Kozak’s Departure Marks a Reset for Moscow’s Post-Soviet Policy (Part Two)

Executive Summary:

• President Vladimir Putin has entrusted First Deputy Chief of Staff Sergei Kiriyenko with even greater responsibilities after relieving Dmitry Kozak of his duties as deputy head of Russia’s Presidential Administration.
• In recent years, Kiriyenko has significantly expanded his influence, both in managing domestic policy and in advancing Russia’s strategic interests in neighboring states, notably in Moldova, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia.
• Kiriyenko’s rising prominence may provoke opposition from the Russian security services and broader elite, however, particularly if his team encounters setbacks in foreign policy.

The resignation of former Deputy Head of the Russian Presidential Administration Dmitry Kozak on September 18 confirmed speculation that he had steadily lost influence since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 (RIA Novosti, September 18; see EDM, October 20). Kozak had previously overseen the Directorate for Interregional and Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries and the Directorate for Cross-Border Cooperation, but Russian President Vladimir Putin dissolved those structures on August 29 and then established the new Department for Strategic Partnership and Cooperation in their place (Government of Russia, August 29).

Several theories have been put forth regarding Kozak’s resignation. Namely, a disagreement with Putin’s inner circle over Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, or a loss in an internal power struggle with First Deputy Chief of Staff Sergei Kiriyenko. The second option seems more plausible regarding Putin’s subsequent decisions.

For many years, Kozak had been coordinating Russia’s strategy toward several post-Soviet states, including Ukraine, Moldova, and Armenia (Haqqin.az, April 13). His methods were largely based on “soft power,” and he formed a policy aimed at reducing anti-Russian sentiment, supporting pro-Russian political forces, and fostering dialogue with neighboring countries (Carnegie Politika, September 22). Kozak’s strategy, however, proved ineffective in Ukraine following the collapse of Viktor Medvedchuk’s pro-Russian political project and in Moldova, where Igor Dodon, a politician linked to Kozak, has also failed to meet Moscow’s expectations (Vedomsti, April 30).

Since 2022, as Kozak’s influence has weakened, Kiriyenko’s position has strengthened sharply. He has now become not only the curator of the Kremlin’s domestic policy, but also oversees Russian policy toward much of the post-Soviet space (Telegram/@russicaRU, June 8). After leaving his post as Deputy Chief of Staff, Kozak was expected to be appointed Presidential Plenipotentiary Envoy to the Northwestern Federal District. This position possesses significant influence in the Russian political system. Putin appointed Igor Rudenya, then-Governor of the Tver oblast, to this position, however, officially ending Kozak’s political career (Realnoe Vremya, September 29).

For the past three and a half years, Kiriyenko has been responsible for managing the Russian-occupied territories of Ukraine (RBC, April 27, 2022). Simultaneously, Kiriyenko has steadily expanded his control over the Kremlin’s domestic policy mechanisms. His domestic portfolio includes issues crucial to the stability of Putin’s regime, such as overseeing elections, maintaining ideological control over the education system, and managing governor appointments (Meduza, October 7, 2019; Meduza, June 9, 2022; RBC, May 5; The Moscow Times, August 11). Kiriyenko has also expanded his influence through a network of independent non-profits and foundations controlled by the Kremlin (Carnegie, March 9, 2023). Furthermore, he launched the “Leaders of Russia” award for young hopefuls in Russia, aimed at educating a new generation of civil servants (Kommersant, November 28, 2024). He also established a “School of Governors” operating under the auspices of the Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration, which aims to train loyal candidates for gubernatorial elections (Ridl.io, March 7, 2024).

In addition to Ukraine, Kiriyenko now oversees other directions of foreign policy, including relations with the self-proclaimed republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, as well as Moldova. Furthermore, in the spring of 2025, Kiriyenko was appointed responsible for relations with Armenia, the direction which had previously been under Kozak’s control (Vedomosti, April 30). Kiriyenko’s team will aim to conduct an information campaign ahead of Armenia’s 2026 parliamentary elections and cultivate loyalists within Armenia’s political system to prevent Yerevan’s Westward shift (Kommersant, April 30; Factor.am, July 22).

On October 23, Putin nominated Vadim Titov, CEO of Rosatom’s International Network, to head the newly created Presidential Directorate for Strategic Partnership and Cooperation, who will report directly to Kiriyenko (RIA Novosti, October 24). Previously, RBC named Igor Chaika, Deputy Head of Rossotrudnichestvo, as a possible candidate for the position, but Titov’s nomination confirms that Kiriyenko is consolidating his position within the presidential administration (RBC, August 29). Titov began working at Rosatom in 2009, making him a longtime acquaintance of Kiriyenko, who served as Rosatom’s General Director from 2005–2016, and still unofficially leads the state-run company as the head of its supervisory body (Vedomsti, October 27).

Moscow plans to use the directorate to expand its cultural and political presence abroad through propaganda, corruption, and election interference. While the new Presidential Directorate is officially tasked with managing post-Soviet affairs, it will likely also expand its international portfolio to include select African countries. For example, in April, RBC reported that staff in the Kremlin’s domestic policy bloc under Kiriyenko began working on the political analysis of several African countries, including Chad, Mali, the Central African Republic (CAR), and Libya (RBC, April 9). Putin’s decision to create a new department within the presidential administration indicates his desire to achieve greater centralization under Kiriyenko’s control, in an effort to ensure its effectiveness (Kommersant, August 29).

With the expansion of his authority, the risks for Kiriyenko have also increased significantly. It remains to be seen whether the growing influence of younger technocrats within the Kremlin, combined with the heightened activity of Kiriyenko’s team, will trigger resistance from his rivals among the Russian elite. Through these appointments, Putin has sent a clear signal to the elite that Kiriyenko is a central figure in his long-term plans, entrusted with ensuring regime stability domestically and advancing Russia’s interests abroad. Criticism and pressure on Kiriyenko, however, are likely to intensify if the “export” of soft power produces unsatisfactory results. While the setback in Moldova may still be ascribed to Kozak, the responsibility for the 2026 parliamentary elections in Armenia lies squarely with Kiriyenko, who is now expected to demonstrate his effectiveness.