Polish-Ukrainian Relations Questioned in the Wake of Poland’s Presidential Elections

Jamestown Senior Fellow Janusz Bugajski just returned from a trip to Warsaw and Kyiv. He is the author of Pivotal Poland: Europe’s Rising Power. The book explores Warsaw’s determined efforts to shape NATO’s eastern policy, to maintain a strong alliance with the United States, and to build a strong, modern military able to resist Russia’s aggression.

Executive Summary:

• The election of Karol Nawrocki as Poland’s new president has stirred fears that Warsaw will be less supportive of Ukraine, as Nawrocki does not back Ukraine’s early membership of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) or the European Union.
• Polish-Ukrainian relations at the state level remain firm, even though periodic problems surface over such questions as agricultural exports or historical disputes.
• Public opinion in both countries has evolved, with a growing number of Poles feeling that aid to Ukrainian refugees should not come at a cost to Polish families, while Ukrainians believe that they are also defending Poland’s security and Kyiv should not be subject to additional pressures.

The election victory of Karol Nawrocki on June 1 unleashed a storm of speculation that Poland’s new head of state was anti-Ukrainian and effectively served Russian interests (Wyborcza.pl, May 27; see EDM, June 2). In reality, Nawrocki represents an influential section of Polish politicians who remain staunchly anti-Moscow and supportive of Ukraine’s military self-defense, while vowing to keep Poland out of a direct war with Russia by opposing some of Kyiv’s initiatives, including North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) membership. More broadly, Nawrocki’s election demonstrates that Polish-Ukrainian relations have evolved significantly since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, and are marked by both close cooperation and periodic disputes. 

Inter-Governmental Relations

Nawrocki’s election is unlikely to result in any significant changes in Poland’s foreign and security policy. He is expected to continue President Andrzej Duda’s approach through a staunch commitment to NATO, the U.S. alliance, Ukraine’s self-defense, and opposition to Russian imperialism. Moreover, although the president is the commander-in-chief of Poland’s armed forces, the government led by Prime Minister Donald Tusk determines foreign and military policy. Additionally, Nawrocki cannot afford to steer the presidency in an anti-Ukrainian direction. Not only would this put him at odds with the Tusk administration, but also with the Law and Justice (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość, PiS) opposition party that sponsored his candidacy (Kyiv Post, June 3). Poland will continue to be the main conduit of assistance to Ukraine, and Warsaw prides itself on the military and humanitarian support it has provided since February 2022, with over 90 percent of Western aid passing through Poland (X/@prezydentpl, November 13, 2024). Nawrocki is also fully supportive of continuing to provide military equipment to Ukraine.

In response to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s congratulations on his election victory, Nawrocki asserted that Poland remains one of Ukraine’s strongest supporters in the fight against Russian aggression (Meza.net, June 3). He added that “no other nation understands this threat better than we do. I hope that we will continue to work together for the common good, both to resolve the turbulent past and to build a secure future” (Belsat.eu, June 4). Nonetheless, Nawrocki’s position on Ukraine sometimes appears contradictory, or at least his criticisms of Kyiv have been more public than those of other Polish officials. At times, he appears to view Ukraine as a buffer between Poland and Russia, rather than as a future member of both the European Union and NATO. On the other hand, he appears to understand that NATO enlargement protects its members if the United States remains supportive. Doubts about U.S. President Donald Trump’s commitments to Europe’s defense have contributed to Nawrocki’s skepticism about NATO enlargement and a fear that Poland would be left stranded to face Russia.

Nawrocki and Russia

Despite charges that Nawrocki’s elections will benefit Russia, he is well known for his strong anti-Moscow positions. As a former director of the Institute of National Remembrance – Commission for the Prosecution of Crimes against the Polish Nation (Instytut Pamięci Narodowej – Komisja Ścigania Zbrodni przeciwko Narodowi Polskiemu), he focused on documenting Soviet-era crimes against Poles. His support for removing Soviet monuments from public display led to him being declared persona non grata in Russia in 2022 and threatened with a five-year prison term if arrested (Wszystko co Najważniejsze, May 23). In February 2024, Russian law enforcement officials initiated criminal proceedings against several senior Polish officials, including Nawrocki (RT.com, June 3). The charges were related to the removal and destruction of several dozen Soviet war memorials in Poland that are widely viewed in the country as propaganda that distorts the reality of Soviet occupation and repression. In one of his election campaign interviews, Nawrocki called for severing all diplomatic ties with Russia, which he has described as a “barbaric state,” as well as for strengthening the NATO alliance (Euractiv, March 5).

