Putin Pivots Kremlin’s Stance Following Rosatom’s Requests on Cooperation with the United States and Ukraine

Executive Summary:

• Russian President Vladimir Putin has seemingly reversed the Kremlin’s position toward cooperation with the United States and Ukraine at the Russian-occupied Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant (NPP) on September 2 on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit.
• The Kremlin, until now, has been claiming that cooperation is not possible and the status of the plant is non-negotiable. Russian state nuclear corporation Rosatom, in the meantime, has been requesting cooperation with the United States since at least 2023 and has been waiting for Moscow to make the “political decision.”
• While Putin’s new alignment with Rosatom may be a tactical move to strengthen Moscow’s position ahead of any potential talks or negotiations, Rosatom may have been influential in changing Putin’s mind, a possible indication of new influence on Russian nuclear foreign policy. 

In a reversal of previous Kremlin rhetoric, Russian President Vladimir Putin suggested on September 2 the possibility of working together with the United States and Ukraine at the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) in Ukraine. While visiting the People’s Republic of China (PRC) for its Victory Day Parade on September 3 and for the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit on August 31–September 1, Putin said at a meeting with Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico:

We can cooperate with American partners at the Zaporizhzhia NPP … We have also indirectly discussed these issues with them in principle. The same … applies to the Ukrainian side. And if favorable circumstances arise, we discussed this with our American colleagues, the three of us could even work at the Zaporizhzhia NPP (President of Russia, September 2).

This is the first time the Kremlin has suggested any degree of cooperation at Zaporizhzhia NPP, which Russian forces have occupied since March 2022 (see EDM, June 1, 2023, May 2, July 11; Interfax Ukraine, February 4). Details remain uncertain as to what exactly Putin meant by cooperation, working together, and favorable circumstances. The English version of the Kremlin’s website refers to this possibility as working at Zaporizhzhia NPP as “a group of three,” suggesting an unusual level of collaboration (President of Russia, September 2). Putin discussing this with Fico was an interesting choice, as Slovakia is both a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and European Union member state, as well as an operator of two NPPs, both with Russian/Soviet-designed reactors. The country has been attempting to diversify away from Rosatom since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine (The Slovak Spectator, October 16, 2023; World Nuclear News, July 28, August 6). Fico prompted the discussion, saying that he wanted to see Russia and the United States cooperate on further nuclear energy development in Slovakia, which Putin said he would consider (President of Russia, September 2). It was Putin, however, who extended the discussion to include U.S.-Russian cooperation in Ukraine as well, and it is uncertain whether Fico anticipated this. 

The Kremlin is unlikely to provide the reason for this change to avoid any perceptions of inconsistency or internal divisions. There is, however, evidence to suggest that the Russian state nuclear corporation, Rosatom, has played a role in shifting Moscow’s position in recent months. 

Rosatom has been requesting to engage with the United States on nuclear issues at Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhia NPP and at Russia’s Kursk NPP vis-à-vis mediation by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). In recent months, Rosatom General Director Alexei Likhachev has claimed that the corporation is ready to engage in discussions with the United States over U.S. nuclear fuel and intellectual property rights for U.S. nuclear technology located at Zaporizhzhia NPP, which is a necessary problem for Moscow to solve before it can achieve its goal of restarting the plant (President of Russia, March 6, 2024; The Kyiv Independent, April 13, 2024, TASS, June 9). IAEA has responded that it is “ready to play a role in trying to facilitate” these discussions, and IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi has accepted an invitation to the World Atomic Week in Moscow later this September (Rosatom, June 6; Kommersant, July 30; World Atomic Week, accessed August 7).

Rosatom, however, has said it is waiting for Moscow to make the “political decision” (Kommersant, April 30; TASS, June 6). The corporation has claimed that it “informed the Russian Foreign Ministry of our readiness to discuss with the American side issues of interest to them … on cooperation in the field of the peaceful use of nuclear energy” (TASS, April 20, 2023). This was in response to a 2023 U.S. Department of Energy letter outlining the illegality of Russian citizens and entities operating U.S.-origin nuclear technical data that was export-controlled to Ukraine and Zaporizhzhia NPP (RBC-Ukraine, April 14, 2023; CNN, April 18, 2023). Likhachev has expressed “hope” that Rosatom and IAEA would find a solution by cooperating “directly with the fuel manufacturer,” Westinghouse (TASS, June 6). 

Until now, the Kremlin had not commented on Rosatom’s statements and has instead insisted that the status of the plant is non-negotiable. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said earlier this year to a U.S. audience that any change at the plant is not conceivable and implied that it was not “being mentioned during negotiations” (CBS News, April 27). In March, the Russian Foreign Ministry issued a statement that “the transfer of [Zaporizhzhia NPP] itself or control over it to Ukraine or any other country is impossible” and that “joint operation … with any state is also unacceptable” (Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, March 25).

The only public acknowledgement thus far of this issue by anyone connected with the Kremlin has been from Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabkov. On June 10, Ryabkov said in an interview with Russian media said that “the long period during which attempts were made at this facility to ‘replace’ Russian-made fuel assemblies with American ones have caused a series of questions, including legal ones, to arise, such as what is to be done with the fresh American-made fuel located at this facility” (Interfax, June 10). Ryabkov argued that developing a solution to this issue is not possible “without dialogue with the Americans” (Interfax, June 10). A secondary question to this dialogue, according to Ryabkov, is whether or not a U.S. presence on the site is necessary from “a practical point of view” (Interfax, June 10).

