PRC Gray Zone Activities Against Taiwan: Civilian Drone Incursions

Executive Summary:

• Civilian drones launched from the People’s Republic of China (PRC) have repeatedly violated the Republic of China’s (ROC) airspace over the outlying islands of Kinmen and Matsu, which serves as part of a gray zone campaign to discredit the self-governing democracy’s ability and undermine its determination to defend itself.
• Incursions were effectively discontinued following the downing of one drone, indicating that credible deterrence is crucial to countering PRC operations in the gray zone.
• The PRC’s repeated efforts to curb civilian drone operations following the shootdown not only suggest civilian involvement, but also reveal the authorities’ aversion toward unintended escalation.

The People’s Republic of China (PRC) recently conducted a round of large-scale military training drills near Taiwan following Republic of China (ROC) President Lai Ching-te’s (賴清德) transit through Hawaii and Guam. The unannounced drills constituted yet another indicator of the PRC’s persistent military pressure as well as its growing assertiveness in and around the Taiwan Strait (Office of the President of the ROC, December 5; MND, December 9). Such activities use coercive or subversive actions that are outside the norms of peaceful interstate diplomacy, economic activity, and people-to-people contact, but that fall short of armed conflict (DNI, July 2024).

Civilian drone incursions into the airspace over the ROC’s outlying islands, which primarily took place during and following the 2022 People’s Liberation Army (PLA) exercises around Taiwan, have received little attention from analysts. A closer examination of this gray zone activity, which cannot be attributed with certainty to the PLA, suggests that seemingly innocuous civilian drone activities are more than mere irritants. Like other coercive tactics seen across the Taiwan Strait, regular, unobstructed drone overflights over the ROC’s airspace discredits the island’s ability and determination to defend itself. This plays into the PRC’s broader ambition of achieving unification with Taiwan without resorting to kinetic conflict. However, this case study also demonstrates the importance of credible deterrence in countering PRC operations in the gray zone.

Incursions Initially Exploited Taiwan’s Desire to Avoid Conflict

The first instance of a drone incursion took place on July 28, 2022, just days before then-Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan, when a flying object appeared twice over a key military outpost in the Matsu islands, an archipelago administered by Taiwan near the coast of the PRC’s southeastern Fujian province. The ROC’s Ministry of National Defense (MND) identified the object as a drone and suspected that the event might be an act of reconnaissance and a test of the military’s response (MND, July 28, 2022). Shortly afterwards, during the PLA’s exercises around Taiwan, small-sized, commercial-grade drones began penetrating the airspace over Kinmen and Matsu, the ROC’s front-line islands near the coast of mainland China. Incursions persisted throughout August 2022, with drones deliberately breaching the ROC’s airspace and hovering near various isles in the region. In response, the MND authorized the use of stronger countermeasures, which ultimately resulted in the downing of one civilian drone on September 1 that year, effectively ending the gray zone activity. Sporadic instances of drone harassment resurfaced in 2024, yet none have been definitively attributed to the PLA.

The series of drone incursions conducted by PRC actors is a textbook example of gray zone operation. Like all activities in the gray zone, flying civilian drones over restricted airspace remains below the threshold that would justify a military response and does not threaten the core interests of the defender (RAND, June 27, 2019). This allows the PRC to eschew an outright conflict, minimizing the risk of penalties or retaliation while incrementally advancing its aim of unification through coercion. Initially, Taiwan’s military adhered to standard procedures by firing warning flares (MND, August 4, 2022). However, this response proved impotent, as incursions intensified and drones returned in greater numbers, emboldened by the lack of meaningful repercussions. Taiwan’s restrained response, rooted in its defense principle of “seeking neither escalation nor conflict (備戰不求戰),” was both a rational strategy and a vulnerability that the gray zone operation quickly exploited (MND, August 24, 2022).

