Moscow Continues Heavy Reliance on Nuclear Weapons

At a recent nonproliferation conference Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov stated that Moscow is ready to continue reducing strategic offensive weapons on the condition that other countries preserve strategic stability and observe Russia’s indefinable mantra of equal security for all. Russia also has non-negotiable conditions, such as no nuclear weapons in space, guarantees of the absence of return or upload of nuclear potential on missiles (i.e. they can only be used once), and rejection of unilateral missile defense systems (RIA Novosti, September 7). In other words, Moscow will only reduce its nuclear arsenal provided that the US essentially derails its overall strategic nuclear programs of missile defense, retaining upload capability and depriving itself of weapons in space, while China and Russia preserve their anti-satellite weapons (ASAT) and other capabilities. Not surprisingly, this is a policy platform to nowhere.

Russia is busy updating and modernizing its own nuclear weapons, replacing arsenal that has outlived its usefulness. Earlier this year, Russia stated its intention to deploy the short-range Iskander missile—which possesses both ballistic and cruise and conventional or nuclear attributes­­­—in Kaliningrad and began awarding contracts for their installation there (RIA Novosti, July 22, 23). Russia also recently announced that in 2011(some would say 2010) it decided to begin development of a heavy, liquid-fueled intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) (Interfax-AVN Online, September 7; Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye, September 14). This missile’s payload (warhead section) will be five tons, or four times greater than those of the solid-propellant Yars and Topol missiles. It will have an enormously greater capability for penetrating the US missile defense, according to the Russian expert retired General Viktor Yesin (RIA Nvosti, September 7). Unfortunately, Yesin also noted that the main “drawback” of the missile is the presence of an “aggressive component” in its makeup. This missile will then replace the aging SS-18 known as Voevoda or Satan (Satana in Russian) and will have up to ten decoys more than either the Yars (RS-24) or Topol (SS-27) missiles (RIA Novosti, September 7). 

Russian ambitions do not stop there. According to Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Strategic Forces, General Sergey Karakayev, not only will the increase in decoys outmaneuver the enemy (US) defense system, Russia also suspects that the US is researching a space-based echelon of missile-defense weapons that will actually be used for attack. Since Russia’s potential for breeching that system with its small-scale solid fuel ICBMs may be insufficient, Moscow wants to develop new liquid-fueled ICBMs with greater performance capability, e.g. a payload to launch weight ratio where the launch weight will be 100 tons. Such weapons, however, could only be deployed in land-based silos and therefore would be more vulnerable to enemy strikes (RIA Novosti, September 7; Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye, September 14). 

These developments suggest Moscow’s continuing reliance or wager upon the possibility of nuclear war-fighting, especially as its conventional defense sector continues to fail to meet the military’s requirements, the latest example being the ground forces’ rejection of the Pantsir air defense system because it is defective (Izvestiya Online, September 14). Moreover, the Yars (Rs-24) is also usable as a space-based weapon and a hypersonic missile derivative of it translates into something approaching a global strike capability, where the enemy would have 30–60 minutes of response time (policymic.com, September 23). 

At the same time, some Russian defense commentators are saying that the US is building the capability for a disarming first-strike, whether it be conventional or nuclear strike upon Russia and that Russia must prepare accordingly by breaking the terms of the latest arms control treaty and by building the kinds of weapons discussed here (Mirovaya Ekonomika i Mezhdunarodnye Otnosheniya, June 30). While other authoritative specialists rebut the exaggerated threat assessments, it is clear that nuclear modernization is occurring and that Russia will have to rely more on those weapons due to the continuing failure of its huge conventional rearmament program to fully meet state requirements. 

At the same time, as Yesin and others realize, these deployments connote an aggressive posture that can only lead to more investment in defenses or more severe offensive counters, and not only in the US or Europe. Given Moscow’s threat perceptions, which include the US, NATO, China, and others, it is necessary to recapitalize its nuclear weapons, whose service can no longer be extended. However, it is by no means clear whether it is necessary for Russia to continue threatening Europe, if not Asia, with a nuclear war. As innumerable analysts have observed, Moscow’s policy is still based on deterrence, which is inherently predisposed to the assumption of enemies and threats (Mirovaya Ekonomika I Mezhdunarodnye Otnosheniya, June 30). And given what else is occurring in Russian foreign and defense policy today, Russia seems intent on validating other states’ perceptions of it as a threat. Thus, as long as Moscow continues to wager on the threat of nuclear war in Europe, if not the broader Eurasia, and to supply weapons to China and other proliferators, it ultimately resembles a dog chasing its own tail when it comes to nuclear weapons. Surely Russian leaders should be able to formulate a more rewarding approach to issues of defense and security than this negative and fruitless cycle.

