Russia Strengthens Ties With Iran to Solidify Position in Middle East

Executive Summary:

• Russia and Iran’s strategic partnership has strengthened steadily since the beginning of Moscow’s war against Ukraine and has progressed as tensions in the Middle East are rising, largely due to the war in Gaza.
• The Kremlin’s growing reliance on an uninterrupted flow of Iranian drones and missiles, plus the reorientation of Russian trade to the south and east to combat Western sanctions, appear to be the driving actors of this transformation.
• Russia’s gyrations on Middle East policy reveal the flaws of its strategy, which has regressed into the old Soviet position that sought to maintain and incite “managed conflict” in the Middle East.

On September 15, Russian Presidential Press Secretary Dmitry Peskov announced that Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian would attend the BRICS (a loose political-economic grouping originally consisting of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) summit in Kazan, Tatarstan, on October 22–24. Additionally, Pezeshkian plans to meet with Russian President Vladimir Putin to discuss strengthening political, economic, and military cooperation between Moscow and Tehran (TASS, September 15). The strategic partnership between Iran and Russia has solidified since the beginning of Moscow’s war against Ukraine and has significantly progressed as tensions in the Middle East are rising, largely due to the war in Gaza. The partnership itself, however, comes at a high price for Russia. The Kremlin’s previous Middle Eastern strategy aimed to position Russia as a valuable interlocutor with every regional government while not taking sides in their myriad conflicts. Today, that tactic is no longer feasible. Moscow’s need for an uninterrupted flow of Iranian drones and missiles, plus the reorientation of Russian trade to the south and east to combat Western sanctions, appear to be the driving actors of this transformation (see EDM, March 6, July 29, September 5, 17).

Russian-Iranian cooperation in the Middle East has been steadily growing. In Syria, reports show that Iran is increasingly using Russian facilities to build a naval base, including the use of the Russian air base in Khmeimim as a terminus for deliveries there. Tehran’s use of Russian facilities is meant to contribute to the Iranian domination of Syria with Moscow’s help (MEMRI, August 12). Similarly, in Iraq, the Kremlin-linked Rybar Telegram project is holding meetings with Iranian officials, supporting their efforts to gain greater control over Iran’s media and information space (T.me/rybar, August 28). Likewise, Russian state-owned news agency TASS is opening an office in Tehran, displaying the two sides’ increasing media cooperation (TASS, August 28).

This cooperation goes beyond conventional state ties. For example, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov criticized Israel for provoking Iran, suggesting that Hamas and Hezbollah cannot be defeated—a curious reversal of Russian anti-terrorist policy when its people or interests are attacked (Russian Foreign Affairs Ministry, July 18; Jerusalem Post, September 1). Other examples of Russian cooperation with Iranian proxies include:

• In November 2023, US intelligence warned that the Wagner Group (now subordinated to the Russian Defense Ministry, see EDM, March 3) is supplying weapons to Hezbollah (Topwar.ru, November 3).
•  In October 2023, Ukrainian military intelligence reported that Russia was providing Hamas with Western-supplied weapons captured in Ukraine (The Kyiv Independent, October 10, 2023).
• Russia is also apparently advising and has sought to transfer weapons to the Houthis in Yemen, who are attacking both Israel and global shipping in the Red Sea (Middle East Eye, August 2; see EDM, August 8). At the same time as it was advising the Houthis and contemplating sending them weapons behind the scenes, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs was publicly calling for a rapid de-escalation of the conflict in Yemen and the Red Sea (TASS, July 27).

The Kremlin has been active in communicating its support to the recently elected Iranian government. In July, following the presidential runoff in Iran, Putin congratulated Pezeshkian for his victory and stated, “I hope that your tenure as president will contribute to a reinforcement of constructive bilateral cooperation between our friendly peoples” (The Moscow Times, July 6). Additionally, Putin sent Russian Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu to Iran in August for talks to highlight Moscow’s support. During the visit, Pezeshkian described Russia as a “valued strategic ally” (The Moscow Times, August 5).

Russia’s gyrations on Middle East policy reveal the flaws of its previous strategy, which have now been rendered untenable. In effect, Moscow’s policies have regressed into the old Soviet position that sought to maintain and incite what used to be called “managed conflict” in the Middle East. The Kremlin has now found that as in Goethe’s poem, the sorcerer cannot control the apprentice, and it is now at the mercy of regional actors who have their own ideas about how to proceed. Many of those ideas do not coincide with Russia’s best interests. However, in many cases, especially now due to the war in Ukraine, Moscow has no choice but to follow these countries’ lead, as is now the case with Iran, while simultaneously trying to restrain them.

Russia’s weakening position is also significant because crises in the Middle East invariably bring the United States and its military forces into full display. Moscow’s heightened dependence on Iran, which is potentially about to become a nuclear power, cannot augur well for the efficacy of Russian policy (Iran International, September 15). Tehran expects substantial military support from Russia in return for its provision of drones and the building of a drone factory in Yelabuga, Tatarstan, in Russia (see EDM. March 6, 2023, March 4). Some outlets report that Russia is transferring short-range Iskander missiles and the Murmansk-BN electronic warfare system to Iran (Kyiv Post, August 6). Since Shoigu promised full support during his visit, it is hardly surprising that other reports claim that Russia is transferring air defenses, radar, and surveillance drones to Iran, along with earlier reports concerning Su-35 and Yak-130 aircraft and the Mi-28 helicopter (The Moscow Times, August 5, 6; Kyiv Post, August 6). 

Moscow’s increased deliveries to Tehran do seem to have brought additional benefits for the Russian war machine. Last week, Iranian member of parliament Ahmad Bakhshayesh Ardestani stated, “We have to barter for our needs. … Part of the barter involves sending missiles, and another part involves sending military drones to Russia” (Iran International, September 8). Additionally, US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken confirmed that Iran has sent ballistic missiles to Russia and that additional sanctions will be placed on Tehran as a result (Meduza, September 10). As the Kremlin continues to wage its “long war” against Ukraine, Moscow and Tehran are likely to expand their exchange of military goods, even if that means further compromising Russia’s ability to influence other regional players in the Middle East.