Table 1: Drone Sorties Over the ROC’s Airspace, 2022–2024

(Source: Press releases from the ROC’s Ministry of National Defense)

The PRC rationalized the incursions with legal and political justifications to repudiate the ROC’s claims of sovereignty. When asked to comment on the presence of civilian drones over Kinmen, the PRC’s Foreign Ministry spokesperson responded: “Chinese drones flying over China’s territory, that is not something worth being surprised at (中国的无人机在中国的领土上飞一飞，这不是什么值得大惊小怪的事)” (MFA, August 29, 2022). Similarly, an article on the state-run tabloid the Global Times argued that it was “legal for Chinese people to fly drones in the country’s territory as long as it meets the requirements set by the Chinese authorities.” The flyovers did not violate any international laws, the article asserted, while the flight restrictions in Kinmen were invalid because “Taiwan is a part of China and the Taiwan authorities have no legislative rights” (Global Times, August 30, 2022). Through the utilization of legal warfare, coupled with a sustained physical presence established by the gray zone operations (albeit temporarily), the PRC could significantly undermine the ROC’s claim to a separate airspace over Kinmen and Matsu while substantiating its one-China principle that the islands, and by extension, Taiwan, are all part of China – in a way similar to the erasure of the median line in the Taiwan Strait.

The drone incursions were also aimed at inducing pessimism and divisions among the people of Taiwan at a time of heightened tensions and great uncertainty. The ROC military’s inability to effectively detect and counter the small-sized commercial drones, compounded by its unwillingness to challenge and confront those provocations, likely invited  more audacious behaviors by PRC actors. After the second encounter on August 3, 2022, the ROC’s Kinmen Defense Command assured the public that it could “fully grasp the surrounding dynamics (全般掌握周邊動態)” and was “capable of responding to emergencies immediately (有能力即時應處)” (MND, August 4, 2022). Yet, the statement failed to inspire public confidence when a video went viral on Chinese social media. In footage taken by a civilian drone on August 16, uniformed ROC soldiers were seen hurling rocks at the aircraft as the latter casually hovered over a military installation in broad daylight. Viewed around 240 million times on Weibo, the footage prompted widespread ridicule in mainland China, with netizens deriding the ROC military as timid and inept (DW, August 25, 2022). “This is the feeling of looking at a primitive tribe of indigenous people,” mocked one top comment on the video. “They didn’t even dare to shoot,” wrote another (Business Insider, August 25, 2022). Across the strait, the incident cast serious doubt on the military’s capabilities. Some deemed it an utter humiliation, while lawmakers fumed over what many charged as incompetence (FTV News, August 29, 2022).

Amid public outcry, the Kinmen Defense Command vindicated itself in a press release on August 24, claiming that its troops strictly adhered to the principle of avoiding escalation. The incursion of PRC drones was part of an orchestrated disinformation campaign to divide and discredit the ROC armed forces, the Command explained, and that the people of Taiwan should not fall victim to such “cognitive warfare (認知作戰)” (MND, August 24, 2022). Later, at around midnight the same day, the Ministry of National Defense released a separate statement clarifying the procedures for handling civilian drone intrusions. In addition, it announced that the military would acquire drone defense systems in 2023 and would prioritize their deployment on the outlying islands to tackle the gray zone challenge (MND, August 24, 2022). A few days later on August 30, Taiwan’s then-president Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文) personally inspected the troops stationed on Penghu islands, an archipelago west of Taiwan, in an apparent effort to restore public confidence in the military and boost morale. Tsai gave a speech in which she emphasized the emerging threat of civilian drone incursions, pointing out that the PRC had been utilizing a range of gray zone tactics alongside cognitive warfare as a means of coercion. “I have already ordered the Ministry of National Defense to take necessary and strong countermeasures as appropriate to safeguard the security of our country’s airspace (我已經下令國防部，適時採取必要而且強力的反制措施，捍衛國家領空的安全),” she reassured her audience (Office of the President, August 30, 2022). On that day, troops in Kinmen began firing live munitions at the drones (MND, August 30, 2022).

