Kurdish PJAK Militants Brace for More Battles With Iran

Executive Summary:

• A July 19 Iranian drone strike killed a Free Life Party of Kurdistan (PJAK) fighter in Iraqi Kurdistan, prompting retaliatory attacks by PJAK in Iran’s Baneh and Sardasht regions and signaling a breakdown in the 2011 ceasefire. PJAK has emphasized it will not disarm or dissolve like the PKK, and will respond militarily if provoked—positioning itself for a more active political and armed role in Iranian Kurdistan.
• The aftermath of the June 2025 Iran–Israel “12-Day War” and the Turkey–PKK peace process has altered regional dynamics, pushing PJAK out of its prior strategic restraint and into a more assertive stance.
• PJAK leaders suggest Iran’s increasing use of drones and military pressure stems from concerns that a demilitarized PKK could enable PJAK to intensify operations along the Iran–Iraq border.

In a rare incident, a Free Life Party of Kurdistan (PJAK) fighter was killed in an Iranian drone strike on July 19 in Penjwen, Iraqi Kurdistan (X/@rojhelatInfo_En, July 27). Peyman Viyan, the co-chair of PJAK, underlined that no attack on PJAK would go unanswered (Rojhelat.info, July 26). The drone attack, which occurred a few weeks after the “12-Day War” between Israel and Iran, seems to be part of Iran’s crackdown on dissent and stepping up mass arrests and executions of Kurds (Komala Party of Iranian Kurdistan Office of International Relations, July 6).

Drone Strike Aftermath

Following the drone strike, there were three armed border clashes in Iran’s Baneh and Sardasht regions, leaving several members of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) dead (Rojhlat.info, July 25). Most sources suggest it was PJAK that initiated the clashes in response to the drone strike on the PJAK fighter in Penjwen, while PJAK-affiliated websites released two videos of clashes near Baneh featuring PJAK fighters attacking Iranian border guards (X/@vvanwilgenburg, July 26; Hengaw Organization for Human Rights, July 22). Iranian state media also reported that three border guards were killed on July 21 (Tehran Times, July 23).

Over the past decade and a half, there have been limited clashes between PJAK—the Iranian wing of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)—and the Iranian regime as a result of PJAK and Tehran reaching a ceasefire in 2011. In that agreement, Iran promised to stop executing Kurdish political prisoners if PJAK ceased its attacks in the country (Rudaw, September 3, 2017). Nevertheless, Siamand Moini, a member of PJAK’s leadership council, told Jamestown that, “The ceasefire between Iran and the PJAK in 2011 has been violated dozens of times by the Iranian repressive forces, and each time the PJAK has responded to these attacks.” [1]

For instance, in mid-September 2018, Iran killed three PJAK members in a clash in Sanandaj (Hawar News Agency, September 15, 2018). This coincided with Iranian ballistic missiles hitting two different factions of the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan (PDK-I) in Koya on September 8, 2018 (Kurdistan 24, September 10, 2018). [2] Also, at that same time, Iran executed three Kurdish activists for the alleged murder of the son of an imam in Marivan, which the activists’ lawyers have denied (Iran Wire, September 10, 2018; Kurdistan 24, September 24, 2018). The Islamic Republic’s strikes in 2018 could have been interpreted as a “warning” to the Iranian Kurdish parties, as well as to the United States and the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) in northern Iraq, Israel, and Saudi Arabia that Iran was willing to use ballistic missiles against enemies of the state (Kurdistan 24, September 20, 2018). This came to fruition during the 12-Day War, when ballistic missiles struck Israel.

Clashes and Regional Geopolitics

The clashes in July in Iran’s Baneh and Sardasht regions also came amid an ongoing peace process in Turkey between the PKK and Turkish state, in which the PKK has promised to disband itself (Middle East Eye, July 11). Despite the seemingly good-faith negotiations, the drone attack on PJAK was initially blamed on Turkey. However, after an investigation, PJAK shifted its blame to Iran.

According to Moini, “Turkish airstrikes—with fighter jets and drones—repeatedly targeted our forces [before the peace process] … Our interpretation was that there was tactical cooperation between Iran and Turkey against PJAK forces. Hence, those Turkish attacks occurred within the context of that collaboration.” [3] Moini believes that after the peace dialogue between the PKK and Turkey began, Turkish attacks decreased and then stopped altogether, which “worried Iran, as it feared PJAK forces would become more active inside Iran and along the border.” Moini added, “The aftermath of the ‘12-Day War’ also heightened Iranian concerns about PJAK’s military capabilities, and Iran wanted to take military precautions and increase drone attacks against us.”

Moini underlined that PJAK continued to exercise its right to respond to all of the Iranian military’s attacks. A former PJAK member, Shamal Bishir, suggested that with “the renewed momentum towards a peaceful resolution of the Kurdish question [in Turkey] and, most notably, the 12-Day War between Iran and Israel in June 2025, the regional balance of power that had taken shape in 2011 came to an end. We are now entering a new and uncertain era in the Middle East.” [4] According to Bishir, “PJAK is repositioning itself—emerging from the strategic passivity it adopted following the 2011 ceasefire. The recent clashes between PJAK and Iranian forces underscore this transition. I believe PJAK is preparing to assume a more assertive and offensive role in Iran and Iranian Kurdistan. This shift is likely to involve not only its military wing, but also expanded organizational and political mobilization.”

Furthermore, PJAK has underlined that just like the SDF in Syria, it will not disband. Moini asserts that the peace process with Turkey “does not involve Eastern Kurdistan and Iran. Until our struggle for the liberation of our country and our people reaches a conclusion, it must continue.” This indicates that PJAK will continue to operate on a political and military level within Iranian Kurdish politics. Iranian state media has also expressed concern over the “continuation of PJAK’s armed activities despite the disarmament of the PKK” (ABNA24, July 29). However, Moini stated that PJAK engages in self-defense: “If we are attacked or if necessary, we will defend ourselves and our people, in any way necessary.”

Conclusion

The Iranian drone attack on PJAK reveals that Iran is worried that PJAK will be empowered and become more active due to both the peace process in Turkey and the weakening of Iran after the “12-Day War” with Israel. Nevertheless, PJAK has emphasized that the group will not attack Iranian forces unless attacked first (ANF News, August 7). On the whole, current events indicate that PJAK is not planning to step back and will become more active in the near future.

Notes:

[1] Author’s interview with Siamand Moini, a member of PJAK’s leadership council, August 7.

[2] The PDK-I united again in August 2022.

[3] Author’s interview with Siamand Moini, a member of PJAK’s leadership council, August 7.

[4] Author’s interview with Shamal Bishir, a former PJAK member, August 4.