PLA Social Media Warfare and the Cognitive Domain

The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has come to recognize the important role of social media in modern conflict and peacetime operations. As such, PLA researchers have begun using the term “social media warfare” (社交媒体战) to describe the extension of non-kinetic military activities onto social media by two or more opposing sides. This term is part of an ongoing conceptual expansion of the scope of warfare in Chinese military thought in which social media is viewed as another space for conflict and not just another channel for distributing propaganda. While the term “social media warfare” does not represent PLA doctrine, its emergence does indicate that the Chinese military finds these activities important enough to raise awareness of them amongst its rank and file. Together with other evidence, this suggests the PLA is working to better incorporate social media into its operations.

This article provides an overview of PLA thinking on social media warfare, including its emergence in PLA literature, its theoretical basis, and PLA lessons derived from observations of foreign examples of social media’s role in modern warfare. This article does not seek to provide a comprehensive review of PLA thinking about social media’s role in military operations, but outlines one part of this conceptual view.

Overview

Emergence in PLA Literature 

The earliest mention of social media warfare can be traced back to a 2015 PLA Daily that examined social media’s role in global events such as Iran’s 2009 Green Revolution and the Arab Spring protests in 2011. [1] This timeline aligns with broader PLA awareness of social media, especially insofar as it poses a risk to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). [2] The article emphasizes that, due to the key role of online communication in inciting protests and garnering rebel support, both of these cases represent some of the earliest examples in which social media has had a direct impact on national security, which the CCP defines as encompassing both internal and external security interests. [3] 2015 was also the year that the PLA National Defense University’s Science of Military Strategy included its first reference to social media, warning that “Since the beginning of the 21st century, cyberspace has been used by some countries to launch ‘color revolutions’ against other countries… [through] behind-the-scenes operations using social networking sites such as Twitter and Facebook as the engine, from manufacturing network public opinion to inciting social unrest.” [4]

The origin of the PLA’s interest in social media thus appears to be primarily defensive, focusing on protecting the CCP regime, rather than offensive, as constituting part of military operations. Given that China was being confronted with similar protests in Tibet (2008) and Xinjiang (2009) around the time this thinking developed, social media’s role in catalyzing the above protests was likely of great concern to the CCP and thus the PLA. [5] However, the PLA’s awareness of and interest in the power and potential of social media has evolved to now seeing it as a component of modern military operations.

In recent years, this evolution has been marked by references in PLA literature to the use of social media in the US military. For example, in response to the release of the Pentagon’s first force-wide social media policy, a 2022 China National Defense article warns that this indicates a desire to formalize social media’s “weaponization.” [6] Another 2022 article from the same publication argues that in the past this “weaponization” has involved impersonating refugees who fled from authoritarian regimes to discredit said governments, and that these efforts will only become more effective with the use of artificial intelligence (AI). [7]

Theoretical Basis

Deconstructing the term “social media warfare” according to PLA military theory sheds more light on conceptual content. Generally speaking, warfare (战) in PLA military theory is used to describe intentionally executed military operations, whereas words like confrontation (对抗) or struggle (斗争) may just refer to existing conditions between two parties. [8] By this logic, “social media warfare” can be defined as operations taking place in, on, or through social media. However, as previously stated, this is certainly not yet a doctrinal concept, and is simply being used to describe and raise awareness of a burgeoning issue.   due to its lack of doctrinal status.

Social Media and Its Relationship with Combat Operations

Social media arguably has an increasingly well-defined place within the PLA’s concept of operations. In the context of the information age, the PLA points to “command of information” (制信息权) as the key to gaining the advantage over an adversary on the battlefield. [9] As social media’s place in society has become more ingrained, social media warfare has become one of the avenues for the PLA to conduct information operations to seize this command of information. While some PLA researchers have described social media as a domain of warfare, it is more commonly viewed as a channel for PLA information operations, [10] or as a subset of either the information domain or the nascent cognitive domain (认知域). [11]

Social media’s rise in importance has come during an evolution of the PLA’s approach to information and influence operations. Since the early 2000s, the PLA’s approach has centered on the “Three Warfares” (三战), namely psychological warfare (心理战), public opinion warfare (舆论战), and legal warfare (法律战). [12] However, there is a growing interest in a new PLA operational concept, “  (认知域作战), as part of a broader PLA evolution to leveraging the cognitive domain as a domain of warfare.

