Romania’s May Presidential Election Has Far-Right Reaching Consequences

Executive Summary:

• The second round of the Romanian presidential election on May 18 will be a battle for the country’s pro-Western direction.
• Romania’s constitutional court annulled the November 2024 election and banned ultranationalist Călin Georgescu from running in May after indications of illegal foreign interference and campaign financing violations.
• His replacement, George Simion, won plurality in the first round on May 4. A potential win of a president skeptical of NATO and the European Union could isolate Romania and have far-reaching implications for European and Black Sea security.

Romania has been dealing with the fallout from its November 24, 2024 presidential election and its subsequent annulment by the Constitutional Court, which also barred far-right candidate Călin Georgescu from running in the May re-run (Euronews, April 4). The court decision may have inadvertently contributed to the rise of Georgescu’s successor, far-right populist George Simion, among Romanian voters frustrated with decades of inadequate government policies. He won 41 percent of the ballots on May 4, double that of independent Bucharest mayor Nicușor Dan, who gained 21 percent. The governing coalition candidate, Crin Antonescu, trailed behind with 20 percent (Politico.eu, May 4). The next day, Romanian Prime Minister Marcel Ciolacu resigned, citing the defeat of his party’s contender (Romania-insider.com, May 5). Simion has a good chance to win the presidency if Dan and Antonescu fail to unite their supporters and mobilize both the domestic and diaspora vote.

The rise of far-right Euro-skeptic politicians is unusual for the firmly pro-Western and historically anti-Russian Romanian public. Last November, Călin Georgescu, a previously obscure ultranationalist candidate who espoused pro-Russian views throughout his presidential campaign, won a plurality of votes in the first round (Radio România, November 25, 2024). Signs that Georgescu’s profile was rising occurred just two weeks before election day, when a Romanian news source reported an upswing in social media activity supporting his campaign (Gandul.ro, November 12, 2024). During the week of November 10–24, 2024, the campaign’s hashtag #calingeorgescu garnered 73.2 million views (Romania-Insider.com, February 5). Ultimately, Georgescu’s TikTok account received 3.7 million likes, 274,000 followers, and nearly 200 million views before the poll (Law & Liberty, January 22; TikTok/@ calin.georgescu.real, accessed May 7).

Romanian law forbids campaign ads starting 48 hours before polling stations open until they close. TikTok’s terms of service bar paid political advertisements, but the platform’s ability to enforce this policy has proven limited (Euronews, November 27, 2024; TikTok Business Help Center; VotCorect.ro accessed May 2). When the Romanian Permanent Electoral Authority (AEP) approached TikTok, the company claimed it removed the offending content (Euronews, December 6, 2024). Georgescu’s campaign ads, however, continued to appear through election day (Vot Corect Coalition, December 1, 2024; Law & Liberty, January 22).

The Georgescu campaign declared zero expenditures to the AEP, despite the proliferation of pro-Georgescu content on social media platforms, including Facebook, Telegram, TikTok, and YouTube (Vot Corect Coalition, December 1, 2024). Maintaining social media activity at the scale needed for a presidential campaign is costly, but the source of the Georgescu campaign’s funding is unclear (Gandul.ro, November 12, 2024). By comparison, for the May campaign, George Simion of the Alliance for Uniting Romanians (AUR) spent $6 million, and the independent candidate Nicușor Dan spent $4 million. Government-supported Crin Antonescu spent nearly $18 million on his campaign (AEP, accessed May 6).

The level and nature of the pro-Georgescu social media campaign indicate a well-coordinated effort. In early February, the French government organization, VIGINUM, released a study describing how the TikTok algorithm was manipulated in Georgescu’s favor. VIGINUM refers to the effort to promote Georgescu content and evade detection as “a sophisticated astroturfing campaign.” (Secrétariat général de la Défense et de la Sécurité nationale, February 2; HotNews.ro, February 5). Astroturfing is a coordinated mass marketing or public relations campaign deceptively portrayed as unsolicited comments from the public.

While attribution has not been confirmed, some analysts point to Russia and Iran. Posts on Telegram in support of Georgescu featured many of the same attributes and language used by pro-Russian content in the lead-up to Moldova’s November 2024 presidential ballot (see EDM, November 6, 2024; NATO Review, February 7). Using artificial intelligence-based threat detection software, analysts from the UK-based Foreign Policy Centre identified 614 primarily Russian-affiliated networks, such as websites and social media accounts, designed to amplify Georgescu’s candidacy. A Telegram channel affiliated with the Iranian state media, Press TV, was observed posting pro-Georgescu content between November 25 through December 4, 2024 (Foreign Policy Centre, December 2024).

On December 4, 2024, over a week after the ballot and with the runoff just four days away, Romanian intelligence declassified reports of massive cyber interference by foreign state and non-state actors (EuroNews, December 4, 2024). But Romanian institutions created to oversee the election process, including the Council of National Defense, comprised of the president, prime minister, and key civilian and military leaders, were unable to respond quickly and decisively (Vot Corect Coalition, December 1, 2024; Consiliului Suprem de Apărare a Ţării, accessed May 2). Faced with a growing crisis, the Constitutional Court stepped in on December 6, 2024, voiding the election results and scheduling a re-run for May of this year (Constitutional Court of Romania, December 6).

Simion’s dramatic rise in the polls and success in the rural areas, where AUR’s support base is located, is attributed to anger over the cancellation of last year’s presidential contest and Georgescu’s removal from the May ballot (Adevarul.ro; AP, April 30). The two men share many ideological viewpoints, and Simion stated that, if elected, he will make Georgescu his prime minister (Romania-Insider.com, May 7).

The Romanian electorate’s shift toward nationalist candidates is not aligned with anti-Western attitudes. Recent polling data indicates that almost 90 percent of Romanians believe closer relations with the primary Western political entities—the European Union, United States, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)—are in the national interest (Agepress.ro, April 10). Such a dichotomy could be explained by the voters’ wish to punish the ruling class for their corruption and inability to effectively negotiate on behalf of Romanian interests in EU institutions (Agepress.ro, April 10). The result is drifting toward politicians with ambivalent or hostile views toward the West, leading to Romania entering a period of domestic tensions with broader geopolitical implications.

Domestic ideological divide and frustration could be further exploited by the Kremlin, causing a deeper and potentially destabilizing schism (HotNews.ro, May 7). Moreover, George Simion has made clear his opposition to supporting Ukraine and shares Georgescu’s positions of ambivalence or hostility to NATO and the European Union. If elected, Simion could push Bucharest into more amenable relations with the Kremlin at the expense of its traditional Western trajectory (Institute for the Study of War, May 5).

Romania has entered a period of political crisis that is likely to fester, eroding confidence in the electoral process and heightening domestic tensions in an already destabilized region (Fondation Robert Schuman, April 15). Threats to regional security, notably from Russia, could persist for years to come. A weakened and isolated Romania, exhibiting warm relations with the Kremlin, could undermine European and Black Sea security and undercut U.S. security and economic interests in the region (Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, September 30, 2024).