Russian Attacks on Ukrainian Grain Shipments in Black Sea Hold Broad Implications Amid War

Executive Summary:

• On September 12, a Russian Kh-22 cruise missile hit the unarmed civilian bulk carrier Aya bringing grain to Egypt, another example of a Russian attack where civilian vessels suffered collateral damage.
• The consequences of Russian missiles damaging civilian vessels, especially vessels exporting grain from Ukraine, are significantly broader than just on the war in Ukraine, including how it affects the grain market and prices.
• The only pragmatic option for truly ensuring freedom of navigation in the Black Sea as well as protecting civil infrastructure and citizens is to defeat Russia’s capability to conduct air strikes at their source.

On the night of September 12, the unarmed civilian bulk carrier Aya, registered to Saint Kitts and Nevis and carrying Ukrainian grain to Egypt, was attacked by a Russian Kh-22 cruise missile launched from a Tu-22M3 bomber (24tv.ua, September 12; Ukrainian Shipping Magazine, September 13). “This Russian attack is a brazen assault on freedom of navigation and global food security, in violation of UN General Assembly Resolution A.1183,” Andrii Sybiha, Ukraine’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, stressed (UNN.ua, September 12). As the Kremlin’s war against Ukraine persists and Russia increasingly targets Ukrainian infrastructure, including civilian cargo vessels, security in the Black Sea will continue to be a critical facet of both Kyiv and Moscow’s strategy.  

The missile hit the vessel south of Snake Island, about 55 kilometers (34 miles) from the Romanian coast (Ukrainska Pravda, September 12). Snake Island, located 35 kilometers (21 miles) from the Ukrainian coast, is one of the most important strategic locations in Ukraine’s littoral waters. Russia captured the island at the beginning of their large-scale military aggression against Ukraine, but Ukraine recaptured it on June 30, 2022. Russian troops tried to set up a “cover” military complex on the island for their warships that operated in this core area, which became vulnerable after the sinking of the Moskva cruiser. The Russians, however, have repeatedly attacked Snake Island through strategic and tactical aviation after Ukraine took it back (UNIAN.ua, September 21). This type of attack was seen most recently on September 12, when the Aya bulk carrier suffered collateral damage as part of a strike on the island (Intent.press, September 12).

The Kh-22 supersonic cruise missile was created in the late 1960s to destroy radar-contrasting aircraft carriers and other large ships and area targets (aircraft carrier strike groups) using a high-explosive cumulative or nuclear warhead, respectively (24tv.ua, August 26; Fakty.com.ua, September 11). The first versions of the missile were built with active radar homing, and a Tu-22M3 weapons operator would have to see the target mark on the aircraft’s onboard radar and wait until the missile’s radar homing head captured the target before firing. Later, the missile was modernized to increase its resilience against enemy electronic countermeasures. Autonomous missile flight was introduced based on the data of the inertial flight counter to the opening point of an onboard radar, operating according to a certain logic of selecting a target and guiding it without an operator (Missilery.info, accessed September 26). This upgrade allows for the capture of the largest near-range radar-contrast target in its onboard radar’s field of view and homing in on said target.

An entire family of former Soviet anti-ship missiles was built with similar target guidance systems, which repeatedly hit third-party ships and vessels, including civilian ones, that found themselves on the missile’s flight path. For example, during a naval exercise on April 24, 2000, a Russian P-35 anti-ship missile with a similar Kh-22 active radar homing system hit the Ukrainian vessel Pavlo Vereshchagin (Gazeta.ua, April 24).  

Following the incident with the Aya carrier, Russian media admitted that one of the missiles was mistakenly guided to the vessel and hit it (Topwar.ru, September 12). The threat level in the Black Sea due to Russian missile attacks, however, is much broader than determining whether the attack on this specific vessel was intentional or the result of a combination of circumstances. At the time of the strike on the Aya, there were other vessels in the area, including large-tonnage tankers, which, if hit and destroyed, would have caused an oil spill and a large-scale environmental disaster (Defence-ua.com, September 12). The maximum deviation of the Kh-22 missile from the target recorded during the ongoing war is three kilometers (1.86 miles), increasing the probability of hitting civilian vessels when using such missiles in the Black Sea (Tverezo.info, January 1).

In the face of the unpredictability of where these missiles hit and the proximity to North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) waters in the Black Sea, the Kremlin will undoubtedly stop using Kh-22 and other similar missiles against Ukrainian maritime infrastructure. During a missile attack on September 20 on Odesa port infrastructure, a civilian vessel flying the flag of Antigua was damaged by missile debris (Suspilne.media, September 20, Blackseanews.net, September 21). Ironically, before this, Moscow called on other countries to respect freedom of navigation—in this case referring to both Houthi attacks in Yemen’s territorial waters and “international players’” acknowledgement of Yemen’s sovereignty. Russian Representative to the UN Dmitry Polyansky stated, “Aggressive actions against objects in [Yemeni territory] … not only flagrantly violate international law, including the UN Charter, but also contribute to the spiral of escalation with the most unpredictable consequences.” These statements, made against the backdrop of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, particularly in the Black Sea, make the Kremlin’s “fights against attempts to introduce national rules that circumvent generally recognized norms that guarantee freedom of navigation” paradoxical (Mid.ru, July 19, 2005; TASS, August 15).

The consequences of Russian missiles damaging civilian vessels, especially vessels exporting grain from Ukraine, are significantly broader than just on the war in Ukraine. Commodity markets are always affected by maritime threats, and after the missile attack on the Aya vessel, wheat prices reached a two-month high (Delo.ua, September 12). Additionally, this incident took place in the open sea, not along the Ukrainian grain corridor. This highlights that shipowners should give preference to the safety of passage within the grain corridor and not leave the recommended path to reduce transit time. In practice, routes such as Ukraine’s grain corridor that pass through NATO member state territorial waters remain safe (24tv.ua, September 13).

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy stated, “Despite the war and Russian terror, Ukraine continues to be a donor of global food security to dozens of countries around the world” (T.me/V_Zelenskiy_official, September 18). He emphasizes that in the past year, Ukraine has transported 70 million tons of cargo via the grain corridor to ports in Asia, Europe, Africa, and the Americas (Ukrinform.ua, September 18). Without diminishing the critical importance of air and missile defenses for Ukraine, however, the only pragmatic option for truly ensuring freedom of navigation in the Black Sea as well as protecting civil infrastructure and civilians is to target Russia’s air strike capabilities at their bases. Ukraine urgently needs long-range weaponry—with respective authorization to operate at their full range—to combat this.