Russia Updates Nuclear Doctrine, Lowering Threshold for Use of Nuclear Weapons (Part Two)
Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 21 Issue: 173
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Executive Summary:
- The Kremlin formally approved a new nuclear doctrine on November 19, following the West’s authorization for Ukraine to utilize its deep strike capabilities on Russian territory.
- The revised document is directed at Western powers and aims to address the potential escalation of military cooperation with Kyiv. It considers scenarios involving the use of long-range weapons against Russia and the possible deployment of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) troops to Ukraine.
- The Kremlin deliberately lowered the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons, reflecting Russia’s intimidation strategy to spread fear of nuclear escalation among Ukraine’s Western partners and transition to offensive nuclear deterrence.
On November 19, Russian President Vladimir Putin approved an updated version of the Basic Principles of State Policy of the Russian Federation on Nuclear Deterrence, or the new nuclear doctrine (Kremlin.ru, November 19). This update follows the United States, France, and the United Kingdom’s decision to allow Ukraine to use long-range weapons against Russia and is based on changes to the doctrine announced in September (see EDM, October 2, November 21). The new doctrine expands the list of actors, dangers, and threats that require nuclear deterrence and clarify the conditions under which Russia might use nuclear weapons.
Officially, the Kremlin proclaims the defensive nature of the new nuclear doctrine, aimed at deterring a potential adversary from aggression against Russia and its allies, and in the event of a military conflict, preventing escalation and the conflict’s cessation on terms acceptable to Russia. The list of potential adversaries now includes individual states and military coalitions (blocs or alliances) with nuclear capabilities or substantial conventional military power. Additionally, any state offering its territory or resources for aggression against Russia is considered an adversary. The Kremlin now views any aggressive action by a member state of a bloc or coalition, even if non-nuclear, as a joint attack. The same is true in the case of aggression against Russia and/or its allies by any non-nuclear state with the participation or support of a nuclear state. The document does not contain the list of specific blocs or countries, but it is clear that it refers to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and Ukraine.
Unlike the 2020 doctrine, which used nuclear weapons “exclusively” for deterrence, this term has been removed from the new document. These provisions clearly reflect the Kremlin’s perception of Western involvement in its war against Ukraine and aims to contain its further expansion, including more profound forms of military assistance, such as potential troop deployment and approval of Kyiv’s requests for longer and deeper strike capabilities. It has failed to contain the latter, however, as the Biden administration recently allowed Ukraine to use its Army Tactical Missile Systems (ATACMS) to strike further into Russia.
The updated doctrine lists ten military dangers requiring nuclear deterrence, especially in case of escalation to threats, six of which migrated from the previous 2020 version.
| Table 1. The List of Military Dangers for Russia Requiring Nuclear Deterrence | |
| In the 2020 nuclear doctrine (Kremlin.ru, June 2, 2020) | New dangers in the 2024 nuclear doctrine (Kremlin.ru, November 19) |
| The enemy’s possession of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, threatening Russia and its allies; | The emergence and expansion of military coalitions (blocs) and the expansion of their infrastructure to the borders of Russia; |
| The enemy’s possession of missile defense systems and means, intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, high-precision non-nuclear and hypersonic weapons, attack drones, and directed energy weapons that can be used against Russia; | Actions to isolate part of the territory of Russia and block transport communications; |
| Build-up of general-purpose conventional forces with delivery vehicles and infrastructure for the use of nuclear weapons in the territories and sea areas adjacent to Russia and its allies; | Destruction of environmentally hazardous facilities, which can cause environmental, man-made, and social disasters; |
| Deployment of missile defense, anti-satellite warfare, and strike systems in space; | Planning and conducting major military exercises near the borders of Russia. |
| Deployment of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery on the territories of non-nuclear states; | |