Cognitive domain operations (CDO) seek to influence the decision-making of an adversary during wartime — or the public opinion of a target audience during peacetime — with the goal of attaining command of the mind (制脑权) or command of cognition (制认知权). [13] Far from being confined to PLA theory, CDO appears to be the PLA operational concept behind some real-world operations, most notably political interference against Taiwan. Social media was specifically listed as the key channel for CDO activity against Taiwan in a 2018 article by researchers at Base 311, the PLA’s Strategic Support Force (PLASSF) unit responsible for influence operations against Taiwan. [14]

PLA Lessons Learned from Foreign Operational Examples

A survey of PLA literature suggests that China’s understanding of social media warfare comes just as much from the experiences of other countries as it does from its own. Taking a closer look at the lessons derived from these observations may therefore offer a more holistic perspective of the PLA’s view of this term. The following section explores three operational examples, the 2003 Iraq War, the 2014 Gaza War, and the 2020 Second Nagorno-Karabakh War.

2003 Iraq War

PLA researchers point to the 2003 invasion of Iraq by the United States as the earliest example of social media warfare, despite social media not yet existing at the time. A 2020 PLA Daily article discusses United States messaging prior to the invasion using this framing, [15] marking a change from earlier discussions in which the Iraq War served instead as an example of public opinion warfare. [16] Some PLA researchers have framed the Iraq War as an example of both, suggesting that these PLA researchers are in some ways recycling traditional views of IO under the newer concept of social media warfare. [17] This tallies with Western research identifying Operation Iraqi Freedom as a major inspiration for PLA information warfare. [18] Given the overlap between the two, lessons drawn from public opinion warfare can still provide insight into PLA thinking on social media warfare.

In the 2020 PLA Daily article, the author, Zhang Hui, argues that the United States exerted tremendous effort to make the war a bipartisan issue by using various media outlets to popularize the rumor that Saddam Hussein had colluded with Osama bin-Laden and that Iraq was in possession of weapons of mass destruction. By shifting the narrative in its favor, Zhang argues, the United States was able to operate in Iraq without many domestic political constraints.  This represents an early iteration of the public opinion influence emphasized in CDO and highlights the PLA awareness of the role of public opinion in the will to fight (and specifically the United States as a potential future adversary). The article emphasizes that information dissemination and public opinion influence must be incorporated into the military’s combat capability construction (战斗力建设), so that these capabilities can be developed in tandem with traditional capabilities. [19] The creation of the PLASSF in late 2015 can in some ways be considered a reflection of this sentiment, as it is charged with the integration of cyber, electronic, psychological, and other capabilities associated with informatized conflict and joint operations. [20]

2014 Gaza War

The 2014 Gaza War was a month-long conflict launched by the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) against the Hamas-governed Gaza Strip and is one of many examples of the PLA learning from the Israeli military’s embrace of social media, specifically by dedicating forces to social media operations: A 2023 Military Correspondent article points out that the IDF had a division dedicated to gathering the materials needed to conduct influence operations on social media before the conflict even began. This included biographical information on Hamas leaders, instances of Hamas causing collateral damage by using non-military infrastructure as cover, and instances of Israel trying to avoid civilian casualties. All of these aided Israel’s efforts to shift public opinion in its favor. After the fighting started, both sides engaged in psychological warfare on social media, with Israel posting the photo of a bloodied, high-ranking Hamas military leader and Hamas responding with a post dismissing “Israel’s ‘Iron Dome’ missile defense system as a ‘paper tiger,’” and warning that IDF had “opened the gates of hell.” [21] In the PLA researcher’s view, Israel adopted a two-pronged approach to social media warfare that attempted to simultaneously influence public opinion and degrade the enemy’s will to fight. This aligns with other PLA writings documenting the United States leveraging ISIS postings on social media as intelligence collection to improve targeting for better kinetic strikes. [22] By focusing on the IDF’s preparedness for this conflict, the article emphasizes the need to “further establish a professional social media informatization unit” within the Chinese military. [23] The PLA has undoubtedly relied on the expertise of specialized units within the PLASSF, including Base 311, reflecting an emphasis on the role of social media as a space for CDO in both peacetime competition and future conflict.

