Moscow Likely to Bolster Its Offensive Against Ukraine

Executive Summary:

• Russian President Vladimir Putin declared a unilateral ceasefire from May 8 to 11 in Russia’s war against Ukraine. Putin called on the Ukrainian side to observe the ceasefire, but noted that the Russian army would retaliate in case of violation.
• Ukrainian officials report Russia exploited prior ceasefires, including the recent “Easter truce,” to reposition forces, stage assaults, and intensify operations, notably in Zaporizhzhia and other regions under active combat.
• Russian forces are ramping up assaults in Sumy and Kharkiv, likely as a diversion, while intensifying operations in Zaporizhzhia, Donetsk, and Luhansk, despite depleted armored vehicle stocks and growing losses.
• Moscow seeks to use these attacks to strengthen Russia’s position in the international arena and for propaganda targeting domestic Russian, Ukrainian, and Western audiences.
• A new offensive against Ukraine would serve to  bolster Russian domestic support for the war, solidify Moscow’s claims over occupied Ukrainian regions, undermine Ukraine’s allies, and prepare for potential future aggression in Europe.

On April 28, Russian President Vladimir Putin announced a ceasefire in Russia’s war against Ukraine from May 8 to May 11. These dates coincide with the Victory Day celebrations in Russia marking the eightieth anniversary of the end of World War II. Putin called on the Ukrainian side to also observe the ceasefire but noted that in case of violation, the Russian army would retaliate (President of Russia, April 28). On May 3, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy rejected Putin’s proposal for a ceasefire, calling it “theatrical play” and insisting on a 30-day truce (Interfax Ukraine, May 3).

This unilateral ceasefire is similar to the recent “Easter Truce” announced by the Kremlin on the eve of the religious holiday. According to Zelenskyy, however, the Russian military did not adhere to its own proposals (see EDM, April 28). Zelenskyy noted that during the so-called ceasefire, there were nearly 3,000 attacks and almost 100 attempts to storm Ukrainian positions (Telegram/V_Zelenskiy_official, April 21).

Andriy Kovalenko, head of the Center for Countering Disinformation at the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine, claimed that the Russian military used the “Easter Truce” to pull up reserves and prepare to continue their offensive. Kovalenko compared such actions to Russia’s tactics during the first phase of its war against Ukraine from 2014 to 2021, when Moscow used self-proclaimed pauses to rearm and restore forces for further aggression (Ukrinform, April 21). Vladyslav Voloshyn, a spokesman for the Ukrainian Southern Defense Forces, confirmed this. He said that under the guise of a truce, the Russians managed to deploy additional forces from Crimea and that the fighting in Zaporizhzhia oblast is expected to intensify (Ukrinform, April 23). DeepState, a Ukrainian open-source intelligence group, expressed the same views, commenting on how Russia still conducted assault operations amid the so-called “truce” (Telegram/DeepStateUA, April 20).

The Kremlin may be trying to have a truce for two reasons. First, this goodwill gesture for Victory Day may be an attempt to protect the celebrations in Moscow, which are expected to be attended by international guests for the first time since the start of the full-scale invasion in February 2022. Putin is likely concerned of a repeat of the situation in 2023, when unidentified drones allegedly attacked a government building in the center of Moscow on the eve of the holiday parade (Suspilne, May 3, 2023).

Second, Russia may need a pause to continue the offensive against Ukraine. Zelenskyy discussed Russia’s alleged preparations for a spring-summer offensive in an interview with the French newspaper Le Figaro for the first time. He said that, according to Ukrainian intelligence, Russia is planning an offensive in Sumy and Kharkiv oblasts. He claimed that this offensive should have occurred earlier, but the Armed Forces of Ukraine disrupted the enemy’s plans by launching their own operation in Russia’s Kursk oblast in August 2024 (Le Figaro, March 26).

Commander-in-Chief of the Ukrainian Armed Forces Oleksandr Syrskyi noted that the Russian offensive has already begun, which can be seen in the sharp increase in the number of assault actions by Russian troops, particularly in the Sumy and Kharkiv oblasts. Since April, the intensity of assaults has increased twice in all major axes (LB, April 9). The Russian Army could use the Sumy and Kharkiv offensive as a military deception operation to stretch Ukrainian forces, with a real attack axis in Zaporizhzhia and/or Donetsk and Luhansk regions.

Reports from the frontline confirmed this. The Ukrainian military has been increasingly publishing photos and videos of troops repelling massive Russian attacks (NOEL Reports, April 17; 24th Channel, April 17, 26). The number of destroyed Russian heavy vehicles is also growing. According to the operational strategic group Khortytsya, the Russian army has lost 885 tanks since the beginning of the year in the eastern sector alone (Telegram/Khortytsky_wind, April 25). Following a long pause, the Russians have used a relatively large number of armored vehicles in these offensive attempts. The pause arose because the number of Russian armored vehicles is rapidly declining, and they are becoming a scarce resource. Analysis of open data on the affected vehicles and satellite images of Russian storage bases, which are almost empty, demonstrates scarcity (Mezha, April 25; X/@Jonpy99, April 27).

