Russian Drone Crash Exposes Critical Weakness in Latvian Comprehensive Defense

Executive Summary:

• An armed Russian drone crash incident reveals in Latvia on September 7 the significant shortcomings within the Latvian comprehensive defense system.
• These shortcomings are related to the lack of certain military capabilities within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). They also expose critical gaps in national crisis management, alarm notification, strategic communication, and communication with the general public and municipalities.
• Several measures have already been implemented to strengthen Latvian air defense and border protection, while more general crisis management and strategic communication issues remain.

A Russian drone flew into Latvia’s airspace from Belarus and crashed in Gaigalava parish in Rēzekne district on September 7. After careful investigation, the Latvian Minister of Defense Andris Sprūds admitted that serious issues exist within the national and societal defense system. “We have come to conclusions about our limited capabilities and need to be strengthened faster than planned, as well as the deployment of combat units on the border, which we have already done in some specific sections,” admits Sprūds (LA.lv, October 31). The drone crash highlights significant vulnerabilities in Latvia’s comprehensive defense system, revealing critical gaps in border protection, air surveillance, crisis management, and communication procedures within both national and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) frameworks.

Communication of the incident with the public and heads of Latvian municipalities turned out to be quite controversial within the few hours after this crisis. Both the Minister of Defense and Commander of the Latvian Armed Forces appeared at the press conference only a day after the Russian drone crashed and announced that “everything was under control, the drone was immediately noticed, and it has no ‘hostile targets’ in Latvia” (LSM.lv, September 8). A few weeks following the incident, it came to light that the Military Police were informed about the fallen object by the State police when it received a call from a local resident one morning. Immediately after the incident, the drone’s path was traced as far as possible by reviewing radar records. When the Latvian National Armed Forces (NBS) commander, Lieutenant General Leonīds Kalnins, was asked whose idea it was to hide that the army found out about the downed drone from the police, he answered, “No, we told the truth, and we really monitor the airspace in accordance with the capabilities we have been given, and this is also outlined in our audit here and the report to the Ministry of Defense” (Rezekneszinas.lv, October 15).

Army representatives did not hide the difficulties in tracking drones with existing radars at the first press conference after the incident and following press conferences. In addition, when noticing them, the system shows a point, but whether it is a drone, bird, or a cloud is undetectable unless it is seen visually. Due to a new order to clarify small objects detected by the radar, the allied fighters stationed in the Baltic countries have been identifying these points (LSM.lv, October 13).

Another failure of communication after the drone incident is related to how heads of municipalities in the Eastern regions of Latvia learned about what happened from mass media, not from the Ministry of Defense or other crisis communications channels. The chairman of the Civil Defense Commission of the Rēzekne and the chairman of the Rēzekne district council, Monvīds Švarcs, who lives in Gaigalava parish, learned about the incident on the Delfi.lv news outlet at noon on Sunday, more than 24 hours after the drone crashed. “I had no idea what had happened. The Civil Defense Commission, along with the Ministry of Defense and the armed forces, should revise the causes of the communication failure—something went wrong with the algorithm established by the defense sector, or whether there is a problem with the particular official or several officials who did not follow the existing algorithm, which provided for timely information to the public. Local governments would be ready to get more involved,” stresses Švarcs (LSM.lv, September 10).

The public’s request to openly explain all the circumstances of the Russian Forces’ combat drone falling near Rēzekne is well grounded. After the event, the confusion created a justified storm of indignation, emphasized Latvian president Edgars Rinkēvičs (NRA.lv, September 10). Simultaneously, Rinkēvičs emphasized that the arrival of Russian drones in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) territory should be dealt with collectively (LSM.lv, September 8). Glen Grant, the Defense Expert of the Baltic Security Foundation, interviewed by this author on October 20, stressed that Article IV of NATO provides consultations among the parties if one of the members is threatened, must be invoked the same day of the incident, in this case on September 7.

The incident has undermined public faith in the NBS and also in NATO, stated Jānis Garisons, the former state secretary of the Ministry of Defense. He suggests that rapid reaction units should be formed in Latgale, which would be able to quickly deploy and wait for the drone in a safe area in potential cases. Simultaneously, Garisons believes that in addition to the RBS-70 anti-aircraft weapons, more mobile weapons should also be purchased, such as the shoulder-launched anti-aircraft missiles Stinger or the Polish Pjorn. Also, he believes larger caliber machine guns should be placed on wheeled platforms to quickly reach the required point and wait for the violator (VS.lv, October 7).

After the incident, mobile near-airspace surveillance radars were deployed on the border of Latvia to spot drones. Along with the radars, several battle groups with mobile RBS70 anti-aircraft missiles have also been moved to the border, which can be used to shoot down spotted drones. The decision-making chain has now been both shortened, and new procedures have been made more precise. As a part of the newly established emergency procedure, upon identification of the target, they would jointly create a safe zone where there are no other objects, thus no risk of shooting down anything other than a drone (Rezekneszinas.lv, October 15).

Air defense capabilities will strengthen when the already-ordered missile systems, high-resolution radars, and command and control elements will be delivered to Latvia by 2026. Latvia still has to wait for the equipment to be produced, however, as the demand for armaments is very high. The Baltic States, taking into account that they are located on the Eastern flank of NATO, are trying to emphasize the need to speed up their supply (LSM.lv, October 13). As the drone incident has showcased, building capable defense and crisis response systems against possible acts of military aggression is a more complex issue, which will require further testing and adjustments of the algorithms, aligning the national defense system with the public and especially, communities over the most exposed municipalities in Latvia’s Eastern regions.