2020 Second Nagorno-Karabakh War

PLA Daily published an article in 2020 following the outbreak of the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War, a territorial dispute between Armenia and Azerbaijan. The piece highlighted the reliance of both sides on social media to accomplish their operational objectives. Throughout the conflict, both sides attempted to confuse enemy decision-making by posting false claims on official accounts about having destroyed certain targets. Azerbaijan also conducted “mental attacks” (精神打击) [24] by posting photos of targets that had been destroyed and enemy supply lines being seized in an effort to embolden their own soldiers and degrade Armenia’s will to fight. The article ends by noting that the influence of social media in this conflict “surpassed even the actual war.” [25] This article suggests that at least some in the PLA believe social media’s utility can go beyond merely supporting traditional kinetic capabilities and instead play a decisive role in a conflict. As the PLA continues to emphasize the conceptual expansion of conflict from the material domain to the cognitive domain, such observations may increase the prominence of social media in future operations.

Conclusion

Social media’s increasing significance as a space for non-kinetic military operations has undoubtedly grasped the attention of PLA scholars, who have emphasized the importance of incorporating social media with traditional military capabilities and having military units dedicated to operations on social media, and the potential for it to play a decisive role in operations by complementing kinetic strikes. As the role of social media in modern warfare becomes increasingly well-defined within the PLA’s concept of operations, this new vector of warfare will likely become a more common framing construct for how the PLA thinks about social media and methods of raising awareness for its troops to better leverage social media to China’s advantage in peacetime competition and future conflicts. Ultimately, the concept of “social media warfare” is likely to remain more theoretical, as CDOs serve as the PLA’s primary operational concept for leveraging social media. However, one key indicator to watch for how the PLA thinks about social media moving forward will be its discussion in future revisions of the Science of Military Strategy.

Notes

[1] See Chen Hanghui [陈航辉] and Xia Yuren [夏育仁], “Social Media Warfare: A New Dimension of Information Age Wars” [“社交媒体战: 信息时代战争新维度”], PLA Daily [解放军报], September 25, 2015.

[2] Nathan Beauchamp-Mustafaga and Michael S. Chase, Borrowing a Boat Out to Sea: The Chinese Military’s Use of Social Media for Influence Operations, Washington, D.C.: John Hopkins University, School of Advanced International Studies, Foreign Policy Institute, 2019.

[3] Yun Sun, Chinese National Security Decision-making: Processes and Challenges, Brookings Institution, May 6, 2013.

[4] Xiao Tianliang, ed. [肖天亮], Science of Military Strategy [战略学], Beijing: National Defense University Publishing House [北京国防大学出版社], 2015.

[5] Nathan Beauchamp-Mustafaga and Michael S. Chase, Borrowing a Boat Out to Sea: The Chinese Military’s Use of Social Media for Influence Operations, Washington, D.C.: John Hopkins University, School of Advanced International Studies, Foreign Policy Institute, 2019.

[6] Shi Wen [石文], “United States military Promotes Social Media ‘Weaponization’” [“美军推动社交媒体 ‘武器化’”] China National Defense [中国国防报], September 9, 2022.

[7] Fu Bo [傅波], “United States Military Uses Social Media to Unveil Information Warfare” [“美军利用社交媒体开展信息战”], China National Defense [中国国防报], October 10, 2022.

[8] The authors thank Jeffrey Engstrom for this insight.

[9] Xiao Tianliang, ed. [肖天亮], Science of Military Strategy [战略学], Beijing: National Defense University Publishing House [北京国防大学出版社], 2020.

[10] See Huang Dianlin [黄典林], “10 Years of Mobile Social Media, How Have We Changed” [“移动社交十年，我们如何被改变”], PLA Daily [解放军报], January 27, 2021; Zhang Liwei [张黎伟] and He Xiaoqiang [和晓强], “How to Strengthen the Image of the Military in the Era of Social Media” [“社交媒体时代如何加强军队形象传播”], Military Correspondent [军事记者].

