Kremlin Prioritizes Russian Language in Moscow’s Near Abroad

Executive Summary:

• In the aftermath of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, governments in Eastern Europe have begun reducing the presence of the Russian language in their education systems to combat Moscow’s influence and the Russification of their populations.
• The preservation of the Russian language abroad is a significant soft-power tool for Moscow. Russia is working to preserve Russian’s status in Central Asia, expand its use in higher education systems in the region, and foster Russian-language education in Africa.
• The more Moscow’s soft power erodes, the more likely Russia will resort to hard power—as seen in Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova—to secure its diminishing role in the post-Soviet space in the future.

Two and a half years since the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine, the status of the Russian language has become a litmus test across post-Soviet Eurasia for how Moscow’s former satellites view their relationship with Russia. In early October, Ukraine’s Ministry of Education announced its support for legislation that would ban the use of the Russian language in Ukraine’s schools, including during breaks, to create a “Ukrainian-speaking environment.” Oksen Lisovyi, Ukraine’s Education Minister, announced before the Verkhovna Rada that Ukraine is investing in increasing language competency in the “languages of the national communities” of the European Union (TSN, October 11). The legislation reflects growing animosity toward the Russian language in Ukraine. A poll by TSN in March 2024 indicated that 81 percent of Ukrainians are opposed to the use of Russian in official communications, and 52 percent believe that Russian should not be studied in the country’s schools (TSN, March 12). The use of the Russian language in the post-Soviet space is a vector for Moscow’s soft power. As more countries move away from using and teaching Russian, Moscow continues to lose its once-dominant influence on the surrounding region.

Ukraine’s move mirrors recent actions by the Baltic states regarding Russian language use. In Latvia, where half of the country’s schools teach Russian as a second (foreign) language, new education standards are moving to replace the course offering with EU languages (Korrespondent, April 23). In Estonia, then-Prime Minister Kaja Kallas stated in January that Tallinn would end the financing of Russian language instruction in the country’s schools to prevent the “Russification of Estonian children” (Interfax, January 16). In Armenia, a country that has traditionally maintained close ties to Russia’s labor market, the education ministry is considering making Russian language courses an elective rather than compulsory in schools (Nezavisimaya Gazeta, September 8).

These proposals are of vital importance to Moscow, as the continued use of the Russian language across Eurasia is important for the Kremlin’s concept of a Russkiy Mir (Russian World), which has been promoted by the Russian state for centuries (see EDM, July 2, 2014, July 13, 2022; Kuzio, “Crimea: Where Russia’s War Started and Where Ukraine Will Win,” July 8). In a recent address in the Republic of Tuva, Russian President Vladimir Putin characterized the Russian language as the element uniting Russia’s diverse nationalities into a “single organism,” underscoring the increasingly imperialist undertones of the language question in its treatment by the Kremlin. Putin continued, stating that upholding Russian language instruction across the former Soviet space and abroad will be crucial to maintaining any hope for the growth of Russia’s geopolitical influence (Nazaccent, September 3).

The use of Russian is important for Putin’s vision of a Eurasian trade bloc. One of the major issues that the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) has faced is the challenge of creating a common labor market to restore the freedom of labor movement that existed between the Soviet republics under communism (Eurasian Economic Commission, September 30). Maintaining a lingua franca will be crucial to this endeavor. In contrast to the downward trend of Russian language instruction in Eastern Europe, the language has retained and, in some cases, strengthened its position in Central Asia. Russian has retained official use in Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan, both EAEU members, while Uzbekistan and Tajikistan remain heavily dependent on the language to access Russia’s labor market. In turn, the Kremlin has financed the development of new Russian-language academies and primary schools across the region over the past two decades (Vek, June 29, 2023).

Moscow has also worked to extend the Russian university system into Central Asia, introducing dozens of new branches and programs over the past twenty years. Fourteen of these now operate in Uzbekistan alone. Even notoriously isolationist Turkmenistan has initiated talks to allow a Russian university branch to open in its capital (Asia24, September 19). In addition to these regional university branches, higher education inside Russia remains a significant draw. As of 2023, 185,000 Central Asian students were enrolled in Russian universities, around a third of whom received scholarship money from Moscow (RSR Online, May 16, 2023).

Moscow hopes to see the number of foreign students in Russia grow. Putin has launched an initiative to allow 500,000 foreign students into Russia by 2030, with a particular eye to expanding the number of students from Africa (RIA, May 7; see EDM, June 10). Denis Gribov, Russia’s Deputy Education Minister, estimated that 37,000 Africans were studying at Russian universities earlier this year, with 30 Russian language academies functioning across Africa, restoring educational exchange flows that had previously existed during the Cold War (TASS, June 10; see EDM, September 16).

Mikhail Demurin, a veteran Russian diplomat, emphasizes the inextricable ties of language and influence in the Kremlin’s worldview. In his essay “The Future of the Russian Language Depends on Our Victory in the West,” Demurin envisions the creation of a Russo-Eurasian Union—which would replace the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)—formed of countries “oriented toward Russia, acknowledging their beneficial dependence on Moscow.” Central to this, he writes, “Russian will be the official language” of this union (Regnum, October 7, 2022). While many such variations exist, Demurin’s position embodies a widespread and deeply historical conception of the Russian language as a vehicle for an imperialist project centered on the dominance and integration of Eurasian peoples under the authority of the Kremlin.

Russian remains one of the six official languages of the United Nations, as well as the working language of the CIS, the Collective Security Treaty Organization, and the EAEU. Nonetheless, the crackdown on Russian language instruction across Eastern Europe will be sure to unnerve Moscow and will likely instigate further efforts to ensure the language’s status in Central Asia and Belarus, as well as expand its presence in the Global South. Undeniably, the international spread of Russian is one of the country’s most valuable soft power assets and the fabric of any idea of Eurasia as a coherent geopolitical space. Yet, the more Moscow’s soft power erodes, the more likely Russia will be to resort to hard power to secure its diminishing interests in the future.