Following Nawrocki’s election, the Russian media derided him as “radical nationalist” and “anti-Russian,” even though he had been critical of Ukraine during the election campaign (Fakt.pl, June 2). Rather than viewing Nawrocki as a partner similar to Hungary’s Prime Minister Viktor Orbán or Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico, Moscow has relished the notion that Nawrocki would help undermine the European Union from within due to his opposition to several EU initiatives, including immigration and federalization. Kremlin-directed media have been promoting a scenario in which the European Union could be fractured with the assistance of leaders such as Nawrocki (Wyborcza.pl, May 26). In reality, the Polish president has limited means to influence Warsaw’s EU policy and does not possess the executive powers of either Orbán or Fico. He will, however, be able to veto legislation that could prevent Poland from meeting EU criteria for unblocking funds in ongoing disputes over the rule of law. Nawrocki, much like PiS as a whole, emphasizes protecting Poland’s sovereignty and reducing what he sees as excessive influence from Brussels. He has also prioritized closer military and political relations with the United States. In essence, Nawrocki’s approach reflects a balancing act between his strong opposition to Russia and a cautious approach to Ukraine’s integration into Western alliances, driven by concerns about Poland’s own national interests. 

Lingering Disputes Between Warsaw and Kyiv

While Nawrocki supports Ukraine’s resistance to Russia’s invasion, he has occasionally been critical of Ukraine’s leadership and some of Kyiv’s policies. He may attempt to capitalize on several outstanding disputes with Kyiv to be perceived as a more staunch defender of Poland’s national interests than Tusk. He has opposed Ukraine’s NATO membership, citing concerns that it could pull the alliance into a direct war with Russia, and even signed a declaration stating he would not ratify Ukraine’s accession to NATO (Ukrainska Pravda, May 22). At the same time, Nawrocki said he admires Ukraine’s bravery against Russian imperialism, which he considers the greatest threat to Central-Eastern Europe. The day after the presidential elections, the Polish government reaffirmed its commitment to Ukraine’s NATO membership (Kyiv Post, June 3). During a summit of the Bucharest Nine (B9) and the Nordic-Baltic Eight (NB8) security groupings on June 2, Nordic, Baltic, and Central European NATO members pledged their commitment to Ukraine’s accession (Kyiv Post, June 3).

Regarding the European Union, Nawrocki has stated that Ukraine’s fast-tracked accession is not in the interest of most member states in the region (Nexta, June 7). He attributes his cautious stance to concerns about the impact of Ukrainian agricultural exports on the farming sector. Nawrocki has qualified his opposition by claiming that he opposes Ukraine’s EU accession “at this moment,” indicating that his position could change during his term in office (Notes from Poland, June 9). In many respects, Nawrocki has voiced the skepticism of several European governments against expanding both the European Union and NATO. Even though they publicly express support for Ukraine’s inclusion, they know the process of EU accession is a long-drawn out process in which a long list of criteria has to be met, while NATO entry is largely contingent on the agreement of the United States. 

Inter-governmental relations between Ukraine and Poland have not been trouble-free. Three factors, in particular, have undermined ties, regardless of ongoing military backing. These include agricultural disputes, unresolved grievances from World War II, and occasional verbal duels with Kyiv. The agricultural dispute between Warsaw and Kyiv, most notable in the summer of 2023, concerned the import of cheap Ukrainian grain that was widely perceived as undermining the livelihoods of Polish farmers, a key constituency of the then ruling PiS party on the eve of the October 2023 parliamentary elections (IPS Journal, March 1, 2014; see EDM, September 27, 2023, March 12, 2024). The dispute is likely to flare up again before the scheduled 2027 parliamentary elections, as agriculture will remain one of the major sticking points in any future negotiations over Ukraine’s EU entry, with the farmers lobby in several EU member states opposing what they view as unfair competition.

Nawrocki has also raised grievances over the commemoration of the slaughter of Polish civilians in Volhynia by Ukrainian nationalists during World War II. Kyiv has objected to Warsaw’s plans to establish July 11 as a “Day of Remembrance of Poles – victims of genocide committed by the OUN-UPA [Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists-Ukrainian Insurgent Army] in the Eastern Borderlands of the Second Polish Republic” (Notes from Poland, June 5). One of the main demands by Polish officials has been permission to exhume the bodies of victims. Nawrocki has stated that until issues such as exhumation are resolved, he does not see a future for Ukraine in the European Union or NATO. Zelenskyy’s government has attempted to prevent the dispute from escalating and, in January of this year, permitted the exhumations to resume in western Ukraine (Notes from Poland, April 27). Ukrainian officials have also sought an acknowledgment that Polish forces also committed reprisals against Ukrainian civilians during World War II in battles over the future of western Ukraine.

There have been periodic verbal confrontations between Polish and Ukrainian leaders, revolving around the notion that Zelenskyy does not appreciate all the help that Poland has provided to Ukraine. In one notable episode, during an election rally in September 2023, then-Polish Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki warned Zelenskyy to “never insult Poles again.” This statement followed a speech by Zelenskyy at the United Nations General Assembly, where he suggested that Poland was engaging in “political theater” regarding disputes over grain exports and playing into Russia’s hands (Eurasia Media Network, September 23, 2023). Morawiecki emphasized that defending Poland’s name was a crucial task of the government, and the Polish people would not tolerate being insulted (The Kyiv Independent, September 22, 2023). Such emotional outbursts over sensitive questions while Russia is attacking Ukraine are not conducive to the productive resolution of bilateral disputes. In contrast, Duda has attempted to assist Zelenskyy in restoring relations with Trump, following their confrontational encounter at the White House in February, by urging patience, calmness, and constructiveness in dealing with the U.S. President (Notes from Poland, February 21). 