Definitive Attribution Remains Elusive

Unlike some of the more conspicuous forms of gray zone operations seen in the Taiwan Strait, the incursions of civilian drones blur attribution and grant plausible deniability. PRC state media and commentators brushed off the accusations holding the PLA responsible, instead claiming the incursions were “normal civilian legal activities” (Global Times, August 30). In another article, the Global Times also touted the idea that the August 16 incursion was likely an unintended consequence of “a blogger on the mainland livestreaming the flight of his or her private craft” (Global Times, August 25, 2022). This explanation might be true. Reviewing all the documented incursions, August 16th stands out as an anomaly: it was the first intrusion after the PLA’s exercises had concluded and occurred following a brief hiatus. It also deviated from the previous patterns by being the first intrusion during daytime, and was the first time an ROC military outpost was filmed, with the footage disclosed to the public.

Incursions that took place on September 2 and September 12 were equally unusual, suggesting they may have been carried out by civilians. In the former instance, troops in Kinmen found a plastic bag of food near a beach, and suspected it was dropped by the drone which entered the restricted airspace earlier that day (MND, September 2, 2022). A Weibo user soon claimed responsibility, admitting that it was a deliberate act of protest (China Times, September 2, 2022). He also posted a video showcasing the entire intrusion process (Youtube, September 3, 2022). The day after the airdrop incident and two days after a drone was shot down, a decree to ban the operation of civilian drones for ten days was issued in the city of Xiamen, a PRC city across the Taiwan Strait from where the drones were believed to have been launched. Officially, the temporary ban was intended to ensure public safety during an annual trade fair which would soon take place in the city (Xiamen TV, September 3, 2022). Nevertheless, on September 12, a defiant drone flew over Kinmen despite the ban. It is uncertain if the PLA was involved in that particular flight given its preference for retaining plausible deniability.

Subsequent incursions in 2024 have been identified by the MND to be carried out by civilians in the PRC. A prominent case that occurred during the PLA’s Joint Sword-2024A exercises around Taiwan in May involved a private company dropping allegedly crudely made propaganda leaflets in an apparent attempt to garner attention online (MND, May 26; June 8). The occurrence of those individual instances, however, only further complicates the issue of attribution. It is unknown if civilians were inspired by the preceding PLA gray zone operations or vice versa, nor can it be definitively determined whether the PLA is responsible for any of the drone activities.

Taiwan’s Escalated Response Proved Effective

In the end, an effective response led to a swift reversion to the status quo ante. On August 30, 2022, when the ROC military began firing live munitions at the drones, the famed PRC commentator and former editor-in-chief of the Global Times Hu Xijin (胡锡进) decried it as “an egregious act (性质恶劣)” and claimed Taiwan’s military would “pay the price (为此付出代价)” if it dared shooting down any of the drones (China.com, August 31, 2022). However, no retaliation followed the downing of a drone the next day. Instead, incursions essentially came to a halt. Hu jettisoned his hardline posture overnight, instead urging Taiwan to “exercise restraint (应当克制),” claiming that none of the drones belonged to the PLA (Radio Free Asia, September 1, 2022). The spokesperson for the PRC’s Taiwan Affairs Office meanwhile dodged the question when asked about these developments, instead accusing Taiwan of “hyping up tensions (制造紧张气氛，升高两岸对立对抗)” (Office of Taiwan Affairs, September 14, 2022). Furthermore, following Xiamen’s ten-day drone ban, the city announced an additional mandate which permanently tightened government control on both civilian acquisition and operation of drones, citing public security reasons (Siming.gov, September 21, 2022).

Conclusion

Civilian drone incursions are just one of many dimensions of the gray zone challenge posed by the PRC in the Taiwan Strait. This specific episode, based on open-source information, showcases Beijing’s efforts to incrementally coerce and weaken Taipei by using a variety of instruments at its disposal to achieve its political ends. There are two implications. First, activities in the gray zone will only be emboldened when there is an absence of credible deterrence and clear red lines. The end of systematic drone activities over the ROC’s outlying islands indicates that the gray zone operation has been suspended when faced with a compelling response, in the form of shooting down intruding drones that violate its airspace. Second, the PRC’s repeated efforts to curb civilian drone operations following the shootdown not only provides a compelling suggestion of civilian involvement, but more importantly, they also reveal PRC authorities’ aversion toward unintended escalations.