Romania Avoids Far-Right Pivot as Pro-Europeans Win Presidential Ballot

Executive Summary:

• Pro-EU candidate Nicușor Dan secured Romania’s presidency in the election’s second round on May 18, defeating far-right leader George Simion amid fears Simion would shift Romania’s foreign policy and weaken ties with Ukraine and the European Union.
• The election highlighted Romania’s democratic resilience despite intense polarization, online disinformation campaigns, and attempted foreign interference, including suspected Russian information operations aimed at undermining trust in the electoral process and Dan’s legitimacy.
• The ballot revealed changing demographic and political trends, with Dan’s support coming from urban centers, minorities, and Moldovan voters, while Simion gained ground in rural areas and among the Western European diaspora.

Independent candidate and Bucharest Mayor Nicusor Dan won the second round of Romania’s presidential elections with 53.6 percent of the votes on May 18 (Biroul Electoral Central, May 19). He defeated George Simion, leader of the nativist and sovereigntist party Alliance for the Unification of Romanians (AUR), who many feared would change Romania’s geopolitical orientation, withdraw support for Ukraine, and strengthen the ranks of European far-right politicians (see EDM, May 13). After initially conceding defeat, Simion unsuccessfully challenged the vote results before the Constitutional Court. On May 22, the justices unanimously validated Dan’s mandate (Hotnews.ro, May 22). The elections had a turnout of 64.72 percent, the highest turnout in the past decade.

Dan’s victory comes amid a deeply polarized race and allegations of foreign information manipulation and interference in the campaigns, including coordinated inauthentic behavior, such as manipulative communication that uses fake or inauthentic accounts for a strategic aim. Evidence surfaced during the November 2024 presidential contest, annulled by the Constitutional Court for campaign violations (see EDM, May 13). It also highlighted, however, the resilience of the Romanian citizenry and the unifying potential that democratic values and membership in the European Union community hold. 

The atmosphere during the election was tense. Local observer groups noted high polarization and deliberate attempts from the Simion campaign to question the credibility of the vote and possibly intimidate or put pressure on poll workers (Votcorect.ro, May 19). The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe-Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (OSCE-ODIHR) election observation report also noted deficiencies in regulating and monitoring online campaigning, with major instances of inauthentic behavior and distorted information, which limited voters’ ability to find accurate information and make informed decisions (OSCE, May 19; Context.ro, May 20). The Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Internal Affairs revealed information about attacks bearing the signs of Russian disinformation campaigns (Hotnews.ro, May 22). Reactions from Russian officials and influential figures to the election indicate an effort to discredit the electoral process, claiming foreign interference (Spotmedia.ro, May 22). Simion’s critics argue that he initially conceded, but later decided to challenge the results, following a visit to Vienna after the runoff (Euronews.ro, May 22). Major allegations against him include obscure links to pro-Russian actors, such as through the former AUR candidate Călin Georgescu, on whom Simion relied heavily to increase his popularity. Georgescu’s presidential campaign had financial ties with Russia, as investigative journalists revealed (Snoop.ro, December 5, 2024). This exposes deeper weaknesses in the campaign finance regulatory and enforcement setup, particularly the EU-wide inability to properly track online activity and hold internet platforms accountable. Additionally, it further reinforced Romanians’ perception that institutions have effectively failed to protect the country from foreign information operations.

Perceived vulnerability to Russian interference partly motivated the anti-Simion vote. The high turnout and overwhelming pro-Dan majority among Romanian voters in Moldova is a strong indication (Agerpres, May 19). Simion is persona non grata in Moldova for his pro-unionist actions, which align with the Kremlin’s agenda in the country (Presshub.ro, March 14). The elections were high stakes not only for Moldova but also for Ukraine. Simion has been declared an undesirable person by Kyiv for his destabilizing efforts to stir tension between the Romanian minority and the Ukrainian state (Euractiv, November 18, 2024). His victory would have made diplomatic relations between Romania and its two neighbors very awkward and support for the two countries, either bilateral or through the European Union, more cumbersome. 

Romanians’ anti-Russian sentiment and support for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union have been taken for granted by domestic politicians and international partners. Surveys consistently showed low approval for Russia and high adherence to NATO and the European Union, with the most recent figures from January (Inscop Research, accessed May 22). Public attitudes may have blunted authorities and experts’ ability to accurately assess how far information manipulation campaigns are shaping Romanians’ political preferences in ways that are not overtly pro-Russian but that mirror the classical Russian disinformation narratives.

The factors that contributed to Dan’s victory underscore the need for a discourse and policy change in Romania to ensure that inclusive, democratic values carry forward beyond this election cycle. Turnout among youth voters remains the lowest among all age groups. The urban-rural divide remains strong, as Dan won in most big cities, while Simion carried the vote in rural areas and also in many regions that traditionally would lean toward the Social Democratic Party (PSD) (Prezenta.roaep.ro, accessed May 23). This overlap raises questions about the type of mobilizing discourse that even mainstream political parties have used, laced with nationalist and anti-Western tropes. The votes of ethnic minorities are often overlooked, but the strong turnout and support for Dan and his pro-EU agenda are notable. Participation among Roma voters increased exponentially during the second round from 24,460 to 131,862 votes for Dan in communities with significant Roma populations (Hotnews.ro, May 20). Similarly, in regions where the majority population is Hungarian, he carried overwhelming majorities, as well as among Romanians in Hungary (G4media.ro, May 22). This is an indicator of the peril that the nativist, far-right discourse presents to historic minorities in Romania. It also highlights the limitations of the ideological alignment between Simion and Hungary’s Prime Minister, Viktor Orbán. The support Simion sought among far-right European leaders may not have yielded the expected results, at least inside the country. 

The far-right agenda won among the Romanian diaspora in most Western European countries, sharply contrasting with the rest of the world and reversing established trends. The Romanian diaspora had consistently voted for center-right candidates until 2024 (Deutsche Welle, May 20). Sociologists are beginning to grapple with the factors that have led to the emergence of this nationalist constituency in Europe, examining issues of social exclusion and cultural alienation (RFI Romania, May 5). Exposure to divisive, anti-democratic, and nativist narratives and efforts that have marred EU politics in recent years, and which are not unique to Romania, likely plays a large role in this shift. 

For now, Romania dodged a far-right bullet. The vote results demonstrated democratic resilience amid ineffective institutional responses, widespread perceptions of corruption, and widespread general disappointment with political leadership. This gives President-elect Dan a strong mandate with undisputed legitimacy but also a tremendous task to start rebuilding trust in institutions as far as and even beyond his presidential attributions will allow him. The far-right parties have a strong presence in parliament, however, and the president will need a stable democratic coalition to implement his agenda. Additionally, Dan’s victory does not mean that the malign external forces in Romania will cease to exert influence overnight. Especially after the November 2024 annulled vote debacle, Romanian institutions will need to undergo serious reforms.