The high level of armored vehicle losses, as well as the strong saturation of the front with various reconnaissance and strike unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), is leading to changes in Russia’s tactics. The use of infantry on motorcycles and buggies is increasing, as they can ensure rapid deployment of forces to Ukrainian positions (Ukrinform, April 27). Also, fast and maneuverable motorcycles require more ammunition to destroy compared to relatively slower armored vehicles. Motorcycles are expected to be used more separately or in combination with armored vehicles in the upcoming summer-autumn campaign (LB, April 23; ISW, April 26; Telegram/ombr_28, April 29).

According to Kostyantyn Mashovets, a Ukrainian military expert at the Information Resistance analytical group, the Russians currently have about 65,000 trained soldiers, up to 120 tanks, 480 to 625 armored combat vehicles, and up to 1,000 pieces of artillery, which include howitzers and multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS), in the Sumy oblast. According to Mashovets, these forces can conduct an offensive operation of a limited scale (10 kilometers (6.2 miles) in depth and up to 30 kilometers (18.6 miles) along the front) to create a so-called buffer zone of appropriate length on the territory of Ukraine’s Sumy oblast. This is not enough, however, to break through the fortified Ukrainian borders, let alone to create a significant threat or capture the cities of Sumy and Kharkiv (Facebook/pashtetof, April 9). As reported by Andriy Demchenko, spokesperson for the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine, some of the battles in Sumy oblast have begun. He said that the small teams of Russians are trying to break through on all-terrain vehicles (ATVs) to get deeper into the territory of Ukraine as quickly as possible, gain a foothold, and expand the control zone with reinforcements (RBC-Ukraine, April 27).

A new offensive is important to Moscow due to several factors. The Kremlin does not have full control over Donetsk and Luhansk regions, as well as Zaporizhzhia and Kherson, despite them being listed as part of Russia in the Russian Constitution. To demonstrate some kind of success for their domestic audience, Moscow needs to fully capture at least some of the regions. Additionally, fully capturing these regions could grant Russians a stronger negotiation position, according to Zelenskyy (24th Channel, April 17).

According to Ukrainian Defense Intelligence, the Kremlin has prepared 15 plans for further operations against Europe but needs to finish its war against Ukraine before carrying out these operations (RBC-Ukraine, April 26). The Russian government seeks to demonstrate an image of a capable superpower to influence Western decision-making processes. The Kremlin aims to stop foreign military assistance to Ukraine, create conditions for Ukraine’s surrender, and lift the sanctions against Russia. Maintaining close partnership with allies such as Iran, North Korea, and the People’s Republic of China is also important to Moscow (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, April 1). Additionally, Russia seeks to create a lack of unity among Ukraine’s international partners and a lack of decisive action on their part (New Voice, April 29). Deploying a limited European military contingent could be an adequate response to combat North Korea, but it is plagued by contradictions between allies (The Times, April 29). This further encourages Russia to act.

Russia seeks to exert influence on Ukrainian society to break the will for resistance, including mobilization efforts, and to force official Kyiv to accept “peace” on Russian conditions. Among possible instruments to ensure this is a combination of kinetic and non-kinetic means. For example, massive terror air strikes against the civilian population, followed by psyops, as has happened recently in Sumy, Kharkiv, and Kyiv (see EDM, June 11, August 1, 2024; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, April 5; Mashovets’s Facebook, April 13; Espreso.TV, April 14).

Russia maintains an unimpeded supply of weapons, ammunition, and soldiers from Russia’s allies, including North Korea. Recently, Russian officials officially recognized the participation of North Korea’s military in the war against Ukraine for the first time. More are expected to be involved in further operations (BBC Ukrainian Service, April 28).

Moscow will need to combat the negative social and economic consequences within Russia if the ongoing aggression stops. The Russian economy is currently supported by significant budgetary expenditures in the defense industry, which has been effectively switched to military mode (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, April 12). Maintaining a large army that will not fight is also economically inexpedient, and the return of a number of combatants back into society could potentially lead to a surge in crime rate and even major social unrest (Verstka, April 25, 2024).

Moscow is seeking to continue active offensive actions despite negative factors and the Kremlin’s alleged demonstration of readiness for a ceasefire (see EDM, April 14, 21). This is necessary to achieve the strategic goal of the “operation” against Ukraine and prepare the Russian Armed Forces for future military offenses against Europe. Russia is likely to use any potential territorial gains to strengthen its bargaining position in future peace negotiations, as well as to put pressure on the Ukrainian government and society. At the same time, the Russian army faces serious problems with the supply of weapons and military equipment, but is attempting to compensate for this by adapting its tactics. In the current circumstances, a cessation of hostilities and a freeze of the war are not in Moscow’s interest.