Non-Western Engagement in Russian Nuclear Cooperation at All-Time High

Executive Summary

• World Atomic Week in Moscow is due to showcase Russian nuclear cooperation with non-Western countries, especially members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and BRICS, despite Western attempts to isolate the Russian regime.
• In addition to World Atomic Week, Russia’s state-owned nuclear corporation, Rosatom, is engaging in nuclear cooperation with countries in or partnered with the SCO and BRICS. Russia has been using nuclear cooperation as a soft power tool for decades, but its most recent efforts suggest a much more concerted campaign to shape the landscape of the global nuclear industry in its favor.

At the World Atomic Week in Moscow on September 25–28, more than ten thousand visitors from over one hundred countries will attend a showcase of Russian nuclear advancements and international cooperation. The official website frames World Atomic Week as the largest international platform that brings together representatives of countries developing nuclear programs, government agencies, companies, public organizations, and scientists (World Atomic Week, accessed September 16). The lineup includes participation of member states of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and BRICS and its partner countries, which comprise about thirty percent of the speakers. [1] Based on the speakers attending and the topics they will discuss, Russian leadership is likely attempting to convey that the nuclear business is booming and that a significant portion of the world now wants Russian nuclear cooperation more than ever. 

World Atomic Week follows the recent BRICS Summit in July and the SCO summit in August and September (see EDM, September 2; see China Brief, September 5; BRICS, accessed September 17). Alexey Likhachev, general director of Russia’s state-owned nuclear corporation, Rosatom, said that all of the countries whose leaders met with Russian President Vladimir Putin during the SCO summit expressed interest in Russian nuclear technology. Notably, an agreement was reached between Russia and the PRC on the joint development of strategic nuclear energy (President of Russia, September 2; RIA Novosti; TASS, September 5).

World Atomic Week is dedicated to the 80th anniversary of the Russian nuclear industry and replaces AtomExpo, which usually occurs annually in March (World Atomic Week, accessed September 16). Russia marks the creation of the Special Committee on the Use of Atomic Energy on August 20, 1945, as the starting point of the Russian nuclear industry (Rosatom; 1TV, August 20). World Atomic Week is hosting around the same number of speakers as AtomExpo in 2024 (264 in 2024 and 254 in 2025), and international speaker participation has jumped from 28 percent of total speakers in 2024 to 39 percent in 2025. As the total number of speakers, including those representing Russia, remains about the same compared to 2024, this increase suggests that Russian participation on stage has been limited or swapped for international representation (see Table 1).  

Kremlin foreign policy prioritizes development and economic cooperation with BRICS and the SCO, as these organizations are among those that Russia claims should be upheld as part of a fair and sustainable world order (Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, March 31, 2023). The BRICS bloc, in particular, represents more than half of the global population, and the majority of them are newcomers to nuclear energy. 

BRICS has a newly formed Nuclear Energy Platform, which held its first meeting in Moscow in October 2024 (RIA Novosti, October 19, 2024; Rosatom, July 3; Rosatom/TASS, accessed September 17). The Nuclear Energy Platform is meant to reflect BRICS as a driver of development by creating and implementing nuclear technologies within BRICS and their respective markets (RIA Novosti, October 19, 2024). 

The PRC and Russia are the only two BRICS member states capable of exporting nuclear reactors (Davis, August 2022). Rather than competing, these two states have coordinated their nuclear capabilities development at a notable pace in recent years. The most recent of which was on September 10, when Rosatom announced a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with the Chinese National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC) (AtomMedia, September 11). The MOU creates a platform for joint projects and coordinating training activities in their respective nuclear industries, particularly for young people and women (Rosatom; TASS, September 11). Earlier this year, Rosatom was selected to lead an international consortium to construct Kazakhstan’s first nuclear power plant (NPP), and CNNC was selected to lead construction on a second one (Government of Kazakhstan, June 14 [1], [2]; see EDM, July 15, 21).

