PLA Perceptions of and Reactions to U.S. Military Activities in Low Earth Orbit

Executive Summary:

• Space industry experts within the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) have observed and drawn lessons from the United States’s use of space as a warfighting domain since the 1990s. These experts tend to characterize the deployment of proliferated low earth orbit (pLEO) constellations, such as the privately-owned Starlink constellation, as an application of the Department of Defense’s resilient space concept.
• The PLA views Starlink as challenging its core operational concept of multi-domain precision warfare due to the decentralized nature of pLEO constellations. It attributes many unconfirmed, hyperbolic capabilities to Starlink, which contributes to the belief that Starlink is creating a strategic imbalance between the United States and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in space.
• The PRC has begun developing its own comparable megaconstellation, Project SatNet, which PLA analysts see as enabling similar capabilities to Starlink and which they also envision as countering Starlink.

In March, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT) announced the successful launch of a fifth batch of satellites to comprise its broadband G60 megaconstellation, also referred to as the Qianfan (千帆; “Thousand Sails”) Constellation. This latest batch was launched on the Long March 8, a new generation rocket designed specifically for placing assets in low earth orbit (LEO) (MIIT, March 12). The PRC’s increased efforts to capitalize on dwindling space in LEO have been driven in part by developments in U.S. space capabilities.

Over the past several years, U.S. activities in LEO have attracted great interest within the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA). Analysis of professional military education textbooks and journal articles written by PLA scholars and Chinese industry experts indicates that the PLA associates the development of LEO as a warfighting domain with the fielding and expansion of the commercial Starlink constellation, operated by the American firm SpaceX. [1] By linking Starlink with U.S. military activities in LEO, PLA researchers attach specific security implications to Starlink, which in turn has led to a range of countermeasures being proposed, as well as the development of indigenous Chinese LEO systems (China Brief, September 6, 2024).

Perceptions of Starlink Inform PLA Views of pLEO and LEO as a Warfighting Domain

A survey of research from the People’s Republic of China (PRC) on the United States’ use of space as a military domain since the 1990s reveals that the PLA’s shift in focus toward LEO is closely tied to the PLA’s assessments of the operational significance of Starlink. Taking a closer look at the evolution of PLA space research, therefore offers a more holistic perspective on the origins of its emphasis on LEO, proliferated LEO (pLEO), and Starlink, as well as PLA analyses’ tendency to equate the three. [2]

Emergence of Resilient Space

The emergence of the concept of “resilient space” in U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) policy, which refers to space assets that can effectively function in contested environments, has had an immense impact on the PLA’s view of space as a warfighting domain. Traditionally, the PLA has characterized space in terms of function rather than orbit. For example, when evaluating the use of space-based assets in U.S. military operations in the Gulf War, Kosovo, and Afghanistan, PLA researchers focused on the information linkages provided by those assets that strengthened capabilities such as communications, precision guidance, and intelligence collection. They did not note which orbit the assets were placed in (NDU Press, 2021, p.311–337). [3]

Over time, as researchers observed discussions on the need for resilient space architectures appearing in DoD policy documents and wargaming exercises, they began incorporating orbitology into their assessments of space systems and operations. For example, an analysis published by the PRC’s National Defense Industry Press on the Schriever Wargames pointed out that resilient space was applied in the “SW-14” game in order to ensure U.S. space assets could continue functioning in contested environments. More broadly, these researchers assessed that U.S. government and military actions (such as changes to space policy and updates to military doctrine on space operations) are coordinated with and supported by launches of commercial satellites to build out pLEO constellations. [4]

Four key characteristics of resilient space are best enabled in LEO, according to the conclusions of a research group at the Academy of Military Science’s War Studies Institute. These include (Space and Network, November 8, 2021):

1. dispersed, proliferated, and diversified deployment;
2. the ability to be disintegrated, reorganized, reconstituted, and repaired at any time;
3. comprehensive threat perception and rapid counterattack capabilities; and
4. the ability to support joint operations under high-risk conditions.

 Starlink as an Application of Resilient Space

The PLA’s emphasis on LEO as an emerging key domain for warfighting was further solidified by PLA analysis that Starlink was developed as an application of resilient space. For example, one PLA Aerospace Engineering University researcher assessed that the U.S. Space Force intends to rely on SpaceX’s commercial capabilities to provide U.S. forces with constellations with resilient traits, such as rapid reconstitution (PLA Daily, July 16, 2020). Furthermore, the tendency of PLA researchers to use the terms LEO, pLEO, and Starlink interchangeably, which they have done with increasing frequency since Starlink’s use in the Russia-Ukraine war, suggests that the PLA views Starlink as outlining the operational potential of LEO and as an implementation of the concept of pLEO, rather than solely as a discrete system (PLA Daily, January 9, 2020, December 19, 2023; China Social Science Network, June 19, 2023). Notably absent from PLA analyses of LEO surveyed was an emphasis on DoD-operated constellations such as the Space Development Agency’s (SDA) Proliferated Warfighter Space Architecture. This reinforces the sense that the PLA derives LEO’s current operational significance from the advent of Starlink in particular.