At a recent nonproliferation conference Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov stated that Moscow is ready to continue reducing strategic offensive weapons on the condition that other countries preserve strategic stability and observe Russia’s indefinable mantra of equal security for all. Russia also has non-negotiable conditions, such as no nuclear weapons in space, guarantees of the absence of return or upload of nuclear potential on missiles (i.e. they can only be used once), and rejection of unilateral missile defense systems (RIA Novosti, September 7). In other words, Moscow will only reduce its nuclear arsenal provided that the US essentially derails its overall strategic nuclear programs of missile defense, retaining upload capability and depriving itself of weapons in space, while China and Russia preserve their anti-satellite weapons (ASAT) and other capabilities. Not surprisingly, this is a policy platform to nowhere. 

Russia is busy updating and modernizing its own nuclear weapons, replacing arsenal that has outlived its usefulness. Earlier this year, Russia stated its intention to deploy the short-range Iskander missile—which possesses both ballistic and cruise and conventional or nuclear attributes­­­—in Kaliningrad and began awarding contracts for their installation there (RIA Novosti, July 22, 23). Russia also recently announced that in 2011(some would say 2010) it decided to begin development of a heavy, liquid-fueled intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) (Interfax-AVN Online, September 7; Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye, September 14). This missile’s payload (warhead section) will be five tons, or four times greater than those of the solid-propellant Yars and Topol missiles. It will have an enormously greater capability for penetrating the US missile defense, according to the Russian expert retired General Viktor Yesin (RIA Nvosti, September 7). Unfortunately, Yesin also noted that the main “drawback” of the missile is the presence of an “aggressive component” in its makeup. This missile will then replace the aging SS-18 known as Voevoda or Satan (Satana in Russian) and will have up to ten decoys more than either the Yars (RS-24) or Topol (SS-27) missiles (RIA Novosti, September 7). 

Russian ambitions do not stop there. According to Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Strategic Forces, General Sergey Karakayev, not only will the increase in decoys outmaneuver the enemy (US) defense system, Russia also suspects that the US is researching a space-based echelon of missile-defense weapons that will actually be used for attack. Since Russia’s potential for breeching that system with its small-scale solid fuel ICBMs may be insufficient, Moscow wants to develop new liquid-fueled ICBMs with greater performance capability, e.g. a payload to launch weight ratio where the launch weight will be 100 tons. Such weapons, however, could only be deployed in land-based silos and therefore would be more vulnerable to enemy strikes (RIA Novosti, September 7; Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye, September 14). 

These developments suggest Moscow’s continuing reliance or wager upon the possibility of nuclear war-fighting, especially as its conventional defense sector continues to fail to meet the military’s requirements, the latest example being the ground forces’ rejection of the Pantsir air defense system because it is defective (Izvestiya Online, September 14). Moreover, the Yars (Rs-24) is also usable as a space-based weapon and a hypersonic missile derivative of it translates into something approaching a global strike capability, where the enemy would have 30–60 minutes of response time (policymic.com, September 23). 

At the same time, some Russian defense commentators are saying that the US is building the capability for a disarming first-strike, whether it be conventional or nuclear strike upon Russia and that Russia must prepare accordingly by breaking the terms of the latest arms control treaty and by building the kinds of weapons discussed here (Mirovaya Ekonomika i Mezhdunarodnye Otnosheniya, June 30). While other authoritative specialists rebut the exaggerated threat assessments, it is clear that nuclear modernization is occurring and that Russia will have to rely more on those weapons due to the continuing failure of its huge conventional rearmament program to fully meet state requirements. 

At the same time, as Yesin and others realize, these deployments connote an aggressive posture that can only lead to more investment in defenses or more severe offensive counters, and not only in the US or Europe. Given Moscow’s threat perceptions, which include the US, NATO, China, and others, it is necessary to recapitalize its nuclear weapons, whose service can no longer be extended. However, it is by no means clear whether it is necessary for Russia to continue threatening Europe, if not Asia, with a nuclear war. As innumerable analysts have observed, Moscow’s policy is still based on deterrence, which is inherently predisposed to the assumption of enemies and threats (Mirovaya Ekonomika I Mezhdunarodnye Otnosheniya, June 30). And given what else is occurring in Russian foreign and defense policy today, Russia seems intent on validating other states’ perceptions of it as a threat. Thus, as long as Moscow continues to wager on the threat of nuclear war in Europe, if not the broader Eurasia, and to supply weapons to China and other proliferators, it ultimately resembles a dog chasing its own tail when it comes to nuclear weapons. Surely Russian leaders should be able to formulate a more rewarding approach to issues of defense and security than this negative and fruitless cycle.