Pashinyan Escalates Tensions With Armenian Apostolic Church

Executive Summary:

• Armenia faces a deepening power struggle as Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan openly attacks Catholicos Karekin II, the head of the Armenian Apostolic Church, intensifying long-standing tensions between the state and the Armenian Apostolic Church ahead of the 2026 elections.
• The conflict exposes constitutional dilemmas over church-state boundaries in Armenia and raises fears of escalating unrest amid Yerevan’s fragile efforts to normalize relations with Azerbaijan and Türkiye.
• Allegations of corruption and political obstruction surrounding the Church amplify Armenia’s internal divisions, threatening its national identity and weakening public trust in both religious and political institutions.

Armenia is again gripped by a dramatic confrontation between its political and religious elites. Recent public attacks by Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan on Catholicos Karekin II, the head of the Armenian Apostolic Church, are the latest in a series of standoffs since 2018 that reflect a broader struggle between Armenia’s revolutionary present and its entrenched past (Azatutyun, June 2 [1], [2], June 4). This comes a year after Karekin II approved of street protests led by one of his archbishops to force Pashinyan’s resignation (see EDM, May 14, 2024). Pashinyan has accused the Catholicos of violating his vow of celibacy and fathering a child. These accusations are not new. They last surfaced in the Armenian media over a decade ago (Keghart, August 8, 2013). The recent language accompanying these charges, including that from Pashinyan’s wife, Anna Hakobyan, who likened the clergy to pedophiles, however, marks a significant escalation (Azatutyun, June 2 [1], [2], June 4). Many suspect that Pashinyan seeks to silence critical voices ahead of parliamentary elections scheduled for June 2026 (see EDM, May 21; 1lurer.am, June 7; The Insider, June 16).

The church and opposition groups are hitting back. Even though the Catholicos has not previously denied these accusations, his supporters have claimed that the allegations violate articles of Armenia’s criminal code (Hetq, February 14, 2016). The government, however, has for over a year now claimed that the Armenian Apostolic Church has violated the constitutional separation of church and state by involving the Catholicos in domestic politics, including by opposing the fragile peace process with Azerbaijan (see EDM, May 14, June 5, 2024).

Pashinyan’s critics accuse him of violating the same constitutional provision by announcing his intention to establish a new body to remove Karekin II from his position (Azatutyun, June 10). The country’s Public Council suggests that while the Church should not interfere in politics, the government should not concern itself with the Church’s inner workings (PanARMENIAN.Net, June 13). Given Pashinyan’s demands that the Catholicos resign, there are additional concerns in Armenia that this war of words could escalate into violence (Azatutyun, June 9).

The attacks coincided with Karekin II’s participation in a conference in Switzerland on May 27 focused on Armenian cultural heritage in Azerbaijan and comments made about the Azerbaijan’s prosecution of the ethnic Armenian de facto leaders of the former Soviet-era Nagorno Karabakh Autonomous Oblast still ongoing in Azerbaijan (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, January 17; Armenpress, May 31). With elections on the horizon, which are likely to focus on normalization of relations with both Azerbaijan and Türkiye, the timing of Pashinyan’s assault is telling (see EDM, May 6, 2024, March 24).

It appears increasingly likely that they are part of a broader effort to dismantle the remnants of the political system established by his predecessors, Robert Kocharyan and Serzh Sargsyan. Karekin II, elected in 1999 amid suspicions of manipulation by Kocharyan, remains one of the most visible relics of that era (EVN Report, June 19, 2024; Tchilingirian, “Catholicosal Elections in Armenia,” accessed June 23). Encouraged by Pashinyan’s 2018 “Velvet Revolution,” some church insiders also unsuccessfully tried to depose the Catholicos (Eurasianet, July 20, 2018). Since the 2018 revolution, Karekin II has been a vocal critic of Pashinyan’s government. His open support for the release of Kocharyan in early 2020 and his opposition to post-war peace efforts have only highlighted this (Azatutyun, April 15, 2020). In Pashinyan’s eyes, the Catholicos no longer embodies spiritual authority, if it ever did at all, but rather political obstruction.

