Lithuania Warns Against Engagement With Georgia Over Democratic Backsliding

Executive Summary:

• Lithuanian Foreign Minister Kęstutis Budrys warned against diplomatic engagement with Georgia’s ruling party without a renewed commitment to democratic norms on May 20, criticizing recent crackdowns on protests, unfair elections, and restrictive laws against non-governmental organizations.
• Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia have become vocal opponents of Georgia’s ruling Georgian Dream party, accusing the Georgian government of violating human rights and turning the country onto an anti-European trajectory
• The government and the Georgian Dream parliamentary majority accuse their Baltic partners of interfering in internal affairs, provoking a revolutionary scenario, and wanting to use Georgia as a “tool” against Russia.

On May 20, Lithuanian Foreign Minister Kęstutis Budrys warned against re-engaging with Georgia’s ruling Georgian Dream party and its government at any diplomatic level unless it recommits to democratic principles. He stated, “I think that we missed not once a chance to send the stronger message to Georgian authorities about the path that they have chosen,” amid the country’s ongoing democratic backsliding, including missing an opportunity to impose sanctions. This statement was in reference to legislation targeting non-governmental organizations (NGOs), electoral irregularities, and the violent dispersal of demonstrations since the October 2024 parliamentary elections (see EDM, April 9, 24, May 1, 2024; YouTube/@Radio-Tavisupleba, May 20; Civil Georgia, May 21). Budrys is sure that the Georgian authorities’ conduct against protestors in Georgia has been “beyond the red lines” (YouTube/@Radio-Tavisupleba, May 20). He further stated:

So, Lithuania is repeating that the best way out of this situation is to organize fair elections again and recall, also recalling legislation that limits the activities of political opposition and NGOs. If not, we are heading in a very bad direction—and that’s only the responsibility of Georgian authorities right now.” Budrys strongly rejected the idea of normalization with Tbilisi under present conditions (1tv.ge, May 21)

On the same day, Georgian Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze harshly responded to Budrys’ remarks, stating, “The Lithuanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs does not exist. That’s just an ordinary unit of the ‘deep state’” (Interpressnews, May 21). Two days after Budrys’s statements, on May 22, Lithuania revoked the visa-free regime for Georgian citizens who hold diplomatic and official passports (1tv.ge, May 22).

The Lithuanian minister’s statement is just the latest development in the deep crisis in relations between official Tbilisi and the three Baltic states. This is a continuation of the crisis that began last year, when the opposition accused Georgia of rigging the October parliamentary elections and Kobakhidze announced the suspension of Georgia’s EU accession talks (see EDM, December 6, 10, 2024). Mass protests, including clashes with police, erupted in Georgian cities following these events. Hundreds of demonstrators and police officers were injured. More than fifty opposition activists have been arrested and are awaiting trial on charges of “group violence.” They face lengthy prison sentences. The ruling party has passed a series of laws that regulate the activities of non-governmental organizations and undermine the independence of the media (see EDM, December 6, 2024, January 13, February 11, April 9).

The October 2024 elections were not the first shift in Baltic-Georgian relations. On May 15, 2024, the Foreign Ministers of Estonia, Iceland, and Lithuania addressed protesters against the “draft law on transparency of foreign influence” in downtown Tbilisi. Lithuanian Foreign Minister Gabrielius Landsbergis said:

We must all speak openly about what the current policies would mean for Georgia’s European future before it is too late … During the Rose Revolution of 2003, the Baltic States stood with you. Just five months later, we made it to [the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)] and then to the [European Union], and many of us believe Georgia could quickly move along this path as well (Radiotavisupleba, May 15, 2024).

Estonian Foreign Minister Margus Tsahkna noted that “every nation has the right to decide where they belong, what values they are sharing, and what kind of values they are standing for. And I know all together with you, Georgian people, we are sharing the same values about democracy and freedom” (Radiotavisupleba, May 15, 2024).

On December 1, 2024, Lithuania, Estonia, and Latvia applied restrictive measures on the founder of the ruling Georgian Dream party, billionaire Bidzina Ivanishvili, and several senior officials of the Georgian Ministry of Internal Affairs. They have been denied entry to these countries (Netgazeti, December 1, 2024). On December 16, 2024, Estonia announced additional sanctions against 14 Georgian officials and judges, including Kobakhidze (Civil Georgia, December 16, 2024). On January 22, the Estonian Parliament (Riigikogu) adopted a statement in support of the people of Georgia saying it does not recognize the results of the “fraudulent” elections in Georgia and “does not recognize the legitimacy of the Georgian parliament, government, or President” (Civil Georgia, January 23).

The principled position of the Baltic democracies is primarily explained by the activity of the Georgian opposition and its leader, former President Salome Zourabichvili. She has repeatedly met with the leaders of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, calling on them to become “ambassadors” of the democratic forces of Georgia to the European Union (Civil Georgia, March 28).

In response, the Georgian government accuses its Baltic colleagues of selfish interests and a desire to solve their problems with Russia at Georgia’s expense. Georgian Parliamentary Speaker Shalva Papuashvili said that Baltic states “seek a change of the legal government in Georgia.” Papuashvili observed, “I mean three countries of the Baltics, which are members of the European Union and NATO, are interested in Georgia’s being a weapon against Russia.” He continued, “These three post-Soviet states have their fears of Russia, and instead of coping with those fears or fighting, they try to avoid it with the hands of other countries or shifting Russia’s attention to other issues,” referring to Georgian-Russian relations. According to the Speaker, the governments of the Baltic states give a platform to the Georgian opposition and NGOs, which have turned out to be “Estonian NGOs.” Papuashvili stated, “Sanctions were imposed during the visit of representatives of the opposition and NGOs to the capitals of the Baltic states to undermine the Georgian government” (1tv.ge, March 7).

Many of those who remember the history of Georgian-Baltic relations consider the current development a tragedy. As former Georgian Foreign Minister Irakli Menagarishvili told this author in his March 25 interview, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia closely cooperated with the Georgian National Movement for Liberation during the struggle for independence in the late 1980s. In the 1990s, they were close allies during the implementation of a historic “Conventional Armed Forces in Europe” treaty, which provided for the reduction of Russian troops on the borders of Georgia and the Baltic states, aiming to prevent Moscow’s aggression against neighboring countries (Author’s interview, March 25). During the Georgia-EU negotiations on the Association Agreement from 2010 to 2014, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia served as lobbyists for Georgia in Brussels. The priority for these three Baltic states, which have successfully overcome the Soviet totalitarian legacy, is for all partners to adhere to democratic norms.