Putin Attempts to Shift Nuclear Brinkmanship

Executive Summary:

• Russian President Vladimir Putin is shifting from overt nuclear brinkmanship to using Russia’s nuclear energy program as a “peaceful” tool of influence, especially through technology transfers to developing countries.
• Putin’s proposal to extend some terms of the U.S.–Russia New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) projects restraint but lacks real arms control measures. This move is intended to make the Russian posture toward the West more ambiguous against the background of their ongoing war against Ukraine and gray zone tactics in Europe.
• The Kremlin’s softened nuclear rhetoric, paired with recent incursions into European airspace, seeks to split opinion and undermine U.S. and European responses to Russian aggression.

Instead of following the series of aerial Russian provocations in the Baltic Sea region with nuclear brinksmanship, Russian President Vladimir Putin has taken a more subtle tack. At the so-called Global Atomic Forum in Moscow, Putin praised Russia’s nuclear power program and offered to share relevant technologies with “the states of the Global South and East” (President of Russia; Izvestiya, September 25). Only the leaders of Ethiopia and Myanmar were present to applaud this speech, but Rafael Mariano Grossi, Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), who appears to find it important to cultivate connections with Putin, confirmed Russia’s leadership in promoting the peaceful use of nuclear energy (RBC, September 26). Putin’s tone was notably different from the address to nuclear scientists at the Sarov federal research center last month, where he held a closed meeting on the Burevestnik nuclear-propelled drone, emphasizing the role of science in strengthening Russia’s strategic deterrence (President of Russia; Vedomosti, August 22; The Moscow Times, August 23).

The key element of Putin’s “peaceful” nuclear campaign is his offer to continue observing the limitations on the size of nuclear arsenals set by the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), which is due to expire on February 5, 2026, for an additional year (Rossiiskaya Gazeta, September 22). Putin announced the initiative on September 22 at a special meeting of the Russian Security Council (President of Russia, September 22). State-affiliated media instantly trumpeted this announcement as a major breakthrough, so the Kremlin was disappointed by Washington’s slow response (RIAC, September 24; RIA Novosti, September 26). Russian experts have illuminated the risks of dismantling the basic structure of the arms control system, but the Kremlin’s offer would not actually resume data exchange or any other confidence-building measures (Nezavisimaya Gazeta, June 29). Putin’s approach may not fully account for the history of New START, which U.S. President Barack Obama signed in Prague in April 2010 and U.S. President Joe Biden extended in the first weeks of his presidency (Kommersant, September 22).

The Kremlin’s reduced use of the strategic triad, a three-pronged nuclear weapons delivery system, in military exercises underpins Putin’s softened nuclear rhetoric. The Kremlin reduced the scale of Zapad-2025 exercises, which did not feature new tests or deployment of the nuclear-capable Oreshnik intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM), which Russia used against Ukraine in November 2024 (see EDM, November 21, 2024; Novaya Gazeta Europe, September 12; RBC, September 16). Russian nuclear-capable Tu-160 and Tu-22M3 long-range bombers performed two short patrols over the Barents Sea, but did not attempt to make an impression comparable with the flight of a B-2 bomber over the red carpet laid for Putin at the start of the Alaska summit with U.S. President Donald Trump on August 15 (Lenta.ru, August 17; Interfax, September 16). The Knyaz Pozharsky, a Borei-class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine that Putin launched in June, joined the Northern Fleet without the previously mandatory test launch of its Bulava intercontinental ballistic missile (Interfax, August 2). Germany is concerned about the Kremlin’s space activities as Russian Luch-Olymp reconnaissance satellites are closely following two Intelsat satellites, but no hostile approaches to U.S. satellites have been reported (Kommersant, September 26).

Russia’s relative respect for U.S. satellites is meant to aid the rehabilitation of personal rapport between Trump and Putin following Putin’s rejection of the U.S. peace deal at the Alaska summit (Nezavisimaya Gazeta, September 25). The decision of Putin’s ally, Belarusian President Alyaksandr Lukashenka, to release some political prisoners—even while repressions against others are expanded—is also supposed to help mend the Trump–Putin relationship (Carnegie Politika, September 12; Novaya Gazeta Europe, September 14). Lukashenka made himself a star presenter at the Atomic Forum in Moscow, and his key topic was impeccably peaceful—the agreement to construct a second nuclear power plant in Belarus (Kommersant, September 25). When questioned by journalists about the deployment of the Oreshnik missile system, however, he confirmed that it was “on the way” to Belarus (Radio Svoboda, September 26).

President of Türkiye Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was not present at the Moscow forum despite placing great importance on Rosatom’s construction of the Akkuyu nuclear power plant, instead opting to travel to the United States for a long-desired meeting with Trump (Kommersant, September 26). The Russia–Türkiye strategic partnership has notably slackened as Ankara shows full support for North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) actions aimed at countering Moscow’s provocations, and Trump prompts Erdoğan to sanction the Kremlin (Izvestiya, September 26). Russia has made no attempt to escalate hostilities in the Black Sea even after the recent Ukrainian drone attack on Novorossiysk, however, because nuclear energy cooperation is Putin’s best instrument for countering U.S. influence on Erdoğan and because the Kremlin counts on profits from Türkiye importing Russian oil and gas (Meduza, September 24).

The Kremlin is using the combination of its air incursions in the Baltic region and Putin’s nuclear “pacifism” rhetoric, including his proposition for extending New START, to confuse and aggravate divisions between the United States and Europe (Top War, September 25). Moscow cannot quite figure out the meaning of the shifts in Trump’s positions on its war against Ukraine, but tends to interpret uncertainty as an opportunity (Nezavisimaya Gazeta, September 25). Russian pro-regime expert commentary on U.S. policy making remains respectful and deferential, while the Kremlin’s media ridicules and vilifies the European political elite (RIAC, September 22). Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov’s speech to the United Nations General Assembly directed warnings about the severe consequences of intercepting Russian aircraft primarily at the Europeans while expressing readiness for a “honest dialogue” with the Trump administration, and taking no immediate issue with Trump’s description of Russia as a “paper tiger” (Vedomosti, September 27; Forbes.ru, September 28).

Putin’s track record of nuclear brinksmanship is so long and rich that his attempt to show self-restraint and advance cooperative ideas is, at best, unconvincing, likely motivated by the assumption that Washington’s strategic memory is short. His insistence on staying the course in Ukraine is undercut by Russia’s failure to win significant territory and by the failure of massive missile and drone attacks to terrorize Ukraine. Nuclear weapons may be Putin’s only means of rapidly altering the course of an attritional war. The Western coalition may soon have to gather again political courage and military means to deter his new attempts at blackmail and intimidation.