[11] See Nathan Beauchamp-Mustafaga, Chinese Next-Generation Psychological Warfare: The Military Applications of Emerging Technologies and Implications for the United States, RAND Corporation, RR-A853-1, 2023.

[12] Wu Jieming [吴杰明] and Liu Zhifu [刘志富], An Introduction to Public Opinion Warfare, Psychological Warfare, Legal Warfare [舆论战心理 战法律战概论], Beijing: National Defense University Press [国防大学出版社], 2014.

[13] See Nathan Beauchamp-Mustafaga, Chinese Next-Generation Psychological Warfare: The Military Applications of Emerging Technologies and Implications for the United States, RAND Corporation, RR-A853-1, 2023.

[14] Liu Huiyan [刘惠燕], Xiong Wu [熊武], Wu Xianliang [吴显亮], and Mei Shunliang [梅顺量], “Several Thoughts on Promoting the Construction of Cognitive Domain Operations Equipment for the Omni-Media Environment” [“全媒体环境下推进认知域作战装备发展的几点思考”], National Defense Technology [国防科技], Vol. 39, No. 5, October 2018. For analysis, see: Nathan Beauchamp-Mustafaga and Jessica Drun, “Exploring Chinese Military Thinking on Social Media Manipulation Against Taiwan,” China Brief, Vol. 21, No. 7, April 12, 2021; Nathan Beauchamp-Mustafaga, Chinese Next-Generation Psychological Warfare: The Military Applications of Emerging Technologies and Implications for the United States, RAND Corporation, RR-A853-1, 2023.

[15] Zhang Hui [张翚], “Social Media Warfare: A New Pattern of Modern Wars” [“社交媒体战, 现代战争的新样式”], PLA Daily [解放军报], June 16, 2020.

[16] Liu Hui [刘辉] and Wang Peizhi [王培志], “Four Forms of Public Opinion Warfare in Wars” [“舆论战在战争中的四种形式”], Military Correspondent [军事记者], 2006.

[17] Li Bicheng [李弼程], “Model for a System of Online Public Opinion Struggle and Countermeasures’ [网络舆论斗争系统模型与应对策略], National Defense Technology [国防科技], October 2016.

[18] Dean Cheng, “Chinese Lessons from the Gulf Wars,” in Andrew Scobell, David Lai, and Roy Kamphausen, eds., Chinese Lessons from Other Peoples’ Wars, Carlisle, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, 2011.

[19] Zhang Hui [张翚], “Social Media Warfare: A New Pattern of Modern Wars” [“社交媒体战, 现代战争的新样式”], PLA Daily [解放军报], June 16, 2020.

[20] Joe McReynolds and John Costello, China’s Strategic Support Force: A Force for a New Era, Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, 2018; Adam Ni and Bates Gill, “The People’s Liberation Army Strategic Support Force,” China Brief, May 2019.

[21] Liu Yong [刘永], “Research on and Inspiration from the Application of Social Media in Public Opinion Warfare by Foreign Military” [“外军社交媒体在舆论战中的运用研究和启示”], Military Correspondent [军事记者], January 3, 2023.

[22] Zhou Yang [周洋], “An Exploration of United States Military Operations on Social Media to Fight ISIS” [“美国打击ISIS的社交媒体行动探索”], Military Correspondent [军事记者], July 25, 2017, http://www.81. cn/jsjz/2017-07/25/content_7689390.htm. For analysis, see: Nathan Beauchamp-Mustafaga and Michael S. Chase, Borrowing a Boat Out to Sea: The Chinese Military’s Use of Social Media for Influence Operations, Washington, D.C.: John Hopkins University, School of Advanced International Studies, Foreign Policy Institute, 2019.

[23] Liu Yong [刘永], “Research on and Inspiration from the Application of Social Media in Public Opinion Warfare by Foreign Military” [“外军社交媒体在舆论战中的运用研究和启示”], Military Correspondent [军事记者], January 3, 2023.

[24] While no standard translation exists, it should be noted that this term is distinct from the PLA concept of “psychological attacks” (心理打击).

[25] Zhao Jingxuan [赵静轩], “Social Media Warfare in the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict” [“纳卡冲突中的社交媒体战”], PLA Daily [解放军报], November 26, 2020.