Moscow Downplays Drone Incursion on Poland

Executive Summary:

• Russia’s September 9–10 drone attack, when at least 19 decoy Gerbera drones entered Polish airspace, caused little physical damage but triggered a swift response, including operation “Eastern Sentry,” in a kinetic test of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) resolve.
• Moscow’s incursion occurred alongside large-scale drone attacks on Ukraine and the launch of Zapad-2025 exercises, possibly to demonstrate long-range aviation capabilities despite losses from Ukraine’s Operation Spiderweb, while simultaneously cultivating plausible deniability and testing NATO’s reaction.
• NATO’s military response included shooting down four of the drones and Article 4 activation, while broader Western sanctions continue to deepen Russia’s economic crisis.

The incursion of at least 19 Russian drones into Polish airspace on September 9–10 produced plenty of shock but hardly any awe. The damage was minimal because the Gerbera decoy drones that Russia deployed in the attack, cheap Shahed-mimic drones that Moscow uses to overwhelm Ukrainian air defenses, were not carrying explosives. One Russian drone landed on the roof of a rabbit pen so smoothly that the animals were unharmed (Radio Svoboda, September 11). The incident was nevertheless extremely dangerous, and the North American Treaty Organization (NATO) responded accordingly despite Moscow’s claim that the incursion was unintentional (Nezavisimaya Gazeta, September 10). The response was swift and multilateral, and by September 12, NATO launched a new allied operation, Eastern Sentry, to bolster air defense along the entire Eastern flank (Kommersant, September 11; Meduza, September 12). After many hybrid attacks, the Russian drone incursion into Poland represents the first kinetic test of NATO unity and resolve. While the full outcome is still in the making, the Kremlin can hardly be satisfied with its test’s result so far.

Moscow timed its incursion into Poland to coincide with a large-scale Russian drone attack on Western Ukrainian regions, centered on Lviv, to provide plausible deniability for their test of NATO resolve. During large-scale Russian drone attacks, such as the 810-drone attack on Kyiv on September 7, half of the drones are often Gerberas. Moscow uses these cheap decoys to overwhelm Ukrainian air defenses and make targeting more expensive and dangerous Russian drones more difficult (The Insider, September 7). Gerbera drones are manufactured for $3,000–$5,000 by using the most basic electronics, and are thus easily neutralized by Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) systems (Amalnews, May 8; Meduza, September 10). Moscow can therefore claim that the 19 Russian drones that invaded Polish airspace were diverted there by Ukrainian EW defenses. The most zealous Russian pundits are speculating that Ukraine purposely routed Russian drones into Polish territory to drive further NATO involvement in the defense of Ukraine (MK.RU, September 12).

Russian claims that the incursion was unintentional cannot be disproven. It seems unlikely, however, that such an accident would be perfectly synchronized with the start of the Zapad-2025 military exercises, for which several thousand Russian troops have been deployed to Belarus (Vedomosti, September 12). The scale of these war games is much smaller than in 2021, when Moscow prepared for Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, but the 2025 exercise features elements of strategic forces, for instance, Tu-22M3 bombers (Novaya Gazeta Europe, September 12; Izvestiya, September 13). The underlying goal of Zapad-2025 is to prove that Russian long-range aviation remains combat capable despite losses from the Ukrainian special operation Spiderweb on June 1 (Izvestiya, September 13). The Russian General Staff may find the NATO exercises in parallel with Zapad-2025 and the western reaction to the Russian drone incursion into Poland lacking in scale and coordination, but such assertions amount to wishful strategic thinking (TopWar.ru, September 11).

That only four drones were shot down by Polish F-16 and Dutch F-35 fighters, scrambled to intercept the Russian attack and supported by one Italian E-550A early warning aircraft, might appear disappointing by the Ukrainian standards of disabling up to 90 percent of long-distance drones (The Moscow Times, September 11). These were the only four drones that Poland designated a threat, and wasting expensive air-to-air missiles on cheap Russian decoys was not a good option. NATO’s response demonstrated its capacity for joint responses to surprise attacks, a capacity that will be strengthened by additional assets, including new batteries of MIM-104 Patriot surface-to-air missiles, not at the expense of supplies promised to Ukraine (Kommersant, September 10). The immediate activation of the coordination mechanism according to Article 4 of the NATO Charter was even more notable (Novaya Gazeta Europe, September 10). Experts and commentators have recognized a new step in building up European resolve to deter creeping Russian aggression, but Russian generals do not appear to be impressed (Izvestiya, September 13). Romanian F-16 fighters reported a Russian drone in Romanian airspace on September 13, and Polish air defenses were again put on high alert (RBC, September 13; Interfax-Ukraine, September 14).

NATO’s military responses to increased Russian aggression are certain to be complemented by further sanctions. While Russian pundits cannot guess the meaning of U.S. President Donald Trump’s “Here we go” message, they know that every new tariff adds to their worsening economic crisis (see Strategic Snapshot, May 8; Kommersant, September 12). Russian business leaders are pleading for a deep cut in interest rates, but the Central Bank opted for a minimal reduction from 18 percent to 17 percent last week (Radio Svoboda, September 12). The Kremlin is preparing a new increase in taxation since the budget deficit is expanding to a yawning gap, and sources of external borrowing are scarce since the People’s Republic of China appears to show no interest in buying Russian debt (The Bell, September 11). Russian President Vladimir Putin seems to frown at the use of such terms as “technical stagnation,” and state-approved statistics are carefully doctored. Still, the contraction in most industrial sectors is hard to hide. Even in the military-industrial complex, only drone production continues to increase (Re: Russia, September 12). The crucial energy sector has slipped into a deep recession, aggravated by high-precision Ukrainian drone strikes on refineries as far away as St. Petersburg and Ufa, as well as on pumping stations on the pipelines leading to export oil terminals (Nezavisimaya Gazeta, September 11; The Insider, September 14).

The Russian economy is the decisive strength or weakness in a long war of attrition, but the translation of economic degradation into military defeat is a slow process. Putin dismisses the threat of new sanctions, expecting that the strategic initiative on the Donbas battlefields will grant Russia a decisive edge before economic downturn necessitates a compromise peace deal. The combination of expanded Western economic support to Ukraine, increased investment in European deterrence capabilities, and sanctions pressure on Russia is the only way to alter Putin’s ambitious calculations. Each Russian provocation, such as the drone attack on Poland, may give Moscow’s high command a moment of instant gratification in observing its adversaries’ supposed lack of preparedness.