investing significant funds, involving the resources of its intelligence services, and performing numerous well-known hybrid operations (see EDM, July 9, September 25). On September 22, 74 citizens were detained in Moldova and accused of plotting mass riots on the day of the parliamentary election. Moldovan law enforcement agencies claimed that Russian intelligence services were behind the suspects’ training in Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, and that the detainees are linked to both Moldovan political parties and criminal groups (see EDM, August 1; Ukrinform, September 22).

There was a notable increase in the publication of fake videos and disinformation against Sandu and the ruling PAS party in the months leading up to the parliamentary elections. The Russian Matryoshka network was a major source of much of the disinformation (The Insider, April 18). Moreover, the Moldovan authorities recorded cases of vote-buying and the use of Moldovan priests for anti-European propaganda (Kommersant, September 28).

On election day, Moldovan authorities reported Russian cyberattacks that attempted to overload the networks servicing Moldova’s electoral infrastructure. Bomb threats against polling stations abroad that aimed to decrease the total turnout were also reported (Facebook/mfa.gov.md, September 28).

Despite numerous attempts to influence the parliamentary elections, the authorities managed to prevent vote-buying and electoral fraud thanks to the coordinated efforts of the police and other security agencies. According to Moldovan Member of Parliament Ina Coșeru, law enforcement agencies launched investigations into individuals responsible for organizing vote-buying schemes, as well as a widespread information campaign, which, among other things, reduced the risk of fraud (Novyny Live, September 29).

The series of setbacks for Russia in the “Moldovan direction” ultimately affected the position of former Deputy Chief of Staff of the Russian Presidential Administration Dmitry Kozak, who, until his resignation on September 18, had long been responsible for relations with Moldova and policy in the occupied territories of Ukraine (The Insider, August 29; Meduza, September 18).  Kozak had not made any public statements for a couple of years, and it is believed that he has found himself out of the Kremlin’s favor after his opposition to the full-scale invasion of Ukraine during the meeting of the Russian Security Council on February 21, 2022 (Carnegie Politika, September 22). This did not indicate that Russian President Vladimir Putin had suspended him from Moldovan and Ukrainian policy planning, however, since Kozak managed to maintain his high position in the presidential administration, which is symbolic of Putin’s system of governance.

Kozak’s continued influence on Moldova’s domestic policy in the run-up to the elections is indicated by his ties with Moldovan billionaire Vladimir Plahotniuc. According to a journalistic investigation, Plahotniuc regularly visited Moscow in 2024 and 2025, using forged documents to hold meetings with Kozak, who was attempting to secure the support of Moldova’s richest man (The Insider, July 29). At the same time, pro-Russian Moldovan businessman Ilan Shor began a vote-buying scheme, which involved bribe money that was transported by couriers from Moscow to Chisinau (Newsmaker.md, April 23, 2024). As a result, Moldova issued an arrest warrant for Plahotniuc, and on July 22, he was detained in Greece at the request of Interpol on charges of involvement in laundering corrupt Russian money in the “Moldovan laundromat” case (New Voice, July 22). A few days before the parliamentary elections, the billionaire was extradited to Moldova, where he awaits trial (Radio Europa Liberă Moldova, September 25).

Kozak’s faults include the Kremlin’s unsuccessful attempts to sway the Moldovan elections and the extradition of Plahotniuc to Chisinau, who, under favorable circumstances, could have regained his position in Moldovan politics (The Insider, July 29). Putin appears to have reconsidered Russia’s approach to maintaining influence over its neighboring countries. This shift may have compelled Kozak’s resignation, as his methods and strategic outlook were no longer aligned with Moscow’s current expectations (Carnegie Politika, September 22). Putin also liquidated two departments in the presidential administration that Kozak had led, transferring his responsibilities over Moldova, Ukraine, Abkhazia, and North Ossetia to First Deputy Chief of Staff Sergei Kiriyenko, who is expected to bring new approaches and solutions.