Allegations of corruption have plagued Karekin II, real name Ktrij Nersessyan, for years (Hetq, February 14, 2016). This includes the controversial appointment of his brother, Yezras, who Pashinyan now refers to only by his birth name, as head the Russian Diocese and its association with pro-Russian military factions, such as the Arbat Battalion, which was implicated in an alleged coup attempt on the Pashinyan government last year (AGBU, May 2010; Fact Investigation Platform, September 28, 2024; see EDM, October 7, 2024). These connections have only reinforced the perception that the Church is more of a political actor than a spiritual institution.

Karekin II’s current hardline stance on the peace process stands in stark contrast to his 2010 visit to Baku, where he met with Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev and Sheikh-ul-Islam Allahshukur Pashazade (Azatutyun, April 27, 2010). Any shift away from religious diplomacy toward confrontation could complicate post-conflict reconciliation. Pashazade has already declared any future meeting with Karekin II impossible due to his commitment to his political role (Commonspace, June 10).

The opposition, including Armenia’s first post-independence president, Levon Ter-Petrosyan, accuses Pashinyan of “treason” and alleges that Pashinyan has attacked the Church now to appease Baku (Azatutyun, June 12). Since Armenia’s defeat in its 2020 war with Azerbaijan over Karabakh, apathy and disillusionment have already set in among the electorate. Artsrun Pepanyan, a former member of the Public Council, warns that this is only likely to increase, saying that “people will be discouraged, and in 2026, the authorities will have fewer problems … In the upcoming elections, the people will … have less faith or not believe in anyone at all” (Hraparak, June 14).

Ter-Petrosyan’s Armenian National Congress expressed the need for unity in Armenia while tensions between Iran and Israel turned to war earlier this month. For four days, Pashinyan also silenced his attacks. The “ceasefire” in the war of words did not last long, however, as Russian-Armenian businessman Samvel Karapetyan came to the defense of the Catholicos, threatening to take matters into his own hands if the dispute was not settled politically (Azatutyun, June 12, 17). Karapetyan was also one of four businessmen that provided the bulk of an unprecedented $4.1 million bail for the release of Kocharyan five years ago (Azatutyun 22, 2020).

The day after the National Security Service failed to detain Karapetyan in a nighttime raid, Pashinyan dismissed the security body’s head. Karapetyan has since been charged with making public calls to overthrow the government (Azatutyun, June 18). In the meantime, Pashinyan has moved to strip Karapetyan of ownership of Armenia’s electric distribution network. Pashinyan says he plans to nationalize the strategic asset that Karapetyan bought out from Russia’s Inter RAO in 2015 (Jam News, August 25, 2017). Armenian economists, however, have warned against such a move, stating that it could adversely affect the country’s investor climate and potentially lead to international arbitration (Civilnet, June 18). Government lawmakers have since denied that Pashinyan had announced such an intention (Azatutyun, June 19). Armenia’s state hygiene agency is also inspecting and closing down some branches of Karapetyan’s popular Tashir chain of pizza restaurants in Armenia (News.am, June 18). Russian Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Maria Zakharova announced that Moscow is closely following developments (ArmInfo, June 18). Yezras Nersessyan also traveled to Yerevan from Moscow to support Karapetyan (News.am, June 18).

Additionally, in the third week of June, supporters of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation – Dashnaktsutyun (ARF-D) and others following Archbishop Bagrat Galstanyan, the revanchist cleric who led anti-government protesters last year, were detained by police while Pashinyan visited Türkiye on the invitation of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan (Azatutyun, June 20). “He probably fears that something might happen on his return [from Türkiye] and is already unleashing repressions,” claimed Galstanyan in comments to the media. 

The Armenian Apostolic Church, a long-standing cornerstone of national identity, risks losing its legitimacy and ability to function effectively both at home and abroad in the country’s diaspora. The government had already hinted at constitutional reform to strip the Church of its privileged status and is also believed to be working to reshape the diaspora, which contains some nationalist elements (News.am. May 11, 2021, February 19).

As the 2026 elections approach, the rift between the Church and the state is likely to intensify. The conflict has become emblematic of a larger ideological struggle between two visions of Armenia—one rooted in the post-Soviet legacy of Kocharyan, Sargsyan, and the Church, and the other in Pashinyan’s vision of a reformed country seeking to integrate into both regional and international structures, and at peace with its neighbors. If unresolved, it risks destabilizing not just the already shaky relationship between church and state, but Armenia’s broader national identity at a time when many argue that unity is most needed.