PLA Assessments of U.S. Capabilities’ Effects on China’s Security Environment in Space

PLA analyses assert that pLEO constellations such as Starlink pose a significant challenge to the PRC’s security environment in space in terms of both the PLA’s ability to conduct operations and the overall military balance. However, the PLA’s perception of the latter seems to be informed by hyperbolic assessments of Starlink that posit the existence of capabilities beyond what is publicly known.

Challenges to Current and Future Operations

First, PLA analysts assert that Starlink’s observable technical characteristics present a challenge to one of the PLA’s core operational concepts, “multi-domain precision warfare” (多域精确作战). This concept refers to leveraging big data and artificial intelligence to rapidly identify key vulnerabilities in the U.S. operational system and then combine joint forces across domains to launch precision strikes against those vulnerabilities (DoD, October 19, 2023). Specifically, they see pLEO as disrupting the method by which they may conduct operations in the future, namely by disabling key nodes in integrated information systems that underpin joint operations, thus rendering those systems unable to function (PLA Daily, January 20, 2022). In other words, Starlink could significantly challenge the multi-domain precision warfare concept by featuring a decentralized layout that lacks key nodes to strike. One group of researchers at the Beijing Institute of Telecommunications and Tracking Technology who recognized this noted that disrupting Starlink requires “system confrontation” (体系对抗) rather than “individual confrontation” (个体对抗), i.e., striking multiple key targets through low cost, high efficiency means. However, regarding specific countermeasures, the same group admitted not only that mitigating Starlink would be extremely costly but also that they “do not even know where to begin” (无从下手) to develop such measures (Modern Defense Technology, 2022).

Second, the PLA attributes a range of unconfirmed capabilities to Starlink that contribute to its perception of an imbalance in its space capabilities vis-à-vis the United States. PLA observers perceive Starlink as having three main categories of capabilities, namely, supporting information assurance, defensive missions, and offensive missions. The three capabilities most commonly referenced by PLA researchers are as follows:

1. Highly advanced command, control, computing, communications, cyber, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and targeting (C5ISRT) that achieves a level of speed and integration to the extent that it provides U.S. forces “one-way transparency” (单向透明) on any battlefield (PLA Daily, May 5, 2022; International Cooperation Center, September 24, 2023);
2. Missile defense facilitated by Starlink’s debris evasion and route optimization capabilities (Aerospace China, 2022) [5] ; and
3. Use as a co-orbital kinetic kill vehicle that would also be facilitated by the aforementioned maneuverability functions (PLA Daily, January 9, 2024). [6]

Table 1 provides a more detailed summary of PLA assessments of Starlink missions.

Table 1: PLA Assessments of Starlink Missions

(Source: RAND Corporation, March 24)

By attributing these capabilities to Starlink, some PLA researchers assess that the United States may be creating a “vulnerability gap” (脆弱性差距) with the PRC insofar as the DoD has decreased the vulnerability of its space assets relative to those of the PLA (Peace and Development, 2018). The theme in these analyses is that resilient space, and the fielding of a system advancing resilience via Starlink, is meant to decrease the likelihood that the United States will be deterred by the threat of first strike in space, thereby enabling it to act in a less restrained manner (International Cooperation Center, September 24, 2023). [7] This assessment has pushed the PLA to consider various countermeasures in response.

Countermeasures

PLA discussions on how to develop countermeasures against Starlink can generally be divided into asymmetric and symmetric responses. In the former category, the PLA and Chinese Communist Party have been executing an international propaganda campaign against Starlink over the past several years, using bilingual articles and international fora such as the United Nations to propagate claims that Starlink puts other space assets at risk and violates international treaties (Space Debris Research, 2021; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, February 10, 2022; Breaking Defense, February 3, 2023). PLA scholars have discussed other asymmetric means for managing the perceived risks of Starlink, including the development of a “space fence” (太空篱笆) able to simultaneously monitor a large quantity of satellites and deploy soft kill measures such as lasers, microwave weapons, and cyber intrusions (Command Control & Simulation, 2023). However, due to the aforementioned difficulties the PLA would likely encounter in an attempt to disable Starlink, as well as the benefits PLA analysts perceive that Starlink provides to the U.S. military, the PRC is focused on “countering” Starlink by building its own megaconstellation to leverage for military operations.