Almost all of the countries where Rosatom is currently constructing NPPs are members/partners of BRICS (Egypt, India, Iran, PRC, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan) or SCO member states (PRC, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan).[2] Two exceptions are Bangladesh, where Rosatom is constructing the Rooppur NPP, and Türkiye, where it is constructing the Akkuyu NPP (see EDM, June 25). Both countries are sending delegates to speak at World Atomic Week. Bangladesh is a member of BRICS’s New Development Bank (NDB) established in 2015 (New Development Bank, September 1, 2021). Türkiye is an SCO Dialogue Partner and was reportedly offered partner country status with BRICS after requesting admission as a member of the bloc, but has yet to officially join (Türkiye Today, November 18, 2024; Süsler, June 16).

In addition to these countries, others associated with BRICS are in discussions or already have agreements in place to engage with Rosatom to develop their own nuclear technologies, research reactors, conventional NPPs, and small modular reactors (SMRs). Some of these countries include:

• BRICS Members: Brazil and South Africa (RIA Novosti, September 26, 2024; Rosatom, December 24, 2024, June 18);
• BRICS Partners: Belarus, Bolivia, Malaysia, Thailand, Uganda, and Vietnam (World Nuclear News, October 28, 2024; Rosatom, October 28, 2024, May 10, 19; TASS, January 15, September 4; Atomic Energy, January 24; Interfax, September 4);
• Countries which have expressed interest in joining BRICS: Myanmar and Serbia (Rosatom, March 5; TASS, September 17); and
• Countries pursuing cooperation with BRICS: Kyrgyzstan, Mongolia, and Niger (RBC, September 3, 2024; Izvestiya, October 18, 2024, July 28; Rossiiskaya Gazeta, October 20, 2024; Pravda Niger, February 11; Rosatom, August 14).

Rosatom is also looking for an opportunity to be the world’s first exporter of a floating NPP by 2030 and has discussed this most recently with Malaysia (Interfax, May 19, August 8; Rosatom, May 20). Russia is the world’s first and only operator of a floating NPP, located in Russia’s Arctic Chukotka Autonomous Okrug, but it still needs to resolve commercial and lending issues before such a plant can be export-ready (Interfax, May 20; Rosatom, accessed September 17).

Beyond simple state-to-state nuclear agreements, Russia also recently hosted fourteen- and fifteen-year-olds from India, the PRC, Türkiye, South Africa, Kazakhstan, Bolivia, and Bangladesh to join young Russian citizens of the same age group on a nuclear-powered icebreaker to the North Pole (Anadolu Anjasi, August 14; Strana Rosatom, August 18; Atom Media, August 22). The Icebreaker of Knowledge blends education with geopolitical messaging about Russia’s nuclear prowess and leadership in Arctic affairs (see EDM, April 18). International media outlets have reported on and interviewed the students as they returned exuberant and inspired (Anadolu Anjasi; The Bangladesh Monitor, August 14; IOL, August 22; Russianculture.cn, September 5).

While Russia’s use of nuclear capabilities as a foreign policy tool is nothing new, the shaping of World Atomic Week, combined with the collaborations and initiatives discussed above, suggests a much more concerted effort to engage the non-Western world than we have witnessed in the past. Western states and international organizations’ attempts to isolate the Russian regime, particularly from the global economy, are clearly failing to deter many states from pursuing new and increased nuclear cooperation with Russia. For many of these countries, nuclear energy offers a pathway to modernization, energy security, and geopolitical agency, irrespective of who provides the capabilities. So long as Russia remains an attractive partner, the landscape of the global nuclear industry will be shaped in its favor for decades to come. 

Notes:

[1] The original BRICS member states are Brazil, India, Russia, the PRC, South Africa, with Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Indonesia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) joining in 2024 (now sometimes referred to as BRICS+). In addition to BRICS member states, a new category of association, “official partner countries,” was created at the bloc’s 2024 summit in Kazan (BRICS, accessed September 16).

[2] Hungary is not included in this list as of yet since construction has not yet begun on site for two new Rosatom reactors (World Nuclear Association, December 3, 2024; PAKS II, August 21). Hungary is an EU member state and therefore would have less incentive to join a competing economic organization, such as BRICS.

Table 1: SCO and BRICS Member States at 

AtomExpo 2024 Compared to World Atomic Week 2025 

(foreign states category excludes representatives from IAEA and the International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER) as these representatives are both Russian and non-Russian)

Table 2:

International Speakers at Russia’s AtomExpo 2024 

compared to World Atomic Week 2025 

(AtomExpo 2024, March 25, 2024; World Atomic Week, September 11)