The sudden change in Moscow’s stance, if it holds beyond Putin’s brief remarks at the SCO, suggests that Rosatom holds some degree of influence on Kremlin leadership. At this point in time, Rosatom’s influence could apply specifically to the case of Russia’s occupation of the Zaporizhzhia NPP. The extent to which Rosatom may also exert influence on Russia’s aggressive or friendly nuclear engagement abroad is also a factor.

Some examples of these were clear on the sidelines of the SCO summit when Rosatom announced new areas of cooperation with India, Türkiye, and the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Likhachev, who was part of Putin’s delegation to the SCO, announced ongoing discussions with India and Türkiye to construct new NPPs, including a possible floating NPP in India (TASS; RIA Novosti, September 1). With the PRC, Russia signed twenty-two cooperation agreements, including one dedicated to joint development of strategic nuclear energy (President of Russia, September 2). Such agreements are largely expected as Moscow counteracts sanctions by deepening relations with what it calls the Global South and East (President of Russia, September 1). The 2023 Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation includes a specific section on India and the PRC as “friendly sovereign global centers of power and development” (Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, March 31, 2023). 

Rosatom’s involvement in achieving these foreign policy goals is nothing new (Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, July 21). As stated by Likhachev when speaking about the latest SCO summit, Rosatom “exports technological sovereignty,” not simply nuclear energy capabilities (Ren.tv, September 1). As one of the Kremlin’s most strategically vital state-owned enterprises, Rosatom plays a central role in Russian domestic energy production as well as in shaping foreign policy and geopolitical leverage. It was established in 2007 by federal law as a non-profit state corporation authorized to manage Russia’s nuclear industry on behalf of the government (Federal Law of the Russian Federation, December 1, 2007). Rosatom’s key personnel are closely tied to the Kremlin, with members of the supervisory board appointed by Putin (President of Russia, January 23, 2017, February 1, 2021, January 25, 2023). The corporation’s international activities are directly connected to Moscow’s foreign policy goals, according to its official website, which are intended to create the same “favorable” (благоприятный, blagopriyatnyi) conditions that Putin referred to in his statement on September 2, which include: 

Favorable international legal and political conditions for the promotion of Russian nuclear technologies …, strengthening nuclear safety and non-proliferation regimes, and actively working in international organizations and forums (Rosatom, accessed August 5). 

Intergovernmental agreements and research projects on behalf of Russia are a regular part of Rosatom’s international activities. In this respect, Rosatom is authorized by the Russian government to “fulfill our country’s international obligations in the field of peaceful use of atomic energy, as well as compliance with the nuclear non-proliferation regime” (Rosatom, accessed August 5). This is increasingly important for the Kremlin, given the need to balance against the strategic value of hydrocarbons exports and their weaponization, which have been comparatively decreasing since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine (Jirušek, Vlček, Henderson, 2024).[1] 

Rosatom has completed at least eight international nuclear reactor construction projects since 2016 (Rosatom, March 2024). At present, the corporation claims to have thirty-nine reactor construction orders from international customers (Rosatom, August 25, accessed August 27). At least twenty of these are independently confirmed as currently under construction (World Nuclear Association, June 19). An overview of selected Rosatom construction projects is provided in Table 1.

Putin’s new alignment with Rosatom’s position on the Zaporizhzhia NPP suggests that the corporation may be testing the limits of its agency on Russian foreign policy. This would be particularly significant if Rosatom has been successful in convincing Moscow that there is more to gain than to lose by cooperating with actors it does not want to cooperate with. Likhachev placed himself in the line of fire by blatantly contradicting the Kremlin’s position over cooperation at Zaporizhzhia NPP. This was a bold move given the Kremlin’s willingness to remove certain officials from their positions when they no longer align with Moscow (The Moscow Times, July 7; see EDM, July 23). Still, Likhachev has known Putin longer than most, and this may play a role in Likhachev’s ability to push the boundaries of Rosatom’s leash (TASS, September 24, 2020).

Whether Putin truly supports a “group of three” situation at the Zaporizhzhia NPP remains uncertain. Moscow’s reversal to align with Rosatom may reflect a strategic effort to position Russia advantageously ahead of any potential negotiations for a genuine ceasefire or just and lasting peace talks. Until Putin’s statement, Rosatom’s contradictory position toward Zaporizhzhia NPP signaled a potential rupture with the Kremlin. Now that the Kremlin has aligned with its nuclear corporation, or at least Putin has suggested that this is the case, Rosatom could take on a more assertive role in shaping the direction of Russian nuclear foreign policy.

Table 1: Rosatom International Reactor Construction Projects 

[1] Although it is beyond the scope of this article, it is important to discuss that sanctioning Rosatom is difficult and that the majority of sanctions are directed toward individuals rather than the corporation. In June, Washington authorized certain sanctions exemptions for civil nuclear projects that had been initiated prior to November 21, 2024, including the new reactors for Hungary’s Paks NPP (U.S. Department of State, January 10; Department of the Treasury, June 27). This is impactful for Hungary, a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), whose government considers nuclear energy as essential for the country’s energy security and, thereby, sovereignty (Hungary Today, February 28).