| Uncontrolled proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, their means of delivery, technologies, and equipment for their manufacture. | |
The new nuclear doctrine asserts that nuclear deterrence guarantees a potential adversary understands retaliation is certain if they attack Russia and/or its allies. In particular, the clarified and expanded conditions for the use of nuclear weapons include five scenarios:
| Table 2. Conditions for the Transition to the Use of Nuclear Weapons by Russia | |
| Scenarios | Comments |
| Receipt of reliable information about the launch of ballistic missiles attacking the territory of Russia and/or its allies; | Carried over from the previous 2020 doctrine. |
| Enemy use of nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction on Russian territory or that of its allies, including Russian military formations and facilities outside its territory; | Supplemented by Russian military formations and facilities outside its territory. |
| Damage on key state or military facilities of Russia, which could disrupt retaliatory nuclear actions; | Carried over from the previous 2020 doctrine. |
| Armed aggression against Russia or Belarus with conventional weapons, critically threatening their sovereignty and/or territorial integrity; | Supplemented by Belarus. |
| Reliable information on the massive launch and Russian border crossing of aerospace attack weapons such as strategic aircraft, cruise missiles, and hypersonic vehicles; | A new condition added to the doctrine. |
The document emphasizes principles of nuclear deterrence, introducing new elements such as uncertainty about the time, place, and scale of Russia’s nuclear use and centralized control of nuclear weapons, including those deployed outside Russia, for example, tactical nuclear weapons (TNW) in Belarus (Pravo.gov.ru, November 19). Dmitry Peskov, Putin’s presidential press secretary, stated that the doctrine needed updating due to current geopolitical conditions, allowing a nuclear response if Ukraine uses Western non-nuclear long-range missiles against Russia. This confirms the Kremlin’s consideration of first-use nuclear options against Ukraine and its Western allies (TASS, November 19).
Evgeny Buzhinsky, chairman of the Russian Center for Policy Research Center Executive Board and a lieutenant general in reserve of the Russian Armed Forces, views the publication of this document as part of the broader Russia-West confrontation. He notes that even though the threshold for nuclear weapon use has lowered doctrinally, the West remains skeptical about Russia’s willingness to use them in response to minor actions. Buzhinsky suggests that a more effective response to Ukraine’s use of ATACMS would be for Russia to supply anti-ship systems such as Bastion or Bal to the Yemeni Houthis, who oppose the United States (see EDM, August, August 8; Kommersant, November 19).
Other experts Dmitry Suslov and Dmitry Trenin emphasize that Russia’s goal is to force Western politicians to negotiate through fear of nuclear conflict, not trigger a nuclear war, a concept defined as offensive deterrence (Profile.ru, May 29; Interfax, June 2; Russia in Global Affairs, July 1). This strategy involves the threat of the use of nuclear weapons to reinforce offensive military actions, thereby weakening the enemy’s resistance and curtailing external support. This approach focuses not on the state’s survival but rather on safeguarding its external interests (Militarynews.ru, June 1).
Igor Korotchenko, editor-in-chief of National Defense magazine, suggests a demonstrative nuclear strike on the water surface in the North Sea 100–150 kilometers (62–93 miles) from the coast of France and the United Kingdom to intimidate the West without affecting territory or population (Business-gazeta.ru, November 18). Likewise, Russian Admiral Alexander Moiseev suggests that general-purpose naval forces equipped with TNWs can target military facilities at sea, such as aircraft carrier groups, minimizing civilian casualties and environmental damage. He believes selective TNW use at sea could prevent a large-scale conflict from escalating to full-scale nuclear war and deescalate military hostilities on Russia’s terms.
Moiseev also mentions potential changes to other Russian nuclear doctrinal documents, considering scenarios such as regional and large-scale wars against Russia and its allies and strikes with ultra-low-yield nuclear warheads. He envisions the return of TNWs on surface ships, submarines, and naval aircraft flying in strategically important areas of the World Ocean (Voennaya Mysl, September 2024, p. 8–21). Thus, the Russian Military once again signals doctrinal updates as related to the potential use of a tactical nuclear arsenal. Even though the new nuclear doctrine contains hints about their use when referring to Belarus, the specifics remain private and classified.