Project SatNet

The PRC’s interest in developing a LEO megaconstellation dates back to at least 2016, but the state-owned China SatNet Co. (中国星网公司) was established only in 2021. The company is tasked with leading the megaconstellation project known as Project SatNet (星网工程), likely as a national-level priority (China Mobile Association for Science and Technology, September 22, 2023). As of February 2025, the PRC has launched two batches of satellites assumed to be part of the SatNet constellation, the first containing ten and the second carrying an unknown quantity. Analysts expect the PRC to debut its commercially-developed reusable launch rockets later in 2025, which could be used in the launch of subsequent batches (Space News, February 11). As with the push toward a satellite constellation of its own, the PRC’s progress in reusable launch vehicles likely is informed by industry experts’ observations of SpaceX’s innovation in this area (Xinhua, June 8, 2024).

The project will rely heavily on the PRC’s commercial ecosystem, even though Project SatNet will most likely be used as a military asset to counter Starlink. In February 2023, PLA Aerospace Engineering University researchers, one of whom was reported to be leading Project SatNet (at the time codenamed “GW”), suggested using the constellation to compete with Starlink for space in LEO and conduct reconnaissance (Command Control & Simulation, 2023). Whether or not developing a comparable constellation of its own will ease the PLA’s hyperbolic assessments of Starlink’s military utility remains to be seen. [8]

Conclusion

The advent of Starlink has captured the imaginations of PLA scholars. They have subsequently emphasized the importance of pLEO for the United States’ efforts to preserve its strategic advantage in space. PLA analysts have inflated Starlink’s operational significance to the extent that they primarily refer to LEO as a warfighting domain in the context of Starlink. As militaries around the world become more dependent on space to enable their military operations, staying abreast of PLA perceptions of and reactions to systems and organizations at the forefront of space technology will be of increasing importance, whether they are publicly or privately owned. Key pieces of information to watch for in PLA publications include not only discussions of discrete systems but also evolving operational concepts that may be used to counter such systems.

Notes

[1] For this analysis, sources were gathered through word searches for key terms including LEO (低地球轨道), microsatellites (微型卫星) and resilient space (弹性太空). See: RAND Corporation, March 24.

[2] pLEO refers to constellations of hundreds or thousands of satellites orbiting at altitudes of less than 2000 kilometers (see SDA, accessed April 7).

[3] Zhou Xiaoqun [周晓群], “Looking at the Kosovo War from the Perspective of NATO Weapons and Armaments,” [“从科索 沃战争看北约武器装备”], Shipboard Electronic Countermeasure [舰船电子对抗], Vol. 4, No. 6, 1999; Wang Xiangjiang [王湘江], “The Role of Military Satellites in the Iraq War” [“军用卫星在伊拉克战争发挥的作用”], Military Technology [军事技术], 2004.

[4] Li Xiangyang [李向阳], Sun Long [孙龙], Ci Yuanzhuo [慈元卓], Shi Peixin [石培新], Du Yanchang [杜彦昌], and Cheng Shaochi [程绍驰], eds., Interpreting the U.S. Military’s “Schriever” Space Warfare Exercises [美军“施用弗”空间战演习解读], National Defense Industry Press [国防工业出版社], 2016.

[5] Li Lu [李陆], Guo Lili [郭莉丽], and Wang Ke [王克], “Military Applications of the ‘Starlink’ Constellation” [“‘星链’ 星座 的军事应用分”], Aerospace China [中国航天], No. 5, 2021. The most widely cited evidence of this is a 2020 PLA simulation in which Starlink reportedly intercepted 350 ICBMs from orbit with a 100 percent success rate and 5–7 interception opportunities for each missile (PLA Daily, June 11, 2020). Little is known of the baseline assumptions that went into building said simulation, however.

[6] Xu Nengwu [徐能武] and Gaoyang Yuxi [高杨予兮], “International Security Governance in the Development of Low Orbit Small Satellite Constellations” [“低轨小卫星星座发展中的国际安全治理研究”], Social Science [ 社会科学], No. 7, 2020.

[7] Wu Minwen [吴敏文], “Resilient Space Architecture: New Steps in U.S. Space Force Developments” [“弹性太空架构：美 太空军发展新步骤”], Military Digest [军事文摘], September 2022; Zhang and Du, 2023.

[8] For a dataset examining Chinese as well as U.S. and Russian capabilities in LEO and capabilities that can affect LEO, see: RAND Corporation, March 24.