The Public Mood

The public mood in Poland toward Ukrainians has undergone some changes since a majority of citizens welcomed the influx of over five million refugees after the Russian invasion in February 2022. The results of opinion polls often reflect and are tapped into by politicians in devising their policy stances. A detailed poll conducted in November and December 2024 by the Mieroszewski Center in Warsaw juxtaposes the latest data with results of a previous survey in February 2024, enabling analysts to explore current trends (Mieroszewski Center, December 2024). In general, opinions about Ukrainians are mixed. According to the survey results, 25 percent of respondents view Ukrainians positively, while 30 percent express a negative opinion, with neutral assessments prevailing at 41 percent. In focus groups, some respondents highlighted positive experiences of cooperation with Ukrainians and pointed out that “they are people like us, with their own difficulties.” Others perceived problems over integration, claiming that “many Ukrainians live in their closed communities and do not try to establish relations with Poles” (Mieroszewski Center, December 2024).

A growing proportion of Poles, at 51 percent, also believe that the scale of assistance provided to Ukrainian refugees was too large, while only 5 percent of respondents view it as insufficient. While many believed that continuing to help Ukraine was both a moral and strategic duty, others were concerned that much of the aid was being diverted from helping Polish families. According to the survey, support for Ukraine’s EU membership stood at 42 percent, once Ukraine meets all the necessary criteria. The level of support for Ukraine’s NATO membership was higher, although some respondents felt that the war needed to end before integration (Mieroszewski Center, December 2024). In a more recent survey conducted in June by the Institute of Market and Social Studies (Instytut Badań Rynkowych i Społecznych, IBRiS), only 35 percent of Poles believe their country should support Ukraine’s ambitions to join the European Union and 37 percent backed Ukraine’s NATO accession (Defense 24, June 24). These positions seem to mirror Nawrocki’s stance that Ukraine would be a competitor within the European Union and that Warsaw should not risk war with Russia through Ukraine’s NATO accession, as Poland would be obliged to honor the Article 5 provisions of mutual defense.

Regarding the Volhynian massacres, younger people generally expressed the view that the two countries should look toward the future and not allow disputes over history to block the building of good relations. Nonetheless, almost half of the respondents believe that historical topics need to be resolved, particularly the need to exhume the bodies of victims, as this would contribute to building trust and overcoming mutual prejudices and emotions related to the past. Migration also remains a key aspect in Polish-Ukrainian relations, with 56 percent of Poles expecting Ukrainians living in Poland to return to their country after the end of the war to reconstruct their country. At the same time, respondents also highlight the positive aspects of integration, as many Ukrainians have successfully assimilated and enriched Polish society in both cultural and economic terms (Mieroszewski Center, December 2024). It is worth noting that most Ukrainians have either transited through Poland or returned home, and as of May of this year, less than a million remained in Poland (Statista, June 26).

Ukrainian views about Poland have also evolved since the start of the full-scale war. The most accurate and reflective polls are not conducted immediately following a major event, such as the blockage of borders by Polish farmers in protest against Ukrainian exports, but rather over a longer time frame when emotions have subsided.

The overwhelming majority of the public has been grateful for the assistance Warsaw has provided, including military and humanitarian supplies, as well as hosting millions of Ukrainian refugees. There have also been periods of disappointment and even a sense of betrayal during the grain dispute and over other unresolved bilateral questions, however, with Ukrainians feeling that at a time of war, close neighbors should not be placing any additional pressures on the country. Ukrainians also point out that refugees have made significant contributions to the Polish economy despite mistaken views that they are draining the state budget. According to a recent study by the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR), in 2024, Ukrainians generated 2.7 percent of Poland’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (UNHCR Europe, June 10). 

Nawrocki’s election has also raised concerns in Kyiv that his opposition to Ukraine’s NATO membership may signal a shift in Poland’s foreign policy that could prove detrimental to Ukraine’s security (Author’s discussions in Kyiv, July 3–5). Nawrocki’s reassurances after the elections that Poland would continue to support Ukraine’s defense against Russia have therefore been welcomed. Despite the ups and downs in inter-state relations, a major poll released at the end of 2024 found that 48 percent of Ukrainians want a union or confederation between Ukraine and Poland (Poland and Poles in the Eyes of Ukrainians, December 2024). While proclamations about full-scale reconciliation between the two nations were premature after Russia’s large-scale attack on Ukraine, fears about a breakdown of relations are also grossly exaggerated.