Russia Tests NATO’s Eastern Defenses
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Executive Summary:
- In September, a series of Russian drone and military incursions into North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) airspace over Poland and Estonia triggered emergency consultations under Article 4 and revived debate on escalation of deterrence.
- The Russia–Belarus Zapad-2025 exercise revealed a shift toward precision-strike, lower-footprint operations, combined air defense, and electronic warfare rather than mass force application.
- Moscow will continue to exploit alliance cracks through hybrid warfare and ambiguity to destabilize Europe without crossing any red lines to avoid conventional military escalation.
In September, countries in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) reported several incidents involving airspace violations. On September 10, 19 drones crossed into Polish territory, prompting Warsaw to call for Article 4 consultations (Polskieradio, September 10; see EDM, September 15). In a separate episode on September 19, three Russian MiG-31 jets briefly entered Estonian airspace before being intercepted by NATO air policing units (Rus.Postimees, September 19). NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte described these developments as concerning and emphasized that the Alliance remains attentive to safeguarding its members’ security (NATO, September 23).
These incidents reflect an increasingly complex security environment along NATO’s eastern flank. The combination of drone activity and jet overflights highlights the challenges of managing airspace security in an era of hybrid threats (Meduza, September 20). At the same time, the use of unmarked drones, short-duration incursions, and deactivated transponders complicates attribution and leaves room for differing interpretations of intent (24tv.ua, September 12). NATO leaders emphasize the importance of maintaining readiness and alliance unity in the face of threats from Russia, while Moscow views such maneuvers as responses to what it perceives as increasing Western military pressure (NATO, September 23; RBC, September 27). In this delicate environment, transparency, communication, and crisis-management mechanisms are likely to play a decisive role in preventing unintended confrontation (Lenta.ru, September 28).
The Zapad-2025 exercise, which took place in Belarus from September 12 to 16, has been noted for what it represents in terms of Russia’s evolving military posture (see EDM, September 15; President of Russia, September 16). The exercise was nominally characterized by some 13,000 troops, a number aligned with reporting requirements under the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Vienna Document (Belta, February 20). Zapad- 2025, similar to previous iterations, may have represented an even larger body of activity outside the declared scope (see EDM, September 15).
Contrary to past exercises oriented toward mass mobilization, this year’s Zapad exercise appeared to prioritize the deployment of more discriminate, high-leverage capabilities. These included integrated air and missile defense systems, electronic warfare assets, precision strike platforms, and enhanced command-and-control measures (TASS, September 18). Some in Belarus and Russia view the priority on these systems as a response to battlefield attrition lessons from Ukraine, as well as to Moscow’s adaptation to resourcing constraints (News.by, September 14)
The geography in the exercises, conducted deep within Belarus, in the context of smaller Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) exercises, suggests attempts to develop a tiered area of operations along the eastern boundary of NATO (Kommersant, September 17). This would presumably provide Russia with greater room to project power toward the Baltic states or Poland if tensions are raised (see EDM, June 11).
Russian officials presented the exercises as routine and defensive in nature, designed to enhance coordination with Belarus and prepare for contingencies under the CSTO umbrella (President of Russia, September 16). From this perspective, Zapad is part of Moscow’s overall strategy to reassure domestic constituencies and regional allies about its military staying power. Others argue that the exercise serves as a testing ground for new operational ideas, particularly hybrid warfare, electronic predominance, and the coordination of distant strikes. Such experimentation does not necessarily imply an instant escalation, but rather indicates that Russia is continuing to formulate its doctrine for potential long-term competition with NATO (Belarusian Investigative Center, May 30).
More generally, Zapad-2025 illustrates the dual nature of Russian maneuvers. Externally, they are declared defensive in nature, but internally, they are doctrinally exploratory. The extent to which the changes are appreciated will depend on the political frame of analysis through which they are viewed, as stabilizing maneuvers within Russia’s declared defense zone, or as part of a broader effort to maintain leverage against NATO over an extended period of strategic tension (Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, September 18).
Outside of the brief military actions, the never-ending crisis cycle between Russia and NATO places perception management at the forefront (Mir24.tv, September 15). For Russia, limited incursions and drills, such as Zapad-2025, are not only military exercises but also a form of political communication with both domestic and foreign audiences. By demonstrating preparedness without directly crossing red lines, Russia maintains leverage without triggering escalatory measures. For NATO, the test is less about equalizing capabilities than about maintaining political unity among its 32 members, despite each having differing priorities and resource bases (see EDM, June 3, June 4, September 16, October 5). Burden-sharing, defense budgets, and policy toward Ukraine are potential fault lines that Moscow can exploit (see EDM, July 22). Confrontation is therefore as much about narrative control and alliance unity as it is about military deployments. Whether this phase coalesces into a prolonged standoff or stabilizes into managed competition will depend on how each one of them calculates deterrence and restrains itself (Pronedra.ru, September 15).
In response to these operations, NATO launched Operation Eastern Sentry on September 12, enhancing air and sea deterrence in its eastern direction with additional aircraft, frigates, and missile defense capabilities (NATO, September 12; see EDM, September 15, 17). During its June 2025 Hague Summit, NATO pledged to increase defense expenditure to 5 percent of GDP by 2035—3.5 percent for central military capabilities and 1.5 percent for infrastructure (NATO, June 15). That is from reactive deterrence to proactive resilience. Not all members of NATO have reached the former 2 percent threshold, casting doubt on whether the 5 percent mark can be achieved (Atlantic Council NATO Defense Spending Tracker, September 2025).
The Russia–NATO relationship now unfolds on multiple levels. Moscow employs graduated pressure and hybrid tactics to test boundaries, and NATO navigates the need for deterrence credibility against the risk of over-escalation. The standoff is not a brief fire but an occurrence within a broader cycle of competition, with each learning to react to the other (RG.ru, August 28).
The extent of the Alliance’s commitment to remaining united and maintaining its credibility will determine the direction of this confrontation. If NATO holds firm, it may gain a new purpose from today’s tensions. If divisions intensify, Moscow may achieve a strategic advantage without actual escalation (Zavtra.ru, September 23).
