Russia Responds to Kursk Incursion With Nuclear Exercise and Strategic Maneuvers in Belarus (Part 2)

(Part One)

Executive Summary:

• The Ministries of Defense of Belarus and Russia approved the Zapad–2025 Joint Strategic Exercise (JSE), scheduled for 2025, which will focus on both conventional and nuclear components.
• Preparations for the Zapad-2025 JSE are designed to create a cover for the concentration of Russian troops on Belarusian territory for a new attack on Ukraine that might happen after snap presidential elections in Belarus.
• Belarusian and Russian officials remain ambiguous about the specific dates, but deployment area reconnaissance for Russian troops indicates that their mass arrival in Belarus is scheduled for the end of this year or the beginning of next year.

On October 23, under the chairmanship of the Belarusian Minister of Defense, Lieutenant General Viktar Khrenin, a meeting of the joint Board of the Ministries of Defense of Belarus and Russia was held in Minsk. Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov arrived in Minsk to participate in the event. Parties discussed important issues of a joint defense policy and the expansion of military cooperation for 2025–2027 to ensure the security of the Union State of Belarus and Russia. A primary outcome of this meeting was the approval of the design for the upcoming Zapad-2025 Joint Strategic Exercise (JSE), set to occur next year. Alongside this decision, other critical topics were discussed, including strengthening the Regional Troops Grouping (RTG), exchanging insights gained from Russia’s ongoing war against Ukraine, and aligning nuclear deterrence strategies to address new geopolitical realities, including the possibility of using nuclear weapons in response to aggression against Belarus. The Belarusian and Russian Defense Ministries also considered drafting a Treaty on Security Guarantees and a comprehensive Security Concept for the Union State, signaling a deepening of their bilateral defense framework (Ministry of Defense of Belarus, October 23).

During the discussions, Khrenin highlighted the global East-West confrontation as a justification for the Zapad-2025 JSE, framing it as a strategic deterrent. Belousov pointed to what he described as “explicit pressure” from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the West and their hostile actions near the Union State’s borders as compelling reasons for strengthening the joint defense area (Ministry of Defense of Russia, October 23).

From Moscow’s perspective, several factors underscore the necessity of the Zapad-2025 JSE. This year, NATO conducted large-scale exercises reminiscent of Cold War-era drills, reportedly simulating scenarios involving a comprehensive conflict with Russia and its allies. Moscow views the expansion of NATO’s coalition forces and an increase in their training and intelligence operations as an escalation. Additionally, the growing involvement of Western countries in the Ukraine conflict, framed as causing substantial harm to Russia, raises concerns in Moscow about potential global repercussions and the risk of direct confrontation between nuclear powers.

Consequently, the Russian Federation is updating its state policy on nuclear deterrence to reflect these perceived threats, a policy shift that includes the option to deploy nuclear weapons if Belarus is threatened by aggression as part of the Union State arrangement (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia, October 23; see EDM, October 7). This suggests that Zapad-2025 JSE will also include and focus on a nuclear component (see EDM, November 7). Additionally, Minsk and Moscow believe that the presence of Russian tactical nuclear weapons and demonstration of the countries’ willingness to use them will deter Ukraine and NATO from any type of retaliation on Belarusian territory, even if a new offensive against Ukraine comes from the north (see EDM, March 13, April 30).

During the board meeting, the specific date of the Zapad-2025 JSE was not publicly disclosed. Even so, historical patterns suggest that Zapad-2025’s active phase will occur in September 2025. Belarusian Air Force and Air Defense Forces commander Andrei Lukyanovich indirectly confirmed this timeframe, noting a forthcoming joint exercise with Russia scheduled for September on Belarusian soil (CTV.by, October 27). He did not, however, explicitly label this maneuver as being part of the Zapad series, hinting that it could instead focus on the Unified Regional Air Defense System (URADS)—another joint military project involving the Russian Aerospace Forces and Belarusian Air Force and Air Defense Forces.

Usually, the RTG and URADS are trained during Zapad (“West”) joint strategic exercises as well as during Schit Soyuza (“Union Shield”) joint operational exercises (see Jamestown, March 2, 2020). The Zapad exercise takes place every four years (last held in 2009, 2013, 2017, and 2021) on Belarusian territory and partially in Russia, while Schit Soyuza (“Union Shield”) drills, carried out on Russian territory, are held every two years following a Zapad exercise (2011, 2015, and 2019; in 2023, it was canceled). The active phase of such maneuvers is traditionally held in September, preceded by the transfer of Russian troops to Belarus or Belarusian troops to Russia in July–August.

Recent history has shown flexibility in this scheduling. On the eve of the large-scale invasion of Ukraine by the Russian Armed Forces on February 24, 2022, Minsk and Moscow also announced the holding of joint strategic exercise Soyuznaya Reshimost-2022 (“Allied Resolve-2022”). Formally, this was to train and deploy a new component of the RTG in Belarus, the so-called RTG Response Forces. The active phase of drills fell on February 10–20, while logistical preparations started in January (Altyn73.livejournal.com, January 22, 30, 2022; TASS, February 20, 2022). The Kremlin used these maneuvers, as well as a subsequent surprise inspection of the RTG, as a cover for concentrating massive strike and invasion forces in Belarus for use in Ukraine.

Later, Russian military command announced plans to hold the Zapad strategic exercise in 2023 instead of 2025, as previously planned (TASS, December 21, 2022). The Russian side, however, skipped it entirely due to a lack of reserves. Neither Belarusian nor Russian defense officials have explicitly stated the month for Zapad-2025 JSE, but logistical preparations have already begun, with railway military echelons reserved from mid-May and reconnaissance efforts in Belarus by a Russian military delegation in early September to identify troop deployment areas (see EDM, November 7).

Speculation abounds that the forthcoming exercises will be the largest in RTG history, incorporating more advanced scenarios that simulate high-tech threats such as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and cyberattacks. One of the exercise’s objectives may be integrating new Russian Armed Forces units into the RTG, scheduled to arrive in Belarus by the end of 2024 (T.me/Hajun_BY, October 17). This means that in terms of quantitative parameters, they might surpass both drills of the Zapad series and the Soyuznaya Reshimost which led to the accumulation of around 40,000–50,000 Russian troops in Belarusian territory.

Coinciding with the defense ministers’ meeting in Minsk, the Belarusian parliament urgently rescheduled the country’s snap presidential election for January 26, 2025, nearly a month earlier than February 23, 2025, when it was initially scheduled (T.me/belpol, August 16). This change likely reflects Alyaksandr Lukashenka’s awareness of the Kremlin’s plans for a sharp, deliberate escalation of the conflict with Ukraine, to occur at the end of January to the beginning of February next year. By shifting the election, Lukashenka aims to conduct it under stable conditions, avoiding the potential chaos that could accompany a regional escalation in hostilities.

This means the joint strategic maneuvers or subsequent surprise inspection of the RTG Response Forces may take place in accordance with the Soyuznaya Reshimost schedule in January–February 2025. This offers another cover for the concentration of a strike group of forces prepared for a new invasion of Ukraine from Belarusian territory. Taking into account the plans of the Russian military command to increase the number of the Russian Armed Forces by another 170,000 servicemen by the end of the year and a new expansion of the Russian army by 180,000 personnel, this time, there should be no problems for the Kremlin with accumulating reserves for deployment in Belarus (TSN.ua, July 27; RBC Ukraine, September 16). Moreover, a joint offensive of Belarusian and Russian armies as part of the Regional Troops Grouping is not ruled out in this case, considering a deepening bilateral defense security framework (Belarusinfocus.info, August